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This thesis focuses on the use of maternal health services and child health in Tanzania. The 
main focus is on how these issues relate to social networks and bargaining power within 
couples. These issues are interrelated and are discussed in three essays. The first essay 
investigates the impact of information externalities in social networks on the use of antenatal 
services. Particular emphasis is placed on the extent to which the probability of early antenatal 
check-up and antenatal completion are affected by social networks. Adopting an econometric 
technique that minimises the problem of omitted variable bias, the analysis suggests that these 
network effects increase the probability of antenatal care completion by an additional 6 to 35 
percent, and may be as high as 59 percent. The study further finds that without adequate control 
of omitted variables, the network impact would be understated. It is also evident that failure to 
control for individual and household observable characteristics overstates the impact of 
networks. Results from the two approaches used in this study confirm that irrespective of the 
definition of social network, having a high quality contacts increase the probability of utilis ing 
maternal health services. 
The second essay examines the effect of bargaining power within couples on the probability of 
delivering in a health facility (public and private), as opposed to a home birth. It further 
investigates the effect of bargaining on the probability of health care provider choice at 
childbirth using a multinomial nested logit. Evidence suggests that cooperation within couples 
in decision-making, female discretion over household resources, and freedom from domestic 
violence increases the probability of childbirth in a facility, as opposed to home. The study 
finds that a woman’s influence on service use varies if she is better educated than her partner. 
In addition, while cooperation in household decision and the incidence of domestic violence 
significantly affect private facility use, female discretion over household resources has a strong 
effect on public facility choice. Finally, antenatal completion, health knowledge, and maternal 
specific factors increase the probability of delivering in a public and private facility.  
The third essay empirically explores the contribution of intra-household bargaining, to the 
rural-urban gap in child nutrition. The study analyses the effect of parental bargaining 
indicators (cooperation in household decisions, the incidence domestic violence and discretion 
over household resources) on the probability of child stunting in both rural and urban areas. 




household bargaining increase the rural-urban gap in child health. It further contributes to the 
literature by correcting for possible sample selection bias. The results suggest that the 
significant effects of household bargaining indicators on child stunting in Tanzania are mainly 
from the rural and not the urban population. It provides evidence that weak bargaining power 
within couples in rural areas account for 5 percent of the rural-urban gap in child nutrition. The 
contribution reduces to 4 percent after correcting for sample selection bias. The results also 
suggest that failure to adequately correct for selection bias leads to a substantia l 
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Background and Motivation of the Study 
 
 
“Good health of women and children has a universally acknowledged intrinsic value and is a 
basic human right. Healthy women and children also contribute to economic growth. For every 
dollar spent on key interventions for reproductive, maternal, new-born and child health, about 
US$20 in benefits could be generated. The economic case should inform priorities and 
resource allocation decisions in women and children’s health, alongside arguments based on 
human rights and the intrinsic value of good health” (Partnership for Maternal New-born and 
Child Health, 2013). 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Globally, most governments and development agencies recognise the critical importance for 
utilising reproductive health services in developing countries, and health care interventions in 
recent decades have increasingly given priority to reproductive related health issues (Haaga et 
al, 1997; Reproductive, 2004; Kerber et al., 2007). The popularity of reproductive health care 
as a policy issue stems from its inherent ability to improve maternal and child health outcomes, 
especially reducing maternal and infant mortality (Granovetter, 1985; Overbosch et al., 2004). 
It has been shown that the use of maternal health services is an important instrument to counter 
the risk and vulnerability associated with maternal and infant health (Campbell & Graham, 
2006; Gross et al., 2012; Kamal, 2009; Overbosch et al., 2004; Reynolds et al., 2006). For 
example, it has been shown that over 50 percent of all neonatal mortality between 1995 and 
2003 in developing countries emanated from home delivery when trained health professiona ls 
were not present (Lawn et al., 2005; Lawn et al., 2006).  
Arguably, health outcomes are potential determinants of individual or household wellbeing as 
well as macroeconomic growth (Luke & Munshi, 2007). For instance, child health status is 
associated with child growth, skill development and future productivity; and inequality in child 
health promotes inequality in the adult population in the future (Cravioto & Arrieta, 1986; Zere 
& McIntyre, 2003a). This suggests to the value of encouraging utilisation of maternal health 
services to improve maternal and child health, which is essential for household wellbeing and 
future economic growth (Thomas et al., 1990; Todaro & Smith, 2009). Many of the problems 




antenatal care. The use of maternal health care is especially important in rural areas with poor 
maternal and child health outcomes. Promoting the use of maternal health services is thus 
imperative, particularly in rural areas, as it may narrow the rural-urban inequality in child 
health and rural-urban poverty inequality stemming from differences in skill development and 
future productivity1.  
In line with this recognition, the government of Tanzania has in the recent decades designed a 
substantive number of programmes to enhance the utilisation of reproductive health services, 
most especially maternal and child health care (Mwaikambo, 2010). Some of these programs 
include the Health Sector Reforms (HSR) and the Health Sector Strategic Plan between 2003 
and 2007, the Maternal Newborn and Child Health Partnership (MNCHP), the Primary Health 
Service Development Program (PHSDP) established in 2007, the Health Sector Support 
Program (HSSP) III in 2008, and free primary maternal and child health services (Mosha et al., 
2006; Mwaikambo, 2010). In addition, health facilities are evenly distributed through the entire 
economy, with 90 percent of its citizens living within 5 kilometres of a primary health care 
facility (see Mwaikambo, 2010).  
 
With these enabling interventions, and improvement in the supply of health facilities, one 
would expect to see an increase in the use of maternal and child health services. Rather, 
analyses of the micro-data attest to a significant decline in the uptake of maternal health 
services in Tanzania in the past decade (2000 and 2010). In particular, between 2000 and 2010, 
the number of pregnant women receiving the required antenatal care visits reduced from 70 to 
43 percent, and approximately half of all childbirths between 2005 and 2010 took place at 
home, of which the majority is not been attended to by a skilled health professional (TDHS, 
2010). There is a continued high rural-urban inequality in infant and child nutritional outcomes 
within this period. Similarly, maternal mortality rates remain significantly high and in 2010, it 
                                                                 
1 It has been over a decade since 189 member states in the world agreed (at the United Nation Submit, 2000) to a 
set of eight goals to be accomplished by 2015. Important to these was the target to reduce overall under-five 
mortality by three-quarters. While the world has witnessed a decline in child mortality and improvement in child  
nutritional status, regional differences remain a point of concern. For example, within the context of child  
mortality, the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) rates are worse than all other regions of the world (MDGs Report, 
2013). While some countries have made substantial progress in Africa and SSA  in particular, some have not been 
able to accomplish this goal. The slow progress can largely be attributed to the prevailing poor child health 
outcomes in rural relative to urban areas. As the United Nation is at the verge of taking stock of progress mad e 
towards these goals, and as member states are delighted with their progress, it is essential to assess how this 
progress is distributed between different regions and within each member state. Understanding the source of the 
unequal distribution of this progress within a country is important as it affects decisions made towards enhancing 





was 460 per 100,000 (United Nations, 2014). Relative to the rest of world, infant and child 
mortality rates in Tanzania are still substantively high. With this paradox, namely, intervention 
programmes against declining service utilisation, this thesis examines the state of maternal 
health care utilisation and child health in the Tanzanian health care system by focusing on three  
fundamental areas. These areas include antenatal care utilisation, health care provider choice 
at delivery, and the rural-urban gap in child health. 
 
Internationally, a growing body of evidence has demonstrated that individual or household 
resource endowment and community development contribute positively to the use of 
reproductive health services, as well as maternal and child health outcomes (Celik & Hotchkiss, 
2000; Falkingham, 2003; Gabrysch & Campbell, 2009; Mekonnen & Mekonnen, 2003; Nisar 
& White, 2003). In particular, a number of studies have shown that maternal education, 
household wealth, and proximity to health facilities are important sources for the utilisation of 
maternal health services, and in some instances are linked to improvement in child health (Erci, 
2003; Matthews et al., 2001; Paredes et al., 2005; Sharma, 2004). Yet another strand of 
literature has identified positive effects of these factors on child nutrition (Smith et al., 2005; 
Fotso, 2007), and negative effects on child mortality (Heaton & Forste, 2003; Sastry, 1996; 
Van de Poel et al., 2007; Van de Poel et al., 2009). Some researchers argue that what limits the 
ability of most developing countries to achieve their health goals is the enormous rural-urban 
gap in health outcomes (Fotso, 2007; Harpham, 2009; Lalou & LeGrand, 1997). In addition, 
information externalities through social interaction (Deri, 2005; Luke & Munshi, 2007; 
Wallerstein, 1986) and bargaining power between couples (Beegle et al., 2001a; Maitra, 2004; 
Nikièma et al., 2008) are identified as important factors in promoting the use of health services 
and child health outcomes.   
In the context of resource constraint developing countries, it is difficult to ascertain why take-
up of existing health care programmes is very low. In this case, policy-makers in developing 
countries face a critical challenge in designing new health care policies. For instance, even 
when reproductive health services are heavily subsidised or made free, take-up in most 
developing countries is far from universal (Beegle et al., 2001a). Acton (1975a) highlighted 
that in the absence of user fees, non-monetary factors, such as waiting and travel time, could 
explain the unequal access to health care. In addition, the utilisation of reproductive health 
services may be constrained by the non-market environment (Ajakaiye & Mwabu, 2007; 




characteristics, as well as the information people have about the quality of health services.  In 
line with this, studies have shown that both price and non-price factors are sine qua non for 
health care demand (Bolduc et al., 1996; Dor et al., 1987; Eme Ichoku & Leibbrandt, 2003; 
Sahn et al., 2003). Following Becker (1996) and Deri (2005)2, this thesis argues that 
information externalities through social networks and women’s ability to participate (or 
cooperation) in household decision making process can promote the use of maternal health 
services and child health outcomes. 
The literature on social networks and intra-household bargaining in health economics is, as 
mentioned above, rather limited but growing. In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), unlike other 
regions, empirical literature on health care utilisation has overlooked the effects of social 
interaction. In Tanzania, in particular, we are not aware of any study that has examined the  
health care utilisation effects of social networks and bargaining within couples. While social 
interaction creates awareness about the availability of these services and health care policies, 
the level of negotiation within couples may determine the extent to which these services are 
used. Seemingly, cooperation between couples results in efficient allocation of household 
resources (Rasul, 2008) and is likely to improve child health as women devote a larger portion 
of their time and income on children’s needs (Gupta, 1996; Kabeer, 1994; Thomas, 1993). 
Despite these concerns and given that cooperation between couples in Tanzania is more likely 
in urban than rural households, little is empirically known about the contributions of intra-
household bargaining to the rural-urban gap in child health. This thesis sets out to separately 
investigate these issues and, in the process, contribute to a currently small body of empirica l 






                                                                 
2 According to Becker (1996), women’s decision to use reproductive health services occurs within the context of 
a marriage, a household or a family; and to Deri (2005), networks reduce search costs as it provides information  
to peer friends about the appropriate health providers and detail information about the functioning of the national 




1.2 Objectives of the Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the influence of social networks and intra-househo ld 
bargaining on maternal health care utilisation and child health outcome. The thesis contributes 
to the debates on health care utilisation and health outcomes in the Tanzanian health care 
system by pursuing the following specific objectives: 
i. To investigate the effect of social networks on antenatal care utilisation in Tanzania.  
ii. To examine the role of bargaining power within couples on health care provider 
choice at delivery. 
iii. To explore the effect and relative contribution of intra-household bargaining to the 
rural-urban gap in child health.  
 
1.3 Data 
The data used in this thesis comes from the Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) 
conducted by the Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and funded by the Tanzanian 
government in collaboration with other international agencies like World Health Organisat ion 
(WHO), United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF); United Nations 
Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA); and United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP). The TDHS is a nationally representative cross-sectional survey. The first TDHS was 
released in 1992 and subsequent surveys have been conducted after every five years. The 
surveys are independent, because each is based on a different set of individuals or households 
(samples). The sample consider numerous, but wide-ranging households over all the 26 regions 
(Arush, Dar-es-Salaam, Tabora, Shinyanga, Kigoma, Kilimanjaro, Tanga, Manyara, Dodoma, 
Singida, Mbeya, Iringa, Rukwa, Kagera, Mwanza, Mara, Pwani, Morogoro, Lindi, Mtwara, 
Ruvuma, Unguja North, Unguja South, Town West, Pemba North and Pemba South) of 
Tanzania.  
The survey is designed to provide a comprehensive picture of reproductive health outcomes, 
household background characteristics, and general living conditions in the country. While the 
survey provides an opportunity for a detailed empirical analysis of social networks and 
bargaining within couples in maternal health care choices, it should be noted that the survey 
design changed overtime and indicators of household bargaining power were not included in 
earliest surveys. Although pooling all the TDHS or analysis based on all the TDHS data would 




surveys) across the surveys rule out this possibility. Therefore, the 2010 TDHS, as the latest 
data available at the inception of this thesis, is utilised for all empirical estimations in Chapter s 
Two to Four. The survey was conducted between December 2009 and May 2010, and 
comprises 10,300 household from all the 26 regions of Tanzania. The survey is limited in that 
it doesn’t provide information on the price as well as the quality of health services provided. 
The sample interviewed was selected in two stages. In the first stage, clusters were selected 
from a list of enumeration areas in the 2002 Population and Housing Census. In the second 
stage, a complete list of households was selected from all the identified clusters. Households 
were then systematically selected for participation in the survey. In all the regions, 22 
households were selected from each cluster, with the exception of Dar-es-Salaam, where 16 
households were selected from each cluster.  
 
1.4 An Overview of the Tanzanian Health System 
The variety of ethnic groups and the different religions in Tanzania make it a multicultura l 
society. The majority of communities in Tanzania are patriarchal whereby traditional norms, 
practices, and attitudes are concentrated on male power, with limited legal protection of women 
(World Bank, 2013a). This section provides a brief overview of the Tanzanian health care 
system and the maternal and child health status of the population. This overview forms a 
background that enables the reader to gain a snapshot understanding of the economy, and the 
health system upon which this thesis is based. 
 
1.4.1 The Tanzanian Health Care System 
In 1961, the government of Tanzania inherited a health system that was characterised by mainly 
traditional healers, a few clinics, and missionary health centres (see, Kwesigabo et al., 2012). 
During this period, the major health care intervention was characterised by the objective of 
universal access to care, and by 1978, about 90 percent of all Tanzanians lived within 10km of 
a health facility (Dominicus & Akamatsu, 1989). Within this period, and up to the early 1990s, 
the government maintained the objective of universal access to care, ensured free access to care 
in public health facilities and in 1977, actively discouraged, and banned the activities of for-
profit private sector (see Tibandebage et al., 2001). However, the worsening economic 




sector to deliver basic health services to the majority of the population. This adversely affected 
health outcomes and prompted the need for policy reforms, not only at the macroeconomic 
policy level, but inclusive of the health sector in the early 1990s (see, Kwesigabo et al., 2012).  
In early 1993, the implementation of user fees became a centrepiece of the health sector reform 
process. This reform was intended to ensure financial sustainability in the health sector and to 
improve the quality of care. In order to ensure that this policy does not negatively affect the 
poorest and the vulnerable groups in accessing basic health care, an exemption system was 
introduced (see Lambert & Sahn, 2002).  In response to government policy change, primarily 
the removal of the ban on private for-profit practice in 1991, the size of the private health sector 
has increased tremendously over the past decades (see, White et al., 2012).  Currently, the 
public and private health sectors are the main components of the Tanzanian health system. Both 
the public and private health sector comprises of non-for-profit and for-profit entities 
distributed throughout the country. These health facilities are understaffed and Tanzania has 
one of the lowest physician density of about 0.1 per 10,000 of the population in the world 
(World Health Organisation, 2013).  
In terms of the distribution of health care facilities, over 70 percent of all the health facilit ies 
are publicly owned (see Table 1.1). A large number of the public health facilities are lower-
level health centres and dispensaries, which are managed by Local Government Authorit ies 
(LGAs). A vast majority of health facilities at the higher level of the health system are privately 
owned, with 60 percent of all hospitals operated by private for-profit, private non-for-profit 
(mission hospitals) and parastatal organisations (MOHSW, 2008a). Urban areas have a good 
network of hospitals and referral facilities, while primary level facilities are predominant in 
rural areas (Mtei et al., 2012).  
Table 1.1: Number of health facilities in Tanzania 
Facility Type Government Parastatal Non-for-profit For-profit Total 
Hospitals 95 8 101 36 240 
Health centers 434 10 134 55 633 
Dispensaries 3,889 168 625 787 5,469 
Total 4,418 186 860 878 6,342 
Percent of total 70% 3% 14% 14% 100% 





In general, and relative to the size of the population, there has been a persistent and significant 
decline in the absolute number of health workers in Tanzania. Between 2006 and 2012, there 
has been a tremendous increase in the number of physicians (over 2,210 generalist and 
specialist medical practitioners), but this is still low in relation to population growth. In 
addition, the increase in physicians between 2006 and 2012 favoured the urban population, 
with over 69 percent of all the medical doctors and 90 percent of all the medical specialis ts 
working in urban areas, while rural communities remain severely understaffed. The situation 
in rural areas is further worsened, as most of those present in the facilities put in fewer hours 
(Kwesigabo et al., 2012; Manzi et al., 2012). The poor health service delivery in rural areas 
relative to urban may also be a result of the acute shortage of health workers (MOHSW, 2009; 
Chomi et al., 2014).  
 
1.4.2 Health Care Expenditure and Financing in Tanzania 
Internationally, it is argued that whether or not people obtain sufficient health care depends on 
the manner in which the health system is financed (Carrin et al, 2007). In Tanzania, the health 
care system is financed through a mixture of both public and private mechanisms. While 
household out-of-pocket payments, medical schemes, and private health insurance are the 
major sources of private expenditure on health care; general taxes and donor funds are the main 
sources for public expenditure on health care. In 2004/05, foreign resources contributed 31 
percent of total expenditures in health, which increased to 37 percent in the 2008/09 budget 
year (Health Sector Performance Profile Report, 2009). Within the same period, the share of 
domestic recurrent expenditure in total health spending declined from 80 percent to 55 percent. 
Out-of-pocket payment became one of the major sources of health care expenditure between 
1995 and 2004. Within this period, out-of-pocket spending accounted for 45 to 52 percent of 
total health care expenditure, and declined to 32 percent in 2011. Public expenditure on health 
was 4.4 percent whereas private expenditure was 2.9 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
in 2011. Since 1999, health expenditure as percentage of GDP has been fluctua t ing 
continuously. For example, in 2006, total health expenditure was 6.5 percent of GDP. By 2009, 
it was reduced to 5.6 percent and was increased to 7.3 percent in 2011 (see World Development 




Following the Abuja Declaration in 20013, there has been an increase spending on health in 
Tanzania, with over 17 percent of the total budget in 2006 devoted to the health sector. From 
this period, there has been a steady decline with only 11 percent of the 2011 budget spent on 
health. Between the period 2011/2012, only 9 percent of the total budget was devoted to health 
and this figure further declined to 8.5 percent in the period 2012/2013 (Ministry of Finance, 
2013). In 2012, public spending on health was $14 per person and private spending was $19 
per person amounting to a total health spending of $33 per person per annum (Ministry of 
Finance, 2013). This amount is far below the required4. The out-of-pocket expenditure on 
health care (exclusive of insurance) has increased from Tshs. 3919 in 2009 to Tshs. 11822 in 
2011 (Mtei et al., 2012).  
It is important to note that after independence, the Tanzanian health care system was mainly 
financed by the government. However, the economic crisis in the 1980s severely affected the 
financing of basic social services including the health sector (Wangwe et al., 1998). The health 
system was underfunded, resulting in a shortage of medical supplies. This affected the quality 
and the provision of health care services, especially as the government was the main provider 
of health care. The very poor and vulnerable groups were severely affected as user fees were 
introduced and all treatment in both government and private facilities required out-of-pocket 
payment (Hussein & Mujinja, 1997). In order to avoid exclusion of the poor and the vulnerab le 
groups, and to ensure equity in access to health care in the face of user fees, a public exemption 
and waiver system and Community Health Fund (CHF) and National Health Insurance Fund 
(NHIF) were introduced (see Mamdani & Bangser, 2004; (Chomi et al., 2014). 
  
1.4.3 Maternal and Child Health Indicators in Tanzania  
Infant mortality is one of the major indicators of health for most developing countries. It reflects 
the effect of economic and social conditions and effectiveness of health systems on the health 
of mothers and their new-borns (Blaxter, 1981). Table 1.2 provides summary evidence of some 
of the maternal and child health indicators for Tanzania, Sub-Saharan Africa and the world 
averages in 2012. Generally, Tanzanian averages are better than Sub-Saharan African averages, 
                                                                 
3 All governments who signed the Abuja Declaration in 2001 committed to spending at least 15% of their total 
budget on health (see Govender et al, 2008). 
4 According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), for better health outcomes, the total health expenditure, 




but below global averages. For instance, the under-five mortality rate in Tanzania is 54 per 
1,000 compared to 95 per 1,000 for Sub-Saharan Africa and 48 per 1,000 globally. In addition, 
the infant mortality rate in Tanzania is estimated at 38 per 1,000 live births. This has declined 
substantially by almost half in the last decade from 71 per 1,000 in 2002 (United Nations, 
2013). 
Table 1.2: Selected maternal and child health indicators for Tanzania, SSA and the world 
Health Indicators Tanzania SSA averages Global 
averages 
Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 38 54 35 
Under-five mortality (per 1,000 live births) 54 95 48 
Stunting, moderate and severe (%) 42 40 25 
Wasting moderate and severe (%) 5 10 8 
Underweight, moderate and severe (%) 16 33 15 
Maternal mortality rate (100,000) live births 410 500 210 
Source: World Health Organisation (2013) 
The trends and levels of neonatal, infant, and child mortality between 1992 and 2010 are 
presented in Panel A of Figure 1.1. The figures confirm to a significant reduction in child 
mortality outcomes within a decade (2000 and 2010), after the establishment of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). In the period before the year 2000, there was an increase in 
under-five mortality from 137 per 1,000 in 1996 to 147 per 1,000 in 2000. It is partly due to 
poor maternal and child health outcomes in developing countries that most of the health MDGs 
mainly focused on maternal, new-born and child health5. In Tanzania, and between 2000 and 
2010, there has been a significant decline in both infant and under-five mortality of about 48 
percent and 45 percent respectively. This may be attributed to government efforts and the post 
MDGs intervention policies towards child health outcomes. The trend indicates that the 
government is likely to achieve its 2015 targets of child mortality rate. 
The figures in Table 1.2 suggest that in 2012, approximately 42 percent of all under- five 
children were malnourished (stunted) in Tanzania. This is far above global averages (25 
percent), but slightly above SSA averages (40 percent). This confirms the fact that Tanzania is 
among the top 24 countries with high levels of child malnutrition in the world (World Health 
Organisation, 2013). The risk of morbidity, mortality and related impaired mental development 
among children increases with the level of malnutrition (Fawzi et al., 1997; Pelletier et al., 
                                                                 
5 Three of the eight MDGs are health related: reducing under-five mortality by two-third (4.3 percent per annum), 
improve maternal health by reducing maternal mortality by three-quarter (5.4 percent per annum) and combating 




1995). In the context of Tanzania, Panel B of Figure 1.1 illustrates the trend in the various 
measures of child malnutrition status between 1992 and 2010. The results show consistent 
decline in the levels of child malnutrition over the period 2000 to 2010. For example, the 
number of stunted children declined from 44 percent in 2000 to 38 percent in 2005 and to 35 
percent in 2010. A similar pattern is observed for underweight, but the prevalence of wasting 
has remained similar between 2000 and 2010.  
Figure 1.1: Trends in child health and antenatal care use 
 
 
In Panel C of Figure 1.1, the percentage of stunted children is presented by their residentia l 
type.  Children from rural communities are more likely to be stunted than their counterparts in 
urban areas. In 2005, the percentage of stunted rural children (41 percent) was remarkably 
higher than the percent of stunted urban children (26 percent). There is ample evidence that 
rural children usually have worse nutritional outcomes relative to urban children (Hussain & 
Lunven, 1987; Ruel, 2000; Von Braun, 1993). It is also argued that the overall nutritiona l 
advantage of urban children, especially in developing countries, is likely to be decreasing both 
in absolute and in relative terms as a result of rural-urban migration (Haddad et al., 1999). In 




and 2010. This suggests an improvement in the nutritional status of rural children when 
compared to urban children. However, a gap of over 13 percent is still substantially high. Any 
further policy to ensure better nutritional status for Tanzanian children and to achieve the 
MDG4 needs a critical assessment of what explains the rural-urban gap in child nutrition.  
 
Antenatal care, when sought early during pregnancy and is continued until delivery, can be 
more effective in avoiding adverse pregnancy outcomes. The World Health Organisat ion 
(WHO) recommends that pregnant women should start antenatal care before the 16th week of 
gestation, so that their general baseline health can be assessed and monitored regularly and, 
pregnant women without complications should have at least four antenatal care visits to provide 
sufficient care (World Health Organisation, 1995). The reason here is that it is possible to detect 
reproductive health risk factors during these visits. In line with this claim, a number of studies 
have established that regular and timely antenatal care visits reduce associated risk, educate 
women, and ensure better pregnancy outcomes (Gross et al., 2012; Overbosch et al., 2004). 
Consequently, women who initiate antenatal care late and/or have limited number of visits are 
less likely to deliver in a health facility, as opposed to at home (AbouZahr & Wardlaw, 2003; 
Bloom et al., 1999; Rockers et al., 2009). It is evident that most maternal and infant deaths 
resulting from pregnancy complications can be averted with early and frequent antenatal check-
up (Campbell & Graham, 2006; Kamal, 2009; Reynolds et al., 2006).  
In the context of Tanzania, the trends in the number of antenatal visits over the period are 
presented in Panel D of Figure 1.1. Although more than nine in every ten pregnant women 
received at least one antenatal visit before childbirth, the percentage that received at least four 
antenatal care visits appear to be declining, from 70 percent in 2000 to 43 percent in 2010. In 
2010, over 98 percent of all the pregnant women were attended to by a skilled health 
professional at least once before childbirth. Since the likelihood of detecting reproductive 
health risk factors increase with the number of visits, more need to be done to ensure antenatal 
completion. The rationale for up to four antenatal visits is to prevent, alleviate or treat health 
problems that are known to have an unfavourable outcome on pregnancy. In order to do so, it 






1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter has served as an introduction, 
establishing the area of focus, research issues and the objectives of the thesis. It has provided 
an overview of the Tanzanian health care system, the key child health and maternal health care 
indicators in Tanzania. This chapter has only provides a summary of the issues that are 
important for understanding the analysis contained in this thesis. The research issues are dealt 
with in the three subsequent essays that follow in chapter 2, 3, and 4.  
The first essay (presented in Chapter 2) investigates the effect of social networks on antenatal 
care utilisation. This chapter begins with a brief introduction on social networks and demand 
for health care, followed by a theoretical model on which the analysis in this chapter is built. 
Subsequently, the econometric technique used to investigate the effect of social networks on 
antenatal care use is presented. The chapter shows that the prospect of a pregnant woman to 
fully utilise antenatal care services is positive and significantly associated with the quality of 
her network membership. It further shows that the effect of social networks is overstated, if 
personal and household related characteristics are not controlled for; and understated, if omitted 
variable bias is not accounted for. The analysis in this chapter suggests that social networks 
increase the probability of antenatal care completion between 6 percent and 35 percent, and at 
times as high as 59 percent. The results confirm that irrespective of the definition of social 
networks, having a high quality of network increases the probability of utilising maternal health 
services. 
The second essay (presented in Chapter 3) examines the role of bargaining power within 
couples on choice of health care provider at childbirth. The level of cooperation in household 
decision making, female discretion over household wealth, domestic violence, differences in 
education, and differences in age between spouses, are considered as indicators of bargaining 
power within couples. This chapter starts with a discussion on parental bargaining and demand 
for health care, followed by a theoretical model of choice decisions and a description of the 
empirical model. The decision whether or not to deliver in a health facility, as opposed to home, 
is empirically examined using a binary logit model; and the provider choice decision is 
empirically examined with a multinomial nested logit. It shows that cooperation within couples 
in decision making, female discretion over resources, and freedom from domestic violence 
increase the probability of childbirth in a facility, as opposed to home. It also shows that while 
couples’ cooperation in decision-making and low incidence of domestic violence strongly raise 




public care. Finally, maternal empowerment in terms of education and employment among 
others, and household wealth significantly increase the probability of facility use, as opposed 
to home birth.  
The third essay (presented in Chapter 4) extends the analysis in Chapters 2 and 3, by exploring 
the rural-urban gap in child health outcomes, resulting from differences in intra-househo ld 
bargaining process. First, the chapter analyses the effects of parental bargaining indicators 
(cooperation in household decisions, domestic violence and discretion over household 
resources) on the probability of child stunting in both rural and urban areas. Second, it argues 
that the rural-urban gap in child health can be exacerbated by differences in intra-househo ld 
bargaining between these areas. After a background review and presentation of a theoretica l 
framework, the rural-urban gap is empirically scrutinised using a detailed Oaxaca-Blinder, 
Oaxaca decomposition with Heckman, and a non-linear decomposition approach. The results 
suggest that the significant effects of household bargaining indicators, on child stunting in 
Tanzania, are mainly from the rural, but not the urban population. It provides evidence that low 
bargaining power within couples in rural areas account for 5 percent of the rural-urban gap in 
child nutrition. The results further suggest that failure to adequately correct for selection bias 
would lead to a substantial underestimation of the overall rural-urban gap in child nutrition by 
11 percent (from 0.45 to 0.50). While observable characteristics account for over 62 percent of 
the gap, the low household wealth in rural communities account for over 32 percent of the gap.   
Finally, the results from the preceding chapters are discussed in Chapter 5. Specifica lly, 
attention is given to the key issues arising from the analysis. It attempts to provide policy 
implications on how to improve the utilisation of reproductive health services (particula r ly 
maternal health services) and child health in Tanzania. In concluding, the chapter highlights 
some areas for future research, the limitations of the study, and a summary of the major 















Uncertainty about health outcomes is a key feature that distinguishes the demand for health 
services from the demand for standard goods and services in consumer theory. It is due to this 
uncertainty that individuals demand preventive health care to ensure better health outcomes in 
the future (Chang, 1996; Dardanoni & Wagstaff, 1990; Picone et al, 1998; Selden, 1993). 
Empirical evidence on what hinders or drives the use of maternal health services in both 
developed and developing countries has been well documented (Gabrysch & Campbell, 2009; 
Gage, 2007; Kamal, 2009). However, focus has been mainly on household socioeconomic and 
community level factors. Social interactions between network members facilitate information 
spill overs and learning, transmit norms and values, and may matter in explaining economic 
and social outcomes (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1998).  
In the context of health economics, there are numerous channels through which social networks 
can influence health care seeking behaviour7. While social networks have been shown to 
significantly influence most individual and economic outcomes (Bertrand et al., 2000; Burns 
et al., 2010; Deri, 2005; Webster et al., 2014), little is known about the maternal health care 
use effect of social networks. The study by Deri (2005) illustrates the association between 
social networks and health care utilisation. While this study makes important contribution in 
this area, the effect of social networks in the care utilisation decision of pregnant women is still 
relatively unexploited. Similarly, the effect of social networks on health care utilisation in the 
context of Africa is relatively unexploited. This chapter examines how information 
externalities through social networks affect women’s decision to seek maternal health services. 
The primary objective of this chapter is to present unique evidence on the effect of social 
networks on antenatal completion and timing of first antenatal check-up in Tanzania.  
                                                                 
6 In this chapter, maternal health care and antenatal care will be used interchangeably. Social networks are the 
fabric of many of our interaction and include the relationships among friends and relatives with whom they share 
information (information externalities) and favours on regular basis through interaction (social interaction) that 
reach as far as influencing decision (Jackson et al. 2008). 
7 Network reduces search costs as it provides information to peers about the appropriate health care providers and 
details about the functioning of the national health system. In addition, networks can affect the utilisation of health 





A number of studies have established that regular and timely antenatal care visits reduce 
associated risk, educate women, and ensure better pregnancy outcomes (Gross et al., 2012; 
Overbosch et al., 2004). Consequently, women who initiate antenatal care late and/or have 
limited number of visits are less likely to deliver in a health facility as opposed to home birth 
(AbouZahr & Wardlaw, 2003; Bloom et al., 1999; Rockers et al., 2009). For better pregnancy 
outcomes, the WHO recommends that women with uncomplicated pregnancies should visit or 
consult with a health professional at least four times before childbirth (WHO, 1994). It is 
evident that most maternal and infant deaths resulting from pregnancy complications can be 
averted with early and frequent antenatal check-up (Campbell & Graham, 2006; Kamal, 2009; 
Reynolds et al., 2006). While researchers have shown how household and community 
characteristics determine the decision to utilise these services (Duong et al., 2004; Gabrysch & 
Campbell, 2009; Glei et al, 2003), this study argues that information externalities through 
social networks also matter. Social networks is shown to increase the probability of antenatal 
care completion between 6 to 35 percent and in some instances, may be as high as 59 percent.  
It is only in the recent decades that economists have become interested in examining how 
information spill over through networks and learning between network members can explain 
individual choices and economic outcomes. Focus has been mostly in labour market decisions 
(Burns et al., 2010; Oreopoulos, 2003), education (Sacerdote, 2001; Parker, 2012; Vardardottir, 
2013; Chou et al., 2015), welfare participation (Bertrand et al., 2000; Dahl et al., 2014), and 
health outcomes (House et al., 1988; Fowler and Christakis, 2008; Christakis and Fowler, 2013; 
Webster et al., 2014; Shakya et al., 2014, 2015) among others8. In the context of health care, 
contacts may provide more information about the importance of care utilisation than just the 
availability of health care services themselves. In terms of health care, the pioneer work of Deri 
(2005) identified that health care utilisation among immigrants in Canada increases with the 
number of doctors that speak their language in their neighbourhoods. However, very little is 
known about this link in other parts of the world, most especially in SSA. Studying social 
network effects on health care decisions, especially in the context of developing countries 
where most people acquire information through informal sources, is imperative.   
Arguably, information and norms are the major ways through which individual choices are 
affected by the behaviour of others. In terms of information, the awareness of an individua l 
                                                                 




depends, to some extent, on the behaviour or how knowledgeable his/her friends or neighbours 
(contacts) are. With regards to norms, individual preferences may be influenced directly 
through taste and indirectly through social pressure (Bertrand et al., 2000). In addition, and in 
the context of health Berkman et al. (2000) added that social support, social influence, on social 
engagement and attachment, and access to resources and material good are primarily the 
behavioural pathways through which networks operate9. In health economics, it has been 
shown that individuals whose neighbourhoods are healthier are more likely to experience better 
health outcomes and lower exposure to diseases (Katz et al., 2001; Ludwig et al., 2001). 
However, not much is known concerning the use of health care services. Yet reliance on 
networks to utilise health services reduces patient’s uncertainty about physician’s action, 
improves patient and physician relationship, may enhance physician royalty, and hence service 
satisfaction10. In the absence of the media and other formal sources of information, it is obvious 
that the patient’s awareness about the availability of modern health services is relative to the 
quality of his/her contacts. For instance, if one’s contacts rely on traditional healers for 
treatment, the likelihood of being informed about the benefits of modern health services 
through such contacts reduces, thereby reducing benefits from such contacts.  
Within the context of very low and declining levels of antenatal care utilisation in Tanzania 
(see Panel D of Figure 1.2), understanding the effects of social networks on antenatal care use 
is arguably critical, especially as it influences the amount of medical care consumed. It is also 
part of the puzzle that the decline in utilisation of these services in Tanzania does not 
synchronise with the targets of government policies highlighted in the previous chapter. The 
media is likely to be one of the major means or formal channels through which information 
regarding health care policies among others is disseminated to the general public (Sharma et 
al., 2007). According to the 2010 TDHS, it is rather unfortunate that over 76 percent of the 
population do not watch television (TV), 30 percent do not listen to radio at all, and 71 percent 
do not read newspapers. Thus, awareness about the availability of health services and the 
existing policies towards these services may rely heavily on informal sources. Although 
attempts have been made to explore the determinants of maternal health care utilisation in 
                                                                 
9 Social support is defined in form of instrumental and financial, informational, appraisal and emotional whereas 
social influence is define in terms of constraining, norms, peer pressure and social comparison processes. 
10 Interacting with others that have faced similar health related problems in the past, increases patient’s awareness 




Tanzania11, a comprehensive explanation of the importance of social networks to the use of 
health services is lacking. This has been exacerbated by the fact that in Tanzania, most studies 
on maternal health care use had limited coverage of the health care system. For example, 
Kowalewski et al., (2002) focused on rural residence, while Gross et al., (2012) on adolescent 
women. There is, therefore, a huge gap in the literature which must be addressed in order to 
provide a broader picture of the health care situation in Tanzania. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
Two approaches are suggested for the theoretical analysis of health care utilisation (Deb & 
Trivedi, 1997). The one approach is the traditional consumer theory that looks at health care 
demand as primarily determined by the patient (Grossman, 1972; Jacobson, 2000; Muurinen, 
1982). Estimates on the demand for medical services in this tradition have been established 
(Cameron et al., 1988; Duan et al., 1983; Wagstaff, 1986), ranging from the effects of income, 
health insurance and individual characteristics. The other approach is the physician-agent 
method where the physician determines the amount of health care utilisation on behalf of the 
patient once they come into contact (Zweifel & Wirtschaftswissenschafter, 1981). Such a 
method has been analysed empirically and suggests the existence of supplier induced demand 
for medical services (see Manning et al., 1987; Pohlmeier & Ulrich, 1995).  
Based on these theoretical approaches, this chapter uses a standard health care demand model 
developed from the basic neoclassical theory. The theory states that health care is a composite 
of myriad goods and services that maintain, improve, or restore a person’s physical and mental 
well-being (Neun & Santerre, 2007). The specification of the model follows the philosophies 
of Grossman (1972) and Acton (1973). According to Grossman (1972), individuals use medical 
care and their own time to produce health. The health status of individual 𝑖 depends on the 
amount of health care consumed (ℎ𝑐), time (t) and other determinants of health (𝑧)12. 
𝐻𝑖 = 𝑓(ℎ𝑐, 𝑡, 𝑧)          (2.1) 
                                                                 
11 Health care demand studies in the context of Tanzania include (Boller et al., 2003; Gross et al, 2012;  
Kowalewski et al., 2002; Mpembeni et al., 2007; Mrisho et al., 2009; Rockers et al., 2009 Alderman et al, 2006;  
Adhvaryu and Nyshaham, 2010).  




Health care, therefore, enters an individual or household's utility function directly and 
indirectly through improvement in health status. This framework serves as a guide in the 
selection of variables for the analysis of health care utilisation. The analysis of this study is 
based on the structural demand model by Grossman (1972), and the framework by Andersen 
& Newman (1973). The relationship between health care utilisation and the utility function is 
given as: 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑢(𝑋𝑖 ,ℎ𝑐𝑖 , 𝐻𝑖(ℎ𝑐, 𝑡, 𝑧 ))         (2.2) 
Where ℎ𝑐𝑖 is the amount health care consumed, 𝑋𝑖 is a composite of all other goods and services 
in the individual consumption basket. Equation 2.2 shows that medical care is a source of utility 
through better health outcomes, and a source of disutility through the resulting side effects (this 
enters through ℎ𝑐) during the consumption of health care (Evan, 1984). Based on this, Acton 
(1973) assumed that an individual’s utility is a function of two goods: medical services, 𝑚, and 
a composite  𝑥, for all other goods and services. To re-iterate, following Acton (1973), a single 
provider of care and a fixed proportion of money and time to consume 𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥 is considered. 
Thus, an individual chooses 𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥 to maximize utility specified in equation 2.3 below;  
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖(𝑚𝑖 ,𝑥𝑖)         (2.3) 
Subject to a budget constraint in equation 2.4;  
 (𝑝 + 𝑤𝑡)𝑚 + (𝑞 + 𝑤𝑠)𝑥 ≤ 𝑌 = 𝑦 + 𝑤𝑇        (2.4) 
Where 𝑝 and 𝑞 are money prices for 𝑚 and 𝑥 respectively, 𝑡 and 𝑠 are own time spent in 
consuming 𝑚 and 𝑥, 𝑤 is earnings per hour, 𝑦 is non-earned income, 𝑇 is total amount of time 
available for market and the production of goods and services, and 𝑌 is total income. Given 
this, the Grossman structural demand for medical care can be derived given by: 
𝑚𝑖 = 𝑓(𝐻𝑖 ,  𝑤𝑖 , 𝑃, 𝑡, 𝑠, 𝑥, 𝑌,  𝑍𝑖)       (2.5) 
Where 𝐻𝑗 is the stock of health, and  𝑍𝑖 the individual/household socioeconomic and societal 
characteristics, which include information spill-over. In line with equation 2.5, Andersen and 
Newman (1973) outline a framework for health service utilization that takes into consideration 




Societal consideration is mainly about how formal health care services are provided in the 
society through the health care system. The formal services include the availability and 
distribution of health care resources, as well as the organization of the health care system. The 
resources include the total volume of physician care, hospital care, dental care, drugs and other 
health care practitioners. These are distributed geographically, relative to the population within 
a country. As the ratio increases, the health services consumed by the population rises and vice 
versa. However, this study is mainly interested in the individual and household characterist ics.  
Considering that the health care system is well coordinated to satisfy the entire population of a 
given locality, the level of health care an individual consumes is dependent on the 
predisposition to health services, ability to secure the services, and the level of illness. For each 
of these components, Andersen and Newman (1973) briefly described and suggested variables 
that can be used to operationalize them. Predisposition components exist prior to the incidents 
of sickness; they determine the level of health services used, although they are not directly 
related to health care use. The predisposing components are classified into demographic, social 
structure, and belief variables. Demographic characteristics include age, sex, and marital status. 
For instance, individuals in different age cohorts are faced with different types of illnesses and 
consequently require different patterns of medical care. The social structure comprise of 
education, occupation, household size, residential type, ethnicity and religion, whereas beliefs 
include values about health and illness, attitudes towards health services, and health 
knowledge.  
Household attributes and the community in which the household lives can affect the ability of 
the individual to secure health services.  Enabling components are, therefore, classified into 
both household and community attributes. Household enabling conditions are measured by 
resource endowments such as wealth, health insurance coverage, or third-party payment, and 
whether or not the source of care is accessible. The characteristics of the community include 
the ratio of health facilities and health personnel to population, price of health services and 
whether or not the individual reside in a rural or urban community. With the predisposing and 
enabling components, the use of health services occurs when the individual perceives sickness 
or the probability of sickness. The measures of perceived illness include number of disability 
days and experienced symptoms of illness. In addition to our social network variable, this 
framework acts as a guide for selecting other controls both individual and household level 




argues that it is a predisposing factor and falls under the belief component, since it has to do 
with knowledge about service availability and its importance.    
 
2.3 Why might social networks matter for health care use? 
The importance of social networks on individual behaviour has long been documented in the 
sociological literature. An example is the work of Granovetter (1985), who stresses the 
inclusion of individual behaviour into social structure. Following the insights from this 
literature, economists have developed considerable interest in the recent decades, and there is 
growing evidence of network effects in many areas of economic research. The literature 
basically points to two channels through which networks operate. The one channel is the 
information channel which argues on the supply of information on service availability, 
eligibility and procedure of application, and the other channel is the norm channel that provides 
peer pressure and alters the use of services.  
The effects of social pressure on economic outcomes have been studied both at the micro and 
macro level. From the micro perspective, most of the research on social networks and economic 
outcomes relate to labour and public economic outcomes, such as program participat ion, 
fertility, crime and education (Bertrand et al., 2000; Burns et al., 2010; Ellison & Fudenberg, 
1993, 1995; Glaeser, 1999; Goolsbee & Klenow, 1999; Sacerdote, 2001). At the macro level, 
economists have shown that human capital spill overs are essential for economic growth and 
inequality (Benabou, 1996; Durlauf, 1996) 
The major challenge in studying the effect of networks is the lack of information on 
individuals’ actual social contacts. In order to deal with this problem, empirical studies assume 
that individuals mainly interact and learn from geographically close people of the same 
ethnicity. This is referred to as a potential measure of one’s network.  Manski (1993, 2000) 
argued that with this measure, the identified positive correlation between an individual outcome 
and the average behaviour of their reference group does not provide conclusive evidence of 
network effects, unless the identification problem is addressed. This identification problem 
emanates from omitted unobservable characteristics. Based on this argument, Bertrand et al. 
(2000) developed an approach that can be used to circumvent many of the omitted variable 
biases that plague estimates of network effects. Recent studies then rely on this approach to 
draw conclusions on the relationship between individual outcomes to the average behaviour of 




While the effects of social networks on most individual and economic outcomes have been 
researched, very little evidence is available on the effect of social networks on the use of health 
services (Deri, 2005; Devillanova, 2008). This section presents international evidence on the 
effect of information externalities through social networks on the utilisation of health services. 
The generalisation of the findings to the Sub-Saharan African context and Tanzania in 
particular is however still to be determined.  
In health economics, there has been much progress in understanding the dimensions through 
which the supply of health services can be improved, but there is limited evidence on how the 
utilisation of health care varies across social groups (Luke & Munshi, 2007). However, 
sociology and public health literature have illustrated how individual and group characterist ics 
influence health seeking behaviour. With regard to community effects, a number of studies 
have identified a significant difference in health care utilisation across race, ethnicity, religion, 
and region (Basu, 1990; Burgard, 2002; Stephenson & Tsui, 2002). These differences are 
attributed to differences in health beliefs, and practices across communities, as well as 
government policies towards specific social groups.  
The pioneering work of Deri (2005) is the first to provide an insight into the effects of social 
network on health care utilisation decisions. The study explains several ways through which 
networks can influence the demand for health care. First, it states that networks can disclose 
detailed information about the functioning of the health care system, and can provide 
information on appropriate health care providers, thereby reducing search costs. In addition, 
networks can affect the perceived efficacy or desirability of the available services, and then 
alter the demand for services. Deri (2005) finds that the utilisation of health services by 
immigrants in Canada increases with the number of doctors that speak their language in their 
neighbourhood. The study also finds that the network effects are likely to be underestimated in 
the presence of omitted variable bias.  
Following this conclusion, Devillanova (2008) used a dataset that contains direct indicators of 
information spill over to study the effect of networks on health care utilisation. Individua ls 
were asked whether or not they were referred to health care opportunities by friends or relatives. 
With this measure, the identification issues in network effects literature are overcome, and the 
channel through which networks operate is identified. Devillanova (2008) focuses on the time 
an immigrant spent before seeking care from a medical professional. The study finds that 




individual characteristics and ethnic heterogeneity, the results show that networks foster health 
care utilisation, and reliance on a strong social tie reduces the delay to seek care by 30 percent. 
The review shows that there is increasing attention to understand the effects of social networks 
on health care demand. However, there is little evidence to support the role of social interaction 
on the use of health services in Sub-Saharan Africa. Again, recent studies of network effects 
focussed on how to handle the hurdles emanating from the potential identification problem. 
Admittedly, such works have identified numerous ways for quantifying one’s actual and 
potential contacts. In terms of potential contacts, networks have been considered to act through 
language groups and geography. This study argues that this approach is not applicable in 
societies such as Tanzania, where language is not a medium of social grouping.  
While health economists have made progress in understanding the supply and demand side of 
the health care market, there is limited emphasis on how utilisation varies across social groups 
(Luke & Munshi, 2007). Evidence regarding the importance of social networks on individua l 
choices and economic outcomes is further limited as recent literature relies mostly on language 
and geography as a measure of network size. It is important to note that in a society where 
language may not be a good measure of network size, information spill over through other 
forms of social groupings can still influence individual outcomes. In a society where everyone 
speaks the same language or with high degree of inter-tribal marriages, ethnic language may 
not necessarily be a medium for socialisation, and hence language may not be an effective 
measure of the quantity of one’s network. The high level of inter-tribal marriages in Tanzania, 
and the fact that one of its official language – (Swahili) has dominated and displaced many 
tribal languages, makes the use of languages as a measure of quantity of one’s contacts difficult 
and inappropriate. This study argues that in such a scenario, and in the context of maternal 
health care utilisation, female’s age-marital status or her age-fertility cohorts and geography 
can provide more appropriate measures of the quantity of her networks.  
This is because it has been shown that women are more likely to associate with other women 
of the same marital status cohort (D'Abate, 1994; Lin & Westcott, 1991; Rands, 1988a). In 
order to strengthen a couple’s new combined network, the couple selectively dissolves former 
relationships (D'Abate, 1994; Lin & Westcott, 1991; Rands, 1988a). In the context of 
developing countries, especially in Africa, networks of couples during marriage are based on 




rarely develop into a relationship with both partners or are maintained during marriage (Albeck 
& Kaydar, 2002a; Lin & Westcott, 1991; Rands, 1988a).  
The social bridges that exist during marriage collapses in periods of divorce. Women, in 
particular lose a significant percentage of the network of shared friends (Duffy, 1993; Wilcox, 
1986). Again, in periods of divorce, women’s constellation of friendships may collapse entirely 
within a very short time (Duffy, 1993; Rands, 1988a). The damage of her social network is 
extensive if she depended heavily on her husband’s network (Daniels-Mohring & Berger, 1984; 
Gerstel et al., 1985; Wallerstein, 1986). Even the friends she had before and during the 
marriage may dissolve due to conflict of loyalty (Rands, 1988a), social norms that project 
negative attitudes towards divorced women, and the absence of recognised social behavioura l 
codes towards divorced (D'Abate, 1994; Gerstel, 1987; Wiseman, 1975).  
Finally, the social status of married women depends on their husbands’ status. The social 
activity of married women differ considerably from unmarried and divorced women, but fits 
better with the activity of other married women (Albeck & Kaydar, 2002a; Duffy, 1993). Given 
this argument, and the fact that all women in our analysis have given birth, a woman’s age-
marital status cohort is used as a possible measure for quantity of contacts. To further explore 
other possible ways of social cohesion between women, age-fertility cohort is also considered. 
Quantity of networks and quantity of contacts are used interchangeably.  
2.4. Empirical Strategy 
The empirical analysis adopts Bertrand et al.’s (2000) methodological approach. The 
probability that a pregnant woman completed the required number of antenatal care visits 
and/or initiated antenatal care early is represented as: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘) = 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑘𝛼
∗ + 𝑋𝑖
∗ 𝛽∗ + 𝑌𝑗
∗𝛿∗ + 𝑍𝑘
∗ 𝜏 ∗ + 𝑖𝑗𝑘       (2.6) 
Where 𝑖 represents individuals, 𝑗 represents geography (clusters), and 𝑘 is age-fertility cohort.  
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘  is a dummy variable equal to one, if the individual woman utilised the required number 
of antenatal visits, and zero otherwise. 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑘 is a measure of information the pregnant 
woman receives from her female contacts; 𝑋 is a set of observed and unobserved individua l 
and household characteristics; 𝑌 is a set of observed and unobserved characteristics from her 
locality (for instance, urban areas may have abundant health care facilities that increase 
accessibility and may increase the probability of health services utilisation); and 𝑍 is a set of 




Several empirical studies have shown that individual outcomes are directly associated with 
friends, neighbours and ethnic group outcomes. Before the identification of the `reflect ion 
problem13’ by Manski (1993), the average neighbourhood outcome was the basis for measuring 
social network (see Jencks & Mayer, 1990). Bertrand et al. (2000) developed a methodologica l 
approach for handling such hurdles. Social network studies in the recent periods have made 
use of this approach (Burns et al., 2010; Deri, 2005). This study adopts this methodologica l 
approach to identify the effects of social network to antenatal care utilisation in Tanzania. The 
estimation of this model is difficult given that actual information concerning individua l’s 
contacts and the extent of her network hardly exist in many datasets.  
In the recent literature, Bertrand et al. (2000) and Deri (2005) used language while Burns et al. 
(2010) used age-language cohort as a way of defining social networks. The idea is that speaking 
a mutual language is an essential channel for information externalities and individuals around 
the same age cohort in a given geographic area are more likely to spend time together and 
obtain information from each other. However, as highlighted earlier, this study argues that in 
Tanzania, language may not be a good measure for network quantity as one of its officia l 
languages (Swahili) along with the degree of inter-tribal marriages have dominated and 
displaced most ethnic languages (Legère, 1992; Mekacha et al., 1993; Yoneda, 2010). 
Nevertheless, it is evident that social networks equally can be categorised in the dimensions of 
race, ethnicity, age, and religion (Albeck & Kaydar, 2002a; Lin, 2004; Waldinger, 1996). 
Consequently, Arai (2007) showed that beside relatives, other forms of socialisation are 
important determinants of fertility. High fertility enhances experience about the available and 
important use of reproductive health services and can be viewed as a source of information 
spill over about the importance of these services to pregnant women. The analysis in this 
chapter follows Bertrand et al.’s (2000) methodological approach, but proposes some new 
plausible measure for the size of network14.   
                                                                 
13 Manski (1993) highlighted that causal statements between social networks and individual outcomes cannot be 
established due to two related omitted variable biases. First, omitted individual characteristics could be correlated 
with average group outcome. For instance, individuals residing where the incidence of care use is low may be less 
motivated to demand care services. Second, omitted neighbourhood characteristics may be correlated with mean  
incidence of non-user of health services in that locality. For instance, urban areas may have abundant health care 
facilities that increase accessibility and may increase the probability of health services utilisation. Even if  
information on actual contacts existed, individuals select their contacts.  Individuals with many contacts may be 
qualitatively different from those with few contacts. Estimates derived in this manner may suffer from omitted  
variable bias. 
14 Given the peculiarity of language set up in Tanzania and the fact that our data limits the use of other highlighted 




In this chapter, age-marital status and age-fertility cohorts are used as proxies for network size 
for women of reproductive age within a given cluster. Because there is no information on the 
number of pregnancies, the number of children ever born is considered as a measure of fertility. 
The fertility levels are categorised as follows: 0-3 children, 4-6 children, and 7+ children. The 
age brackets ranges from 15–24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and the span of 9 years in the age bracket 
and the fertility cohorts are large enough to reduce the bias that may result from social ties 
(Burns et al., 2010). The age-fertility cohorts consider all the likely age-fertility combinations 
that may result from these two variables. For age-marital status, women are grouped into the 
various age groups and into their respective marital status.  For example, all women between 
the age of 15 and 24 who are married and live within a particular cluster are regarded as 
members of the same network. Such network would be distinct from that of women aged 15 – 
24 who are unmarried or divorced but reside in the same area. The number of women in one’s 
locality who are of the same age-marital status or age-fertility cohort measures the quantity of 
contacts available. Consequently, a woman who resides in an area with more women of her 
age-marital status or age-fertility category will have a large number of available contacts. The 
number of women in one’s contact group that uses antenatal care services measures the quality 
of that network. As there is no explicit information about peer network, this network proxy 
should be viewed as potential rather than actual contacts. In order to minimise biases resulting 
from omitted variable bias at the geographic area and age-marital status, the area fixed effects 
as well as age-marital status fixed effects are included in the estimation.  
In order to resolve the biases resulting from omitted neighbourhoods and age-marital status or 
age-fertility cohort characteristics, the study follows Bertrand et al’s (2000) approach in which 
the network measure is taken to be the interaction between `quantity’ (the number of people in 
one’s cohort) and `quality’ (the attitude and knowledge of these people towards the use of 
antenatal services)15. That is, 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑗𝑘 = 𝑉𝑗𝑘 ∗ 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  where 𝑉𝑗𝑘  represents the density of age-
marital status or age-fertility group 𝑘 residing in area 𝑗 a measure of potential number of 
contacts available to an individual (quantity)16, 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the mean frequency of antenatal care 
                                                                 
measures of network in this case. Focus is on age-fertility cohort and use the age-marital status measure as robust 
check.  
15 See (Bertrand et al., 2000; Deri, 2005; Burns et al., 2010) 
16 Based on  Bertrand et al. (2000), 𝑉𝑗𝑘  is the proportion of individuals in area 𝑗 that are in age-marital status or 
age-fertility cohort 𝑘 as a ratio of the proportion of individuals from Tanzania in that group. The available measure 
for contact is therefore  𝑙𝑛 (
𝑉𝑗𝑘 𝐴𝑗⁄
𝐿𝑘 𝑇⁄
), where  𝑉𝑗𝑘  measures the number of individuals in area 𝑗 in the age-marital 
status or age-fertility group 𝑘; 𝐴𝑗  is the number of individuals who reside in area 𝑗; 𝐿𝑘  is the total number of 




users from age-marital status or age-fertility group 𝑘 in the population. This provides a measure 
of the level of service utilisation in one’s network (quality)17. The estimated equation is then 
written as:  
𝑃𝑟(𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘) = (𝑉𝑗𝑘 ∗ 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )𝜑 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜋𝑗 + 𝜔𝑘 + 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑘 𝜃 + 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑗𝑘𝛿 + 𝑉𝑗𝑘𝛾 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑘       (2.7) 
Where 𝜋𝑗 and 𝜔𝑘 are respective fixed effects for geography and age-marital status or age-
fertility cohort. Their inclusion captures any unobserved differences between regions, such as 
availability of health care facilities and age-fertility group effects; 𝑋𝑖 is individual and 
household level characteristics; 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑘  is distance to a health care facility (supply side 
influence); and 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑗𝑘 is a relocation variable that indicates whether or not an individua l 
relocated away from her network. To deal with biases resulting from any omitted individua l 
characteristics correlated with 𝑉𝑗𝑘, the variable 𝑉𝑗𝑘  is included as an independent variable in the 
regression. This would appear as an estimate of 𝛾 which does not affect 𝜑. Since the age-
fertility group fixed effects, 𝜔𝑘 is included in the equation, the direct effect of  𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is therefore 
excluded. The potential exogenous and endogenous biases are accommodated in equation 2.718.   
The remaining potential bias may result from the correlation between omitted individua l 
characteristics and the network variable (𝑉𝑗𝑘 ∗ 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ). This arises if people self-select away 
from their age-fertility cohort. The idea is that individuals living in areas of high density of 
their age-marital status/age-fertility group are different in some unobserved way from those 
living in low density areas. Differential selection biases the estimates because leaving from a 
group with low level of utilisation to a group with high level of service use might increase the 
care use for that individual and vice versa. However, Bertrand et al., (2000) and Deri, (2005) 
showed that the network effect cannot be completely explained by differential selection.  
                                                                 
population. It is the case that small groups will have small available contacts even if there is full concentration 
and the fact that individuals self-segregate could be misleading. Using proportions resolve these problems and 
prevent the underweighting of small age-marital status or age-fertility groups. 
17 Using the frequency of care use from age-fertility group 𝑘 in cluster 𝑗, excluding individual 𝑖 as a measure of  
𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑘 , introduces bias, since it may reflect the unobserved characteristics this individual has in common with  
others from the same age-fertility group living in the same cluster.  To avoid such biases, the mean care users of 
the age-fertility group in the entire population is used. Precisely, it is measured as the mean deviation the group’s 
level of care use relative to the mean care use of the entire sample used in the analysis Bertrand et al., (2000)    
18 First, the fixed differences in utilisation resulting from differences in service availability between areas are 
removed by geography fixed effects. Second, fixed age-fertility or age-marital status group specific differences in 
utilisation such as differing levels of experience and beliefs are eliminated by age-fertility or age-marital status 
fixed effects. The omitted reasons for individuals choosing to res ide in high/low density area of their age-fertility  
group are eliminated by the direct effect of the density of age-fertility group in her locality. Finally, distance to 




In addition, Burns et al. (2010) argued that this might not be a significant source of bias given 
the high level of aggregation in districts and further proposed the use of a relocation variable. 
A variable equivalent to whether or not an individual relocated is therefore included to control 
for the probability of individuals moving away from their network, in the intervening periods. 
This study employs a Linear Probability Model (LPM) to identify the effects of social network 
on the probability of completing the required number of antenatal visits and timing of antenatal 
care. Even though the LPM is well known for heteroscedastic standard errors, the use of the 
LPM is not entirely problematic, since robust standard errors can commonly be used (Scott 
Long, 1997).  Likewise, the LPM is preferred to the logit or probit models, since the latter 
suffer computational difficulties in the presence of fixed effects19 (Bertrand et al., 2000; Burns 
et al., 2010; Deri, 2005). Furthermore, a logit model is estimated and the estimates are 
compared to those obtained from the LPM. 
2.5. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
As indicated earlier in the previous chapter, the Tanzanian Demographic and Health Survey 
data for 2010 is used to empirically examine the effect of social networks on the probability of 
antenatal care utilisation. In this chapter, the sample is limited to women aged 15–49 years. In 
order to obtain the social network variable, women are categorised into their respective age-
fertility or age-marital status cohort and area of residence. Notably, the entire sample of women 
is used to construct the contact availability (quantity of contact) variable. The measure of mean 
utilisation (quality of contacts) by age-fertility or age-marital status cohort is also based on the 
entire sample. This is because excluding women who did not give birth within the period of 
the survey, but who had done so before, may underestimate the potential quantity and quality 
of contacts available to each individual woman. Getting the direct costs (user charge for 
supplies) for health services is difficult and has made the use of prices in health care demand 
literature limited (Booysens & Visser, 2005; Brown & Theoharides, 2009; Sahn et al., 2003). 
However, these limitations do not undermine our analysis. 
The empirical analysis is limited only to women who gave birth during the survey period. In 
constructing the contact availability measure, women are categorised into four age groups, 
three fertility cohorts and six marital status cohorts. The grouping of individuals into various 
                                                                 
19 Adding fixed effects to any binary outcome model that is based on maximum likelihood estimation induces bias 
in the coefficient and standard errors (incidental parameter bias). In addition, it is near certainty that any probit 
incorporating a nontrivial number of fixed effects will produce bias results (Baltagi, 2008). For the use of fixed  
effects in social sciences, there have been a switch from a standard normal probit to a logit model. The logit fixed  




age categories is guided by previous literature on network (see, Burns et al., 2010). ‘Maternal 
health care utilisation,’ in this chapter refers to antenatal care utilisation (timing of antenatal 
care and antenatal completion). Finally, the available sampling weight for these datasets is used 
to correct for the over and under representation of certain households.  
It is surprising that almost all the women attended at least one antenatal visit before childbirth, 
but less than half of all the women completed the required four visits. It is equally surprising 
that only 15 percent of all the women went for antenatal care within the first four month of 
pregnancy (see Table 2.1). As demonstrated in Table 2.1, up to 98 percent of all the women 
had at least one antenatal visit, while only 43 percent completed the recommended number of 
visits. The average age of the women in the sample is 36 years. 
 
Table 2.1: Antenatal care utilisation Rates by women 15 – 49 years 
  Percentage 
At least one antenatal visit  98 
At least four antenatal care visits  43 
Early antenatal care  (within first 16 weeks)  15 
Average age of women in the sample (years)  36 
    Source: Extracted from TDHS2010 reports 
Table 2.2 reports summary statistics for the sample by antenatal care use,20 revealing the 
interesting differences between early antenatal care check-up and antenatal completion. 
Individuals residing in the southern highlands, the lake, the central and the western zone have 
a lower percentage of those who attended at least four antenatal visits relative to their share of 
the sample. In contrast, individuals from the northern, southern and eastern have a higher 
proportion of those with at least four visits. While the eastern zone records the highest 
proportion of individuals that completed the number of visits, Zanzibar records the highest 
number of under users. Individuals in lower wealth quintiles have a higher proportion of those 
with incomplete antenatal care. The converse holds true for those in the upper wealth quintiles. 




                                                                 
20 An individual is considered to have completed the required number of antenatal care visits if s he indicated to 
have had at least four visits for every childbirth between 2005 and 2010. An individual is considered to have 
initiated antenatal care late if her antenatal care visit for every childbirth is not within the first four months of 




Table 2.2: Mean statistics for sample by antenatal care visit  
Variables Obs All At least four 
visits 




Household size 29777 7.14 (4.05) 6.57 (3.87) 7.27* (4.46) 6.09 (3.33) 
Number of under-five per woman 29777 1.13 (0.91) 1.37 (0.56) 1.56* (0.65) 1.34 (0.54) 
Number of children ever born 29777 5.44 (2.65) 3.56 (2.37) 3.91* (2.46) 3.26 (2.11) 
First wealth quintile 5995 0.21 (0.41) 0.17 (0.38) 0.22* (0.41) 0.17 (0.37) 
Second wealth quintile 6374 0.23 (0.42) 0.18 (0.38) 0.25* (0.44) 0.18 (0.39) 
Third Wealth quintile 6301 0.22 (0.42) 0.20 (0.40) 0.22* (0.42) 0.19 (0.39) 
Fourth wealth quintile 6386 0.20 (0.40) 0.22 (0.42) 0.19* (0.39) 0.21 (0.41) 
Fifth wealth quintile 4721 0.14 (0.35) 0.23 (0.42) 0.12* (0.33) 0.25 (0.43) 
Individual years of schooling 29773 4.82 (3.43) 5.68 (3.44) 4.73* (3.33) 5.88 (3.42) 
Individual has no formal education 8258 0.27 (0.44) 0.19 (0.40) 0.27* (0.44) 0.17 (0.37) 
Individual completed primary 18301 0.68 (0.47) 0.70 (0.46) 0.68 (0.47) 0.71 (0.45) 
Individual completed at least secondary  3218 0.05 (0.22) 0.11 (0.32) 0.05* (0.21) 0.12 (0.32) 
Age at first birth (15 – 19 years) 368 0.01 (0.12) 0.06 (0.23) 0.08‡ (0.27) 0.06 (0.25) 
Age at first birth (20 – 34 years) 11758 0.42 (0.49) 0.70 (0.46) 0.66† (0.47) 0.72 (0.45) 
Age at first birth (35 – 49 years) 17651 0.57 (0.50) 0.24 (0.43) 0.26‡ (0.44) 0.22 (0.42) 
Individual lives in the northern zone 3586 0.14 (0.35) 0.17 (0.37) 0.12* (0.33) 0.13 (0.34) 
Individual lives in the central  2460 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.28) 0.09 (0.29) 0.09 (0.28) 
Individual lives in the southern 
highland  
3105 0.14 (0.35) 0.10 (0.29) 0.17* (0.38) 0.15 (0.36) 
Individual lives in the lake  4080 0.19 (0.40) 0.18 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39) 0.12 (0.32) 
Individual lives in the Eastern zone 2613 0.12 (0.33) 0.20 (0.40) 0.09* (0.28) 0.21 (0.41) 
Individual lives in Zanzibar  6853 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.17) 0.02* (0.15) 0.03 (0.17) 
Individual lives in the southern zone 2847 0.09 (0.29) 0.10 (0.29) 0.09 (0.29) 0.16 (0.36) 
Individual lives in the western zone 4233 0.19 (0.39) 0.15 (0.35) 0.22* (0.42) 0.12 (0.32) 
Age bracket 1: 15 – 24 years 2723 0.11 (0.31) 0.30 (0.46) 0.32‡ (0.47) 0.30 (0.46) 
Age bracket 2: 25 – 34 years 9403 0.33 (0.47) 0.45 (0.50) 0.42* (0.49) 0.47 (0.50) 
Age bracket 3: 35 – 44 years 12236 0.40 (0.49) 0.22 (0.42) 0.24 (0.43) 0.21 (0.40) 
Age bracket 4: 45 – 54 years 5415 0.16 (0.37) 0.02 (0.15) 0.02 (0.15) 0.02 (0.13) 
Fertility cohort 1: 0 – 3 children 7134 0.27 (0.44) 0.57 (0.49) 0.52* (0.50) 0.63 (0.48) 
Fertility cohort 2: 4 – 6  children 11294 0.39 (0.49) 0.29 (0.45) 0.33* (0.47) 0.29 (0.45) 
Fertility cohort 3: 7+  children 11349 0.34 (0.48) 0.13 (0.33) 0.16* (0.37) 0.08 (0.28) 
Distance to facility is problematic 12118 0.46 (0.50) 0.39 (0.48) 0.46* (0.50) 0.36 (0.48) 
Male headed households 23584 0.78 (0.41) 0.80 (0.40) 0.82* (0.38) 0.82 (0.37) 
Individual relocated in the intervening 
period 
3900 0.12 (0.32) 0.16 (0.37) 0.12* (0.32) 0.14 (0.35) 
Participated in health care decision 14868 0.62 (0.49) 0.64 (0.48) 0.56* (0.50) 0.64 (0.48) 
knowledge of pregnancy complication 2906 0.54 (0.50) 0.60 (0.49) 0.51* (0.50) 0.65 (0.48) 
Notes: Standard deviation are in parentheses. ‡, † and * indicates that the difference in characteristics between those 
who completed and those who did not complete the number of antenatal visits is  statistically significant at 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively, otherwise they are not significant. Obs = Number of observations  
 
Another difference between those who completed the number of visits and those who did not 
lies in their potential educational attainment and health knowledge. Individuals with primary 
and secondary education have higher proportion of those with complete number of visits and 




less than primary education or with no health knowledge. Over 70 percent of women that 
completed the required number of visits had their first birth between the ages 20–34 years. 
Similarly, over 72 percent of women that initiated antenatal care early had their first birth 
between the ages 20–34 years. These percentages are far higher than their relative share in the 
sample. This suggest that women who gave birth at an adolescent age (15–19 years) and at an 
older age (35–49 years) are less likely to initiate for early care, or complete the required number 
of antenatal visits. Adolescent mothers have the lowest rate of utilising antenatal care services.  
 
To some extent, the differences in care use may reflect an age-fertility cohort difference. First, 
only 27 percent of the sample have between 0-3 children, but over 57 percent of all women 
within this fertility cohort completed the number of antenatal visits. In fact, to put it more 
starkly, over 34 percent of all women in the sample have at least seven children, but only 13 
percent of all women with complete check-up are from within this fertility cohort. Simila r ly, 
women with 4 to 6 children have a lower proportion of those with complete antenatal check-
up, compared to their share in the sample. Intuitively, this indicates that women gain experience 
that is likely to reduce their utilisation rates in subsequent births. Considering the respective 
fertility levels, it is identified that the probability of early antenatal check-up, and antenatal 
care completion reduces with fertility rate (see Table A2.1 in the appendix). The differences in 
early care check-up and antenatal completion may also reflect an age cohort difference. Just 
about 2 percent of women in the age group 45 and 54 years who gave birth within this period 
completed the required number of visits, and over 2 percent of their counterpart with less than 
required number of visits, compared to their share in the sample. 
 
It is interesting that the majority (64 percent) of individuals that completed or went for early 
antenatal care live in household where both partners cooperate in decision-making towards care 
use, relative to 56 percent for those with less than required number of visits. Those from male 
headed households are significantly less likely to complete the number of visit.  Just over 39 
percent of those who completed the number of visits and 36 percent of those with early care 
check-up are those who had problems accessing a health facility. Approximately 16 percent of 
those with complete care had relocated in the intervening period compared to 14 percent of 
those with early care check-up. On average, there are about 8 persons per household, and about 
2 under-five children per woman. Finally, the fertility rate (average number of children ever 





Since the network variable used in this study defines contact availability in terms of age-
fertility and age-marital status cohorts, Table 2.3 and 2.4 present antenatal care utilisa t ion 
figures by age cohorts, fertility and marital status grouping. These statistics are quite similar to 
the results in Table 2.2. More than half of the individuals in all the respective fertility and age 
cohorts (Table 2.3) underutilise antenatal services and the incidence of underutilisation is high 
amongst those in (4 to 6) and 7+ fertility cohorts.  Except for widows, over half of all 
individuals in the respective marital status used less than the recommended number of visits 
(Table 2.3).  
Table 2.3: Mean statistics for fertility, age and marital status cohorts by antenatal care visit 
Fertility group/ 
age group 






0 - 3 children 7134 46.16 53.84 17.57 
4 - 6 children 11294 40.09 59.91 14.56 
7+  children 11349 37.56 62.44 09.00 
15 - 24 years 2723 41.64 58.36 14.98 
25 - 34 years 9904 44.77 55.23 16.85 
35 - 44 years 12236 41.49 58.51 13.61 
45 - 54 years 5415 45.02 54.98 12.28 
Never married 580 44.83 55.17 18.03 
Married 23838 42.02 57.98 14.57 
Living together 1222 48.28 51.72 21.11 
Widow 1209 53.54 46.46 17.73 
Divorced 1050 43.31 56.69 16.27 
Separated 878 45.91 54.09 16.44 
 
Table 2.4 categorised women into their respective age-fertility and age-marital status cohorts, 
and identify their respective utilisation rates. These are women who all gave birth in the last 
five years before the survey. On average, underutilisation rates varies significantly across the 
various age cohorts. For example, over 76 percent of all individuals between the ages 15 and 
24 who are in the 4 to 6 fertility cohort, and over 73 percent of all individuals between the ages 
45 and 54 in 0 to 3 fertility cohort, attended less than four antenatal visits.  This incidence is 
however not consistent across all fertility and marital status cohorts. For instance, younger 
individuals (15-24 years) in the 0 to 3 fertility cohort have the lowest underutilisation rate, 
whereas oldest individuals (45-54 years) have the highest utilisation rate in the 4 to 6 fertility 





Table 2.4: Mean statistics for age-fertility and age-marital status cohorts by antenatal care visits  






0 - 3 Children 2445 15 - 24 years 42.32 47.68 15.09 
  3446 25 - 34 years 50.83 49.17 20.40 
  999 35 - 44 years 51.51 48.49 22.05 
  244 45 - 54 years 26.81 73.19 23.19 
4 - 6 Children 278 15 - 24 years 23.47 76.53 12.03 
  5129 25 - 34 years 38.41 61.59 13.75 
  4671 35 - 44 years 44.06 55.94 16.22 
  1216 45 - 54 years 61.39 38.61 16.26 
7+  Children 0000 15 - 24 years    
  828 25 - 34 years 36.23 63.77 04.76 
  6566 35 - 44 years 37.15 63.85 09.46 
  3955 45 - 54 years 41.30 48.70 10.66 
Never married 261 15 - 24 years 43.92 56.08 16.39 
  197 25 - 34 years 48.47 51.53 20.87 
  113 35 - 44 years 41.22 58.78 25.34 
 9 45 - 54 years    
Married 2090 15 - 24 years 39.76 60.24 13.18 
  7664 25 - 34 years 44.24 55.76 16.25 
  9999 35 - 44 years 40.76 59.24 13.07 
  4085 45 - 54 years 40.75 59.25 15.25 
Living together 128 15 - 24 years 53.31 46.69 28.38 
  445 25 - 34 years 46.09 53.91 18.10 
  445 35 - 44 years 42.89 57.11 17.13 
  204 45 - 54 years    
Widow 17 15 - 24 years 38.82 61.18 05.16 
  177 25 - 34 years 43.70 56.30 34.83 
  575 35 - 44 years 60.68 39.32 12.27 
  440 45 - 54 years 68.44 31.56  
Divorced 157 15 - 24 years 44.59 55.41 17.30 
  592 25 - 34 years 44.44 55.56 14.46 
  769 35 - 44 years 39.57 60.43 19.11 
  532 45 - 54 years 50.60 49.40  
Separated 70 15 - 24 years 47.45 52.55 22.31 
  328 25 - 34 years 50.11 49.89 18.47 
  335 35 - 44 years 34.93 65.07 08.67 
  145 45 - 54 years 49.53 50.47  
 
2.6. Empirical Results 
The network coefficient estimates from the baseline regression for the respective measures of 
network quantity are presented in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6. In Table 2.5, age-fertility cohort is 
used as a measure of network quantity, while age-marital status is a measure of network 




social networks. The specifications demonstrate how the network coefficient estimates change 
as fixed effects are included for age-fertility cohort, age-marital status cohort and geographica l 
location. The inclusion of distance to facility in the baseline regression is to net out biases 
resulting from differences in the supply of services across regions. Likewise, the relocation 
variable is included at this stage to control for the probability that an individual relocated away 
from her network within the intervening period, whereas the number of children ever born is 
included to account for experience. To re-iterate, the variable ‘antenatal completion’ is a 
dummy variable equal to one, if an individual woman received at least four antenatal visits 
from a health professional before childbirth, and zero, if she received less than four visits. The 
variable ‘early antenatal care use’ is a dummy variable equal to one, if the individual had at 
least one antenatal care visit within the first four months of her pregnancy, zero otherwise.   
Table 2.5: Regression estimates of network coefficient as additional fixed effects are included 
 Probability of  antenatal care 
completion 
Probability of early antenatal care 
use 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Contact availability -0.10*** -0.19*** -0.22*** -0.14*** -0.17*** -0.16*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Network effects 0.39*** 0.65*** 0.74*** 1.27*** 1.36*** 1.36*** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
Individual relocated in the intervening period 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.12*** -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Distance to health facility is problematic -0.05* -0.04* -0.02 -0.03** -0.03** -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of children ever born -0.00 -0.03*** -0.02** 0.00 -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 0.43*** 0.40*** 0.32*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Observations 5,310 5,310 5,310 5,249 5,249 5,249 
R-squared 0.02 0.04 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.33 
Age-fertility cohort fixed effects  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Cluster fixed effects  No No Yes No No Yes 
  Notes:   Significance *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
               The contact availability variable is 𝑉𝑗𝑘  and the network variable is defined as  𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑗𝑘 = 𝑉𝑗𝑘 ∗ 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . 
The means of the variables that make up the network variable are presented in Tables 2.1 – 2.4 
Age-fertility cohort is a measure of the quantity of one’s contact 
 
For the antenatal completion regression, the network effect rises from 0.39 after controlling for 
distance, experience and relocation, to 0.65 when age-fertility cohort fixed effects are included, 
and to 0.74 once areas fixed effects are added. Similar results are obtained when age-marita l 
status cohort is used (see Table 2.6). Similar findings are identified in the work of Deri (2005) 




significant. The network effects on the probability that an individual pregnant woman initiate ’s 
antenatal care early as opposed to late antenatal check-up increases consistently and remains 
significant, after controlling for various fixed effects. Based on this consistency, one can 
conclude that, the network effects on care use will be underestimated if the omitted variable 
bias is not adequately controlled21. However, network effects are higher for early antenatal 
check-up than in antenatal care completion. 
 
Table 2.6 looks at an alternative source of information externalities, by classifying individua l 
women according to their age-marital status cohort. The results reveal that irrespective of the 
various ways of social groupings, individuals with high quality contacts are more likely to 
utilise antenatal care services, relative to their counterparts with low quality contacts22. Similar 
results are obtained after switching the measure of contact availability from age-fertility cohort 
to age-marital status cohort. Results obtained from these two measures are consistent in signs 
and significant, but differ only in terms of magnitude. Though binary choice models in the 
presence of large fixed effects face computational challenges, a logit model is further estimated 
using the same sample. The results obtained from the logit model are presented in Table A2.2 
and Table A2.3 of the appendix. Compared to the LPM, the signs and significance of the 
network coefficients are the same.  
Results from both specifications show that increased distance to health facilities is likely to 
reduce the probability of completing the number of antenatal visits and/or early initiation of 
antenatal care. The effect of distance is consistently significant in the presence of age-
fertility/age-marital status fixed effects, but insignificant as location fixed effects are included. 
Interestingly, individuals who relocated away from their network significantly increased the 
probability of completing the number of antenatal care visits, but not the probability of early 
care use. The positive effect of relocation is possible if the quality of their new network is 
higher than the quality of their previous network, or if they relocated to areas where health 
services are more readily available. This relationship is consistent in both measures of the 
quantity of network. The negative coefficients for contact availability indicate that the positive 
effect of social networks are mainly due to quality and not the quantity of network. Finally, the 
number of children ever born by an individual woman is included to control for experience. 
The study finds that antenatal care utilisation declines significantly with experience. Again, 
                                                                 
21 The network estimates will be interpreted in detail in section 2.6.1 





this relationship is consistent in both measures of network, with higher magnitudes in the age-
fertility measure. 
Table 2.6: Regression estimates of network coefficient as additional fixed effects are included 
 Probability of  antenatal care use Probability of early antenatal care use 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Contact availability -0.06*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.09*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Network effects 0.19*** 0.86*** 0.85*** 0.52*** 0.67*** 0.66*** 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Individual relocated in the intervening period  0.13*** 0.12*** 0.11*** -0.02 0.02 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Distance to health facility is problematic -0.06** -0.05* -0.02 -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of children ever born -0.01* -0.03*** -0.01** -0.00 -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.45*** -0.00 -0.18*** 0.17*** 0.05** -0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 5,310 5,310 5,310 5,231 5,231 5,231 
R-squared 0.02 0.06 0.22 0.16 0.21 0.32 
Age-marital status cohort fixed effects  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Cluster fixed effects  No No Yes No No Yes 
  Notes:   Significance *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
               The contact availability variable is 𝑉𝑗𝑘  and the network variable is defined as  𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑗𝑘 = 𝑉𝑗𝑘 ∗ 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
Age- marital status cohort is a measure of the quantity of one’s contact 
 
Table 2.7 presents regression estimates of network effects after controlling for individual and 
household characteristics. There are no major changes in the magnitude of network effects on 
the probability of antenatal completion after controlling for individual and household 
characteristics. First, when age-fertility is used, the effect of network on antenatal completion 
remained at 0.74 after controlling for individual and household characteristics, but reduced to 
0.69 after controlling for early antenatal check-up23 (see the network effect in column 1 and 
column 2 of Table 2.7 for comparison). Second, when age-marital status is used, network effect 
remained at 0.85, but reduced to 0.72 after controlling for early antenatal check-up (see network 
effect in column 4 and column 5 of Table 2.7 for comparison). The effects are still highly 
significant (see the network effect in column 3 of Table 2.5 and 2.6 and the one in column 1, 
2, 4 and 5 of Table 2.7 for comparison).  
                                                                 
23 Women who initiate antenatal care early are most likely to complete the number of visits. It is there important 
to identify the effect of early care seeking on care completion and how the effect of networks ch anges after 




Table 2.7: Regression estimates of network coefficient including individual and household characteristics 













 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Contact availability -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.16*** -0.28*** -0.24*** -0.09*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Network effects 0.74*** 0.69*** 1.36*** 0.85*** 0.72*** 0.66*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) 
Early antenatal check-up  0.37***   0.35***  
  (0.02)   (0.02)  
Individual characteristics       
Individual relocated in the intervening period 0.11** 0.12*** -0.00 0.10* 0.11*** -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Individual age at first birth (20 – 34 years) 0.08** 0.08** -0.01 0.08** 0.08** 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
Individual age at first birth (35 – 49 years) 0.36 0.55*** 0.16 2.12*** 1.90*** 0.41*** 
 (0.23) (0.13) (0.11) (0.15) (0.14) (0.09) 
Individual years of schooling 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.01** 0.01*** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Knowledge of pregnancy complication 0.05*** 0.04** 0.03** 0.05*** 0.04** 0.02* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Distance to health facility is problematic -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Number of children ever born -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Number of under-five per woman -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.03*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.03*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household Characteristics       
Getting money for care is problematic -0.06* -0.05* -0.02 -0.05* -0.05* -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Male headed household 0.04* 0.04** -0.02 0.05* 0.05** -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Household asset index 0.05*** 0.04** 0.01 0.05** 0.04** 0.03* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Household size -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Individual lives in the central 0.21*** 0.27*** -0.01 0.11*** 0.16*** -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Individual lives in the southern highlands 0.57*** 0.64*** 0.03 0.40** 0.48*** -0.05** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Individual lives in the lake -0.01 0.12*** 0.11*** -0.07*** 0.00 0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Individual lives in the eastern 0.60*** 0.64*** -0.03* 0.54*** 0.58*** -0.05*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Individual lives in Zanzibar 0.18*** 0.26*** -0.07*** 0.15*** 0.23*** 0.10*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Individual lives in the southern 0.03 0.41*** 0.36*** -0.15*** 0.28*** 0.46*** 
 (0.053) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) 
Individual lives in the western 0.23*** 0.29*** -0.00 0.16*** 0.22*** 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Constant 0.14*** 0.06 0.08* -0.25*** -0.27*** -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) 
Observations 5,147 5,146 5,162 5,147 5,146 5,144 
R-squared 0.22 0.28 0.33 0.24 0.29 0.33 
                Notes:   Significance *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
                          The contact availability variable is 𝑉𝑗𝑘 and the network variable is defined as  𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑗𝑘 = 𝑉𝑗𝑘 ∗ 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
                          All regressions include district fixed effects age-fertility and age-marital status cohort fixed effect   
Column 1, 2, 4 and 5 are for antenatal care completion regression, column 3 and 6 are estimates for timing of antenatal visit. In column 2 and 





Similarly, inclusion of these additional controls to the early antenatal care use specifica t ion 
have no major effect on the magnitude of network effects and the significant level is unaltered 
(see the estimates of network in column 6 of Table 2.5 and 2.6 and the one in column 3 and 6 
of Table 2.7 for comparison). The coefficient estimates of network remain positive and highly 
significant after controlling for other explanatory variables and the likely biases. This suggests 
that social interaction among women of reproductive age is an important source of information 
externalities regarding the use of reproductive health services.  
Concerning the additional controls, it is identified that maternal age at first birth, years of 
schooling, knowledge about pregnancy complication and household wealth are positive and 
significantly associated with antenatal care completion. For antenatal care completion, results 
in column 1 are discussed and compared with results in column 4. Specifically, women who 
gave birth at the age 20 to 34 years are 8 percent more likely to complete the required number 
of antenatal visits, compared to their counterparts who gave birth at an adolescent age (15–19 
years). An additional year of maternal education increases the probability of completing their 
antenatal visits by 0.8 percent. As expected, women aware of risks associated with pregnancy 
outcomes increased the probability of completing the recommended antenatal care visits by 5 
percent. Interestingly, timing of antenatal visit strongly explains the probability of antenatal 
completion. Seeking antenatal care within the first trimester increases the probability of 
completing the number of visits between 35 and 37 percent.  
It has been shown that the number of under five children in the household reduces the demand 
for maternal health care (Duong et al., 2004). Using the number under-five children born to an 
individual woman, this study confirms the inverse association between the number of under -
five children and the utilisation of antenatal care. Precisely, an increase in the number of under -
five children per woman reduces the propensity to complete antenatal visits by 8 percent. The 
probability of completing the number of antenatal care visits is lower in household in which 
the woman had difficulty getting money to seek care. An increase in household wealth raises 
the probability of antenatal care completion by 5 percent. The magnitudes of these estimates 
are consistent in both specification (see column 1 and column 4). It is surprising that the 
probability of antenatal completion is higher in male than in female headed households. It is 
equally observed that the probability of completing the required number of visits varies with 




western and eastern zones, significantly increase the probability of completing antenatal visits 
relative to those who reside in the northern zones. 
In the case of timing of antenatal care, maternal age at birth, household assets and health 
knowledge significantly increase the probability of early antenatal check-up. As is the case 
with completing the number of visits, timing of antenatal visit is inversely related with the 
number of under-five to an individual woman. While residing in Zanzibar and the eastern zones 
significantly reduce the probability of early antenatal check-up, residing in the lake and the 
southern zones raises the likelihood of early antenatal check-up relative to their counterparts 
from the northern zone. It is identified that overall, the results are consistent, irrespective of the 
measure of one’s contacts (compare the significance of the estimates in column 1 and 4 for 
antenatal care completion regression in Table 2.7) 
2.6.1 Interpreting the Network Coefficients 
It is worth noting that the interpretation of the real magnitude of the network estimates from 
these specifications is not straightforward. The way the network variable is computed makes it 
difficult to interpret its actual magnitude. However, Bertrand et al. (2000) suggest an approach 
for obtaining the real measure of the magnitude of the network effects. Following this 
approach, this study seeks to answer the question, “to what extent would social interaction 
broaden a policy shock that affects the probability of antenatal care use”? The argument is 
based on the assumption of linearity of the policy shock. The conclusion is that, if the effects 
resulting from the policy shock is removed from the equilibrium outcome, the remaining 
marginal change is attributed to social networks. 
This study adopts the experimental approach, as specified in Bertrand et al. (2000) to identify 
the actual magnitude of network on antenatal care utilisation. First, it assumes a policy € which 
linearly affect antenatal care utilisation outcomes. The policy variable is included in the 
estimation, with the assumption that in the absence of network effect, this variable is scaled 
such that a one percentage point rise in € will leads to a one percentage point rise in the 
probability of antenatal care use. 
  𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘 = € + (𝑉𝑗𝑘 ∗ 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )𝜑 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜋𝑗 + 𝜔𝑘 + 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑘 𝜃 + 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑗𝑘𝛿 + 𝑉𝑗𝑘𝛾 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑘 .  
Inclusion of the network variable generate a multiplier effect, such that in equilibrium, the 




on both sides of the equation for each age-fertility cohort and each age-marital status cohort 
and differentiate with respect to €. In so doing we have, 𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑€
= 1 + ?̅?𝑘 ∗
𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑€
𝜑 where ?̅?𝑘  is 
the average number of contact (𝑉𝑗𝑘) in each age-fertility/age-marital status cohort. The 
responsiveness of each age-fertility cohort’s probability to utilisation of antenatal care services, 
owing to the policy change, can be obtained by solving the derivation above for  𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑€
. In order 
to obtain the marginal change, resulting purely from social interaction, we net out the direct 
effects of the policy change (note that it is equal to one). Hence, the actual magnitude of social 
networks is given by 1
 (1−𝜑𝑉𝑘 )
− 1. Where, 1
 (1−𝜑𝑉𝑘 )
− 1 is used to compute the indirect network 
effect for each age-fertility/age-marital status cohort, and 𝜑 represent the respective network 
estimated coefficients in row 2 of Table 2.7.  It should be noted that we had already controlled 
for the fixed effects and the possible observable characteristics.   
Using this approach, the indirect network impact on the probability of completing the number 
of antenatal care, as well as the timing of antenatal care by age-fertility cohort and age-marita l 
status cohort are presented in Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 respectively. With age-fertility as a 
measure of contact availability, antenatal care completion prospects, owing to social networks 
only, range between 0.06 and 0.35 (see panel A of Table 2.8). The overall network effect for 
all age-fertility groups is 0.24. The highest effect is observed among older women aged (35–
44 years) with fertility rates of at least 7 children, and the lowest is found among the youngest 
mothers aged (15–24 years) with fertility rates of 4 to 6 children. Panel B of Table 2.8 reports 
the indirect network effects on seeking care early. The overall network effects for all age-
fertility cohorts is 0.35, with the network impact to the probability of early care to individua l 
age-fertility cohorts ranging between 0.08 and 0.54. It is interesting to observe that the network 
impact for different groups is consistent across the various measures of antenatal care 
utilisation. This means that age-fertility groups with the lowest network effect to the probability 
of completing antenatal visits also have the lowest network effects to the probability of timing 
of antenatal care use. It is essential to note that these indirect network effects are highly 






Table 2.8: Indirect network impact on completing and timing of antenatal care visits (using age-fertility cohort) 
Panel A: Indirect network effects on completing the required antenatal care visits  
All 0.241 (0.006)    
  15 - 24 years 25 34 years 35 - 44 years 45 - 54 years 
1 - 3 Children 0.160  (0.009) 0.227  (0.017) 0.118  (0.009) 0.061  (0.006) 
4 - 6 Children 0.060  (0.005) 0.243  (0.011) 0.249  (0.011) 0.166  (0.015) 
7+  Children   0.108  (0.011) 0.354  (0.023) 0.230  (0.011) 
Panel B: Indirect network effects on seeking care early  
All 0.351  (0.013)       
  15 - 24 years 25 34 years 35 - 44 years 45 - 54 years 
1 - 3 Children 0.225  (0.016) 0.352  (0.052) 0.160  (0.014) 0.080  (0.008) 
4 - 6 Children 0.079  (0.007) 0.343  (0.019) 0.355  (0.018) 0.231  (0.023) 
7+  Children   0.144  (0.015) 0.540  (0.045) 0.325  (0.017) 
 
Table 2.9 reports the indirect network impact on the use of antenatal care services when age-
marital status cohorts are considered as the bases for forming social groups. The impact of 
networks on antenatal care use prospects ranges between 0.03 and 0.59 (see panel A of Table 
2.9). The overall network effect for all age-marital status cohorts is greater than the overall 
network of the age-fertility groups. The highest effect is observed among married women of 
age 35-44 years and is consistent across all age groups. The lowest is among divorced women 
of age 15–24 years. The indirect network impact on the timing of antenatal care check-up is 
presented in panel B of Table 2.9. The overall network impact for all age-marital status cohorts 
is again greater than that of age-fertility cohorts. The network impact on the probability of early 
care to individual age-marital status cohorts ranges between 0.03 and 0.38. Social networks 
have a higher impact on the completion of antenatal care services than on timing of antenatal 
care visit when age-marital status is used as a measure of quantity of network. These results 
are identical to those presented in Table 2.8. 
It is interesting to observe that the network impact for different age groups is consistent across 
the various measures of antenatal care utilisation. That is, groups with the lowest network effect 
to the probability of completing care services have the lowest network effects to the timing of 
care prospects irrespective of the measure of quantity of contact used. It is also interesting to 
note that network has the strongest effect among married women of age 35-44 years, and the 
weakest impact among divorced women age 15-24 years. This could be possible as social ties 
are likely to be weaker among divorced women. Several studies have shown that women are 




argued that during marriage, most networks (friendship) are based on ties with other couples 
(Rands, 1988a) and women’s friendships in her single days are rarely maintained (Albeck & 
Kaydar, 2002a; Lin & Wescott, 1991). The social bridges that exist during marriage collapses 
in periods of divorce. In most developing countries especially in Africa, the social status of 
married women depends on their husbands’ status, and the social activity of married women 
differ considerably from unmarried and divorced women, but fits better with other married 
women (Duffy, 1993; Albeck & Kaydar, 2002a). Compared to the results in Table 2.8, it is 
clear that irrespective of the bases for forming social groups, individuals with high quality 
contacts are more likely to fully utilise antenatal care services in Tanzania.  
Table 2.9: Indirect network impact on completing and timing of antenatal care visits (using age-marital status cohort) 
Panel A: Indirect network effects on completing the required antenatal care visits  
All 0.359 (0.012)    
  15 - 24 years 25 - 34 years 35 - 44 years 45 - 54 years 
Never married 0.076 (0.018) 0.059 (0.007) 0.075 (0.007) 0.089 (0.012) 
Married 0.139 (0.008) 0.407 (0.018) 0.588 (0.029) 0.248 (0.012) 
Living together 0.050 (0.006) 0.133 (0.017) 0.178 (0.039) 0.149 (0.015) 
Widow 0.036 (0.008) 0.060 (0.004) 0.129 (0.013) 0.149 (0.016) 
Divorced 0.033 (0.003) 0.081 (0.006) 0.138 (0.017) 0.164 (0.022) 
Separated 0.053 (0.012) 0.094 (0.015) 0.096 (0.009) 0.126 (0.012) 
Panel B: Indirect network effects on seeking care early 
All 0.243  (0.007)       
  15 - 24 years 25 - 34 years 35 - 44 years 45 - 54 years 
Never married 0.050 (0.008) 0.044 (0.004) 0.056 (0.005) 0.068 (0.009) 
Married 0.102 (0.006) 0.278 (0.009) 0.384 (0.016) 0.177 (0.008) 
Living together 0.038 (0.005) 0.097 (0.012) 0.129 (0.026) 0.110 (0.011) 
Widow 0.027 (0.006) 0.046 (0.003) 0.095 (0.009) 0.110 (0.012) 
Divorced 0.025 (0.002) 0.061 (0.004) 0.102 (0.012) 0.119 (0.015) 
Separated 0.040 (0.009) 0.070 (0.011) 0.072 (0.006) 0.094 (0.009) 
Table 2.10 reports network estimates and the indirect impact of network on the probabilities of 
completing the number of antenatal visits and early initiation of antenatal care for specific 
subgroups. The results are based on age-fertility cohort as a measure of the quantity of one’s 
contact or quantity of network. The estimates on antenatal care completion are presented in 
column 1 and 2, while the estimates on timing of visit are in column 3 and 4. 
The network estimated coefficient on completion of number of visits is slightly higher in male 
than in female headed households, with the indirect effect suggesting that social networks 
increases antenatal care utilisation for male headed households by 0.01 higher than female 




unemployed women, with the indirect effect indicating that networks raises antenatal care use 
prospects for employed women by 0.13 relative to 0.10 for unemployed women. The network 
estimates for urban residence is greater than that for rural residence, with the indirect impact 
for urban dwellers almost four times higher than for rural dwellers.   
Table 2.10: Marginal effects of network and indirect network impacts on completion and timing of antenatal care (age-fertility) 





Probability of early 
antenatal care 
Indirect effects 
on early care 
Variables 𝜑  𝜑  
Male headed household 0.371*** (0.052) 0.103 (0.002) 1.057*** (0.044) 0.462 (0.044) 
Female headed household 0.355**   (0.115) 0.094 (0.002) 0.876*** (0.091) 0.288 (0.009) 
Household asset index below average 0.137       (0.116) 0.034 (0.001) 0.868*** (0.075) 0.299 (0.014) 
Household asset index is average 0.299*** (0.109) 0.078 (0.003) 0.809*** (0.109) 0.269 (0.018) 
Household asset index above average 0.448*** (0.071) 0.129 (0.003) 1.133*** (0.053) 0.399 (0.083) 
Individual has no formal education 0.204**   (0.097)  0.052 (0.001) 0.741*** (0.095) 0.234 (0.010) 
Individual has completed primary  0.408*** (0.059) 0.115 (0.002) 1.123*** (0.048) 0.031 (0.001) 
Individual has completed secondary  0.300*** (0.132) 0.080 (0.010) 0.804*** (0.105) 0.276 (0.023) 
Individual is employed 0.457*** (0.112) 0.133 (0.005) 1.058*** (0.045) 0.438 (0.029) 
Individual is unemployed 0.351*** (0.053) 0.096 (0.002) 0.900*** (0.081) 0.334 (0.020) 
Individual lives in rural area 0.177*** (0.057) 0.045 (0.001) 0.782*** (0.054) 0.252 (0.008) 
Individual lives in urban areas 0.604*** (0.089) 0.201 (0.009) 1.339*** (0.056) 0.770 (0.175) 
Individual relocated 0.582*** (0.121) 0.165 (0.010) 0.797*** (0.084) 0.248 (0.012) 
Individual did not relocate 0.324*** (0.051) 0.088 (0.002) 1.099*** (0.045) 0.307 (0.152) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Interestingly, the network coefficient on antenatal care use is larger for those with primary 
education relative to those with no education and those with at least secondary education. 
Antenatal care completion prospects due to social networks for those with no education 
increased by 5 percent and those with secondary education by 8 percent compared to 12 percent 
for those with primary education. The network estimate for those who relocated within the 
intervening period almost double that for those who did not relocate. The completion prospects 
for those who relocated increased by 17 percent relative to 9 percent for those who did not 
relocate. Finally, the social network estimate on antenatal care utilisation increases with the 
level of household asset index. The network coefficient for women from poorer (asset index 
below average) household is not significantly different from zero. The indirect effect suggests 
that social network would improve utilisation prospects for those in the middle wealth quintile 
by 8 percent and 3 percent for those in the lower quintile compared to 13 percent for those in 




In contrast, the results for the impact of social networks on the timing of antenatal check-up 
are much stronger than the completion of the number of antenatal visits. It is evident from 
Table 2.10 that the estimated network coefficients, the magnitude of its impact, and the level 
of significance are higher on timing rather than completion of antenatal visits. While the 
network coefficient of women from poor households on antenatal completion are insignificant, 
that for timing of antenatal visit is highly significant. In addition, while the impact of network 
on antenatal care completion ranges from 0.03 for women from poorer households to 0.20 for 
those in urban areas, the impact on the timing of antenatal visit ranges from 0.03 to 0.77. The 
network coefficient of female headed households and no formal education on the timing of 
antenatal check-up is highly significant, relative to antenatal care completion. 
 
Table 2.11: Estimates of network and indirect network impacts on completion and timing of antenatal care  





Probability of early 
antenatal care 
Indirect effects 
on early care 
Variables 𝜑  𝜑  
Male headed household 0.305*** (0.041) 0.103 (0.003) 0.575*** (0.033) 0.186 (0.019) 
Female headed households 0.125*     (0.049) 0.023 (0.001) 0.499*** (0.023) 0.127 (0.013) 
Household asset index below average 0.104       (0.080) 0.029 (0.001) 0.508*** (0.043) 0.170 (0.014) 
Household asset index is average 0.104*** (0.029) 0.030 (0.003) 0.518*** (0.041) 0.282 (0.019) 
Household asset index above average 0.219*** (0.072) 0.066 (0.002) 0.723*** (0.052) 0.180 (0.065) 
Individual has no formal education 0.130*     (0.075) 0.037 (0.004) 0.454*** (0.048) 0.238 (0.017) 
Individual has completed primary  0.201*** (0.039) 0.060 (0.001) 0.644*** (0.054) 0.177 (0.016) 
Individual has completed secondary 0.193**   (0.076) 0.052 (0.003) 0.515*** (0.022) 0.137 (0.016) 
Individual is employed 0.259*** (0.074) 0.086 (0.003) 0.533*** (0.021) 0.174 (0.037) 
Individual is unemployed 0.210*** (0.034) 0.061 (0.002) 0.469*** (0.037) 0.181 (0.015) 
Individual lives in rural areas 0.154*** (0.038) 0.045 (0.001) 0.450*** (0.028) 0.148 (0.013) 
Individual lives in urban areas 0.241*** (0.054) 0.072 (0.003) 0.580*** (0.025) 0.206 (0.083) 
Individual relocated 0.210*** (0.077) 0.062 (0.003) 0.499*** (0.020) 0.172 (0.023) 
Individual did not relocate 0.208*** (0.033) 0.055 (0.002) 0.623*** (0.049) 0.196 (0.041) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
In Table 2.11, the age-marital status cohort is used as a measure of the quantity of one’s 
network, to illustrate how the impacts of network for specific groups vary with the criteria of 
measuring the quantity of one’s contacts. The magnitude of the effects of social network on 
both antenatal care completion and timing of antenatal care visit vary significantly with the 
criteria of network formation. However, it is noted that the significant importance of network 
on both antenatal care completion and timing of antenatal care visit do not depend on the 
criteria for network formation. Thus, as identified earlier, groups with high quality of contacts 





This chapter sought to examine the impact of social networks on the probabilities of completing 
the required number of antenatal visits and early antenatal check-up. The various channels 
through which omitted variable bias could possibly affect the magnitude of these estimates are 
controlled using a linear probability fixed effect model. Two measures of the quantity of 
networks are used to identify whether or not the impact of networks varies with the way through 
which social groups are formed. Two broad groups of controls were included in the empirica l 
analysis. They include individual effects proxy by maternal age, educational attainment, health 
knowledge; number of children ever born and number of children under the age of five, and 
household effects proxy by distance to a facility, household wealth, household size and 
location. 
The study reveals several important findings. Firstly, social networks have a significant 
positive effects on antenatal care use, over and above the typical individual and household level 
variables. This implies that antenatal care may be especially sensitive to network effects. The 
analysis demonstrate that the impact of social networks is underestimated if the possible 
omitted variable bias is not probably controlled. After controlling for various fixed effects, the 
inclusion of individual and household characteristics reduce the magnitude of the network 
effects. The impact of networks is substantially higher for timing of antenatal visits than for 
completion of the number of visits probabilities. The network estimates remain positive and 
highly significant after controlling for age-fertility/age-marital status cohort fixed effects, 
geography fixed effects and other controls. The study established that irrespective of the way 
through which women form their social groups, members from high quality groups are more 
likely to complete the number of antenatal visits, or go for early antenatal check-up. The 
findings indicate that the criteria for social interaction only matters if concerns are on the 
magnitude of the impact, rather than the direction of the effects. 
In addition to the effect of social networks, observed individual and household characterist ics 
influence the probability of completing the number of antenatal visits and timing of antenatal 
check-up. For example, the probability of completing the number of visits reduces with the 
number of children under the age of five years. On the other hand, it increases with the years 
of schooling, maternal age at first birth and household assets. The probability of completing 




households than their respective counterparts. Older women (35-49 years) are significantly 
more likely to complete the required number of visits than younger women (15-19 years).  
The level and extent to which social networks impact on utilisation rates vary with the inclus ion 
of observable characteristics. The utilisation of antenatal care services among pregnant women 
may vary with the quantity and quality of their contacts. However, the magnitude of the effects 
of social network on antenatal care utilisation outcomes is dependent not only on the quantity 
and quality of one’s contact, but also whether she is able to access her network effectively. For 
instance, social networks have a higher effect on antenatal care use probabilities for women 
who relocated within the intervening period. This suggest that those who relocated may have 
high access to high quality network, or they may have relocated to areas with better services. 
The magnitude is also dependent on her socioeconomic status. Social networks have a higher 
impact on care use for wealthy and educated women than the poor and uneducated women. 
This may imply that the quality of networks between these social groups vary significantly, 
with wealthy and educated women having higher quality of contacts. These findings are similar 
when employment status, type of place of residence and household head are considered.  
These findings are essential for policies that are designed to target under-users of antenatal care 
services. As governments design policies to promote the utilisation of health care services, 
there is need to sensitise the population not only through the media, but through other channels 
that reaches community groups or religious centres directly. This will have a multiplier type 
effect. First, it will affect the behaviour of people that receive this information directly, and 
second many others in their network are more likely to benefit indirectly.  
Finally, the study acknowledged that the effectiveness of social networks is contingent on 
differences in the characteristics of care users, the characteristics of their contacts, or their 
relationship with their contacts and the nature of the health care system. This study does not 
ascertain the various channels through which the effectiveness of networks is contingent on. It 
simply illustrates the actuality of the social network effects for respective social clusters. 
Justification as to why the magnitude of network effects varies significantly across groups  
remain difficult, unless there is more detailed information on the functioning of the health care 
system, relationship between health care users and their contacts, and the patient-physic ian 
relationship. A further understanding of the dynamics and complexities of social networks in 
the Tanzanian health care system hinge critically on a robust data set on social networks , 






Bargaining Power within Couples and Health Care provider Choice in Tanzania 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Even in contexts where reproductive health services are heavily subsidised or made free, take-
up in most developing countries is far from universal (Beegle et al., 2001a). One of the reasons 
is that in most circumstances, a woman’s decision to use these services happens within the 
context of a marriage, a household or a family (Becker, 1996). The level of negotiation within 
couples over the use of these services depends on the extent to which they differ in the valuat ion 
of reproductive health care. The outcome of their negotiation is determined by the way each 
member perceives the value of the services in relation to costs, and given their relative power 
in decision-making (Beegle et al., 2001a). This chapter examines a number of indicators of 
relative bargaining power within couples and ascertains their effect on the use of reproductive 
health services in Tanzania. Specifically, it focuses on health care use at delivery and health 
care provider choice at childbirth. The study in Tanzania is interesting as maternal health 
services are costly in private health facilities, but free in public facilities, yet only about 50 
percent of all childbirth occur in a health facility, as opposed to home.  
As the out-of-pocket money price declines due to increased health insurance coverage and the 
likely national health policy legislation, non-monetary factors gain an important role in 
explaining the demand for health services. Even in the absence of user fees, non-monetary 
factors, such as waiting and travel time, help to explain the unequal access to health care 
(Acton, 1975a). In line with this argument, studies have shown that both price and non-price 
factors are sine qua non for health care demand (Bolduc et al., 1996; Dor et al., 1987; Mwabu 
et al., 1993; Eme Ichoku & Leibbrandt, 2003; Sahn et al., 2003). On the one hand, several 
studies have identified the importance of individual and household characteristics (Adamu & 
Salihu, 2002; Andersen & Newman, 2005; Bhatia & Cleland, 1995; Currie & Gruber, 1996) 
and other non-price factors such as waiting and travel time (Wagle et al., 2004). On the other 
hand, few studies have shown that women’s power relative to that of their partners explain the 
use of reproductive health care services (Beegle et al., 2001a; Maitra, 2004; Maitra & Pal, 
2007). 
The channel through which gender empowerment affects health care demand is crucial in 




in household decision making process (Mammen & Paxson, 2000; Nikièma et al, 2008). 
Female education and maternal autonomy increases awareness about the availability of health 
care services as well as utilisation (Obermeyer, 1993). In addition to this, the ability of a woman 
to control household resources has a significant effect on health care usage (Allendorf, 2007; 
Maitra & Pal, 2007). Weaker maternal autonomy is associated with higher fertility, lower 
contraceptive use (Gage, 1995; Govindasamy & Malhotra, 1996; Morgan & Niraula, 1995) and 
poor child and maternal health (Bloom et al., 2001a). Therefore, the economic and social 
dimensions of the distribution of power between spouses matter in determining the use of 
reproductive services.  
In Sub-Saharan Africa, women’s access to health care may be affected by decision making 
mechanisms of intra-household resource allocation as well as traditional norms (Arhin-
Tenkorang, 2001; Stierle et al, 1999). The demand for health care by women is not only 
dependent on household resource endowments, but also on the way resources are allocated 
between household members (Nikièma et al, 2008). Therefore, the underlying household 
decision-making process co-determines if, when, and the extent to which women consume 
modern health services (Nikièma et al., 2008). Relative to men, women usually have fewer 
resources, limited access to education, paid work, inheritance and credit. In addition to these 
constraints, the under-utilisation of reproductive health services may equally be attributed to 
uneven gender relationships and inequities in power within the household.   
In most aspects, and because household resources are mostly controlled by men in most SSA 
countries, women typically depend on their husbands’ consent to seek care (Blackden et al., 
2006; Kevane, 2004; King & Mason, 2001). The high level of gender discrimination in Africa 
may constrain African women’s ability to mobilise resources for health care (Grün, 2004; 
Rogers, 2005; Tuwor & Sossou, 2008). While the role of women’s autonomy on health care 
use has been documented in both developed and developing countries, this evidence is not clear 
in the context of Tanzania. Household dynamics differ between societies, especially in Africa 
where cultural norms and traditional beliefs still play a vital role. This makes country specific 
case studies important for policy intervention. This chapter examines how cooperation between 
couples in decision making and how empowerment of women can influence health care use at 
childbirth as well as health care provider choice in Tanzania.  
Compared to some Sub-Saharan African countries, Tanzania has a well-developed network of 




percent of its citizens live within 5 kilometres of a primary health care facility. In addition, the 
government of Tanzania has authorised the removal of user-fees in public facilities for all 
women during pregnancy and at childbirth (Mosha et al., 2006). Given this and other 
interventions identified in the introductory chapter, it is surprising why up to about 50 percent 
of children are delivered at home when the risk of mortality is higher24 (See Figure 3.1). 
Delivery in a health care facility, therefore, still remains one of the most important challe nges 
facing reproductive health care utilisation in Tanzania.  
Figure 3.1: Trends in delivery by facility type 
 
 
With the low level of physician density in most developing countries and the inability to own 
private medical professionals, home deliveries are less likely to be attended to by a trained 
health professional. In the context of developing countries, it has been shown that the majority 
of all neonatal mortality between 1995 and 2003 emanated from home delivery, without a 
trained health professional (Lawn et al., 2005; Lawn et al., 2006). In terms of effectiveness of 
health service delivery, there is no clear distinction between the private and public providers. 
However, understanding people’s preferences between these providers can help direct policy.  
                                                                 
24 It is evident that home births contribute a high rate of infant and maternal mortality relative to facility births in 
Australia (Bastian et al., 1998). Equally, Wax et al., (2010) showed that in developed Western nations, planned 




It has been highlighted in the literature that individuals from affluent households are more 
likely to access private care, whereas the poor rely on public care and, at times, opt for self-
treatment (Booysens & Visser, 2005; Havemann & Van der Berg, 2003; Booysen, 2003). It is 
important to clarify the factors that hinder individuals’ ability to deliver in a health facility. In 
particular, a distinction between what drives their decision to choose between alternative health 
care providers is important as the benefits and costs obtained from different providers vary 
significantly. 
In the case of Tanzania where public health care for all pregnant women is free and private 
health care is costly, the public/private divide in access to health care remains stark. Bargaining 
power between couples affects the choice to use reproductive health care, and even once choice 
is made, it may influence public-private facility choice. This study adds to previous literature 
by introducing the role of household bargaining dynamics in accessing health care during 
delivery, particularly, how it affects pregnant women’s choice between public and private care. 
This may be of importance in the context of Tanzania where most communities are basically 
patriarchal, whereby traditional norms, practices and attitudes are concentrated on male power 
and legal protection of women is limited (World Bank 2013a).  
 
3.2 Bargaining Power and Health Care Usage Literature 
While the association between household bargaining, and fertility and family planning has been 
carefully researched (Bankole, 1995; Freedman et al., 1980; Rasul, 2008; Thomson et al., 1990; 
Thomson, 1997), very little evidence is available on its association with health care usage (see 
Beegle et al., 2001a; Maitra, 2004). According to Maitra (2004), the literature on the issue was 
surprisingly scarce before 2003. However, in the last decade, there has been growing evidence 
on how household bargaining, most especially women’s autonomy, influence the use of 
reproductive health services. While there is well documented evidence especially in developing 
countries, much is not known in most SSA countries, particularly in Tanzania. This section 
presents international evidence on the effects of bargaining between couples on the use of 
health care services. It also presents any available evidence in the context of Tanzania.   
In an attempt to understand health care use barriers, Becker (1996), highlighted that though 
women are the main point of contact for reproductive health services, their decision to use these 




value reproductive health services differ, then the use of these services will be subjected to 
negotiations within couples. The resulting outcome of the negotiation will depend on each 
person’s perception, costs and relative power in the household. Based on this argument, the 
pioneer work of Beegle et al. (2001a) investigated the role of bargaining power of couples to 
the use of prenatal and delivery care in Indonesia. The study showed that a woman’s influence 
over the use of these services increases if she owns some share or has discretion over household 
resources, and if she is more educated than her husband.  
While the study by Beegle et al. (2001a) was limited to differences in educational attainment 
and ownership of assets as a measure of bargaining power, Bloom et al. (2001a) used three 
indicators to measure women’s autonomy in the household, in a study in India. This included 
control over finances, decision making power and freedom of movement. After controlling for 
maternal characteristics and the household structure, the study found that greater freedom of 
movement of women increases the probability of using antenatal and safe delivery care.  
Maitra (2004) followed a similar approach but expanded the work of Beegle et al. (2001a) and 
Bloom et al. (2001a) by identifying additional indicators of bargaining within couples. This 
study examined the effects of parental bargaining on prenatal and hospital delivery in India. 
The attributes of bargaining considered here include, female ownership of assets, decision 
making power; freedom of movement and incidence of domestic violence. With these 
indicators, the study further constructed an index of bargaining power for women using a 
principle component analysis. It is evident from the study that a unit rise in the bargaining index 
increases the probability of prenatal care by 40 percent and that of hospital delivery by 25 
percent. Results from the study indicate that the gap between a women’s educational attainment 
relative to that of their husband has stronger effects on health care use, and her control over 
household resources significantly increase the use of prenatal and delivery care services.   
Allendorf (2007) examined the health care use effects of female autonomy in Nepal. The study 
argued that education and employment are two most important sources for female autonomy. 
In addition to education and employment, it finds that if spouses agree to female autonomy in 
the household, the use of health care services is likely to be stronger than when they disagree. 
In a qualitative study, Nikièma et al. (2008) argued that in a restrictive socio-cultural setting, 
social norms are likely to shape resource negotiation for women to seek health care. Women 




A number of studies in the recent period have focused on the above listed indicators to explain 
the autonomy or bargaining power of women in relation to the use of reproductive health care 
(see Mullany et al., 2005; Danforth et al., 2009; Sharma et al., 2007;  Mbweza et al., 2008; 
Doss, 2013). Only one of these studies, Danforth et al. (2009), attempted to investigate the role 
of women in household decision-making on facility delivery in the Kasulu district of Tanzania. 
The study confirmed that when partners agree on the importance of delivery in a facility and 
the use of a doctor rather than a traditional birth attendants (TBAs), the probability of delivery 
in a facility increases. Their study is limited as it focused only on a single district. Also, the 
literature highlighted above failed to show how bargaining power between couples explain 
health care provider choice at childbirth. This study covers all the districts in Tanzania and 
further extent previous literature by identifying how bargaining power affect the probability of 
alternative provider choice.  
 
3.3. Theoretical Model 
The modelling of health care demand emerged in the early 1960s as economists saw the need 
to estimate the demand for health care services. These models were reduced-form equations 
obtained from the utility maximisation assumptions. The demand for a particular health service 
was assumed to depend on its price, prices of alternative providers, household resources and 
taste. Factors like time costs for consuming health services and demographic factors of the 
patient, such as age and education, were ignored. The health care equation was reformulated in 
the 1970s to allow for the inclusion of these factors (see Acton, 1975b; Christianson, 1976; 
Grossman, 1972).  
With the limited resource endowment of most households, decision choices are made with a 
view of household utility maximisation. The opportunity cost of paying for medical care is the 
consumption of other goods and services forgone. If a household member is ill, he/she seeks 
treatment if and only if the individual or household utility gain from medical care is at least as 
good as the forgone utility from other non-health goods (Acton, 1975a; Grossman, 1972). 
However, should the household decides to seek medical care for its sick member, the question 
is which alternative care provider is to be used. If the household is rational, they choose the 




The health care provider choice theory builds on the theoretical insights of Grossman's (1972) 
demand for health model, which in itself builds on the neoclassical microeconomic 
fundamental assumptions (Wagstaff, 1986). In this chapter, the probability that an individua l 
pregnant woman chooses a particular health care provider at delivery is modelled. The 
specification follows the philosophies of Gertler et al. (1987) which state that an individual has 
a well behaved25 utility function defined over his consumption of both health and non-health 
related goods and services. Thus, the direct utility function of an individual woman for 
choosing a specific health care provider is specified as follows: 
𝑈𝑗𝑘 = 𝑈𝑗𝑘(ℎ𝑗𝑘 ,  𝑍𝑗𝑘)         (3.1) 
 
Where,  𝑈𝑗𝑘  is the direct utility that individual 𝑗 expects to get conditional on choosing provider, 
𝑘, ℎ𝑗𝑘  is the expected health outcome of individual 𝑗  for obtaining care from provider 𝑘, and 
 𝑍𝑗𝑘 is consumption of non-health related goods. The relative amount of  𝑍𝑗𝑘 consumed depends 
on provider choice 𝑘, since the monetary and non-monetary costs of care differs between 
providers. The resulting improvement in health status (ℎ𝑗𝑘) depends on individua l 
characteristics  𝑣𝑗,such as age, education and wealth as well as characteristics of the 
provider 𝑤𝑘, which include quality, price and availability of services. The improvement in 
health status is given as: 
 
ℎ𝑗𝑘 = 𝑄(𝑣𝑗,𝑤𝑘) + 𝑘          (3.2) 
 
The amount of income available to be spent on other goods and services after expenditure on 
medical care services depends on gross income 𝑌𝑗 and the price 𝑃𝑘 , paid for 𝑘′𝑠 services. The 
expenditure on medical care  𝑃𝑘 are both direct (monetary costs of services) and indirect costs 
(travel time to and waiting time in the facility). After paying for health services in a given 
facility 𝑘, the remaining amount to be spent on other goods and services is given by:   
 
𝑍𝑗𝑘 = 𝑧(𝑌𝑗 −  𝑃𝑘)         (3.3) 
 
Where 𝑃𝑘 is total amount, both direct and indirect, spent on health care for choosing 
provider  𝑘. The direct utility obtained for selecting an alternative provider 𝑘 then becomes: 
 
𝑈𝑗𝑘 = 𝑧(𝑌𝑗 − 𝑃𝑘) + 𝑄(𝑣𝑗,𝑤𝑘) + 𝑘       (3.4) 
 
                                                                 




Where (𝑌𝑗 − 𝑃𝑘) is income net payment for utilising health services of provider  𝑘, 
and 𝑄(𝑣𝑗, 𝑤𝑘)  is the quality of the preferred provider 𝑘. Consider that 𝑘 = 1 if an individua l 
𝑗  chooses a public facility, and 𝑘 = 2 if the individual chooses a private facility, for utility 
maximization, individual 𝑗 will prefer a private provider to a public provider if and only 
if  𝑢𝑗2 > 𝑢𝑗1. The probability for the choice of private over the public provider is given by: 
 
𝑃(𝑦𝑗 = 1/𝑥) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏( 𝑗1 − 𝑗2 ≺ 𝑢𝑗2 − 𝑢𝑗1)      (3.5) 
 
If the sample is random, then the probability that households or individuals with similar 
characteristics prefer 𝑢𝑗2 over 𝑢𝑗1 is given by: 
𝑃(𝑦𝑗 = 1/𝑥) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑢𝑗2 ≻ 𝑢𝑗1)        (3.6) 
Where  𝑦𝑗 = 1 is equivalent to the probability that the utility the individual or household 
obtains for using private care is more than the utility they get for using public care, given the 
individual or household socioeconomic status. In probabilistic models, the stochastic term =
( 𝑗1 − 𝑗2 ) is assumed to be independently and identically distributed with mean zero and a 
variance that depends on the type of the probabilistic model used. The consistency of the 
distribution of the errors to the random utility maximization depends on this property.  
 
3.4. Estimation Strategy  
At the time of delivery, a woman is assumed to seek medical care from a system characterised 
by many health care providers. The woman, or any of her relatives, is assumed to choose the 
provider that yields the maximum expected utility. The probability that the utility from a given 
provider of care is higher than the utility from any of the other alternative providers determines 
the health care demand function of that provider. This study assumes that provider choice 
decision can best be estimated using a nested logit. 
Until recently, most of the health care provider choice literature has assumed that health care 
demand functions take on a multinomial or conditional logit form (Booysens & Visser, 2005; 
Ntembe, 2009; Qian et al., 2010). These models place unrealistic restrictions on individua l 
behaviour. They make strong assumptions that the error terms are independently and identica l ly 
distributed and that the Independence of Irrelevant Alternative (IIA) assumption is satisfied. 




are uncorrelated across alternative providers. The multinomial logit further imposes the 
restriction that cross-elasticities of demand across alternatives are constant.  
These methods could be applicable if, and only if, the various alternative providers of care are 
completely dissimilar, or the error terms of the choices are completely independently 
distributed (see Domencich & McFadden, 1975). Otherwise, the estimates generated are 
inconsistent (Amemiya, 1985). The cross-substitution effects observed between pairs of 
alternatives are unequal in the presence or absence of other alternatives in the model once the 
assumptions are violated (Hensher et al., 2005). Hence multinomial and conditional logit 
models are inappropriate in modelling health care provider choice as their inherent assumptions 
are likely to be violated (Dor et al., 1987; Mwabu et al., 1993; Eme Ichoku & Leibbrandt, 
2003; Sahn et al., 2003; Brown & Theoharides, 2009).  
The nested logit model is identified as the most analytically tractable generalisation of the 
multinomial logit model and is the most advanced in terms of studies of choice (Cameron, 
2005; Hensher et al., 2005; Manski & McFadden, 1981). Although not all multinomial choices 
have the obvious nesting structure, the nested multinomial logit is an ideal model to be used 
when there is a well-defined and identified nested structure (see Figure 3.2 for the case of this 
chapter). It handles the challenges of the multinomial and conditional logit, but retain the 
identically and independently distributed error term assumption at each decision node. While 
the within category errors maybe correlated, the between errors are uncorrelated26.  
This chapter is concerned with both the decision to seek health care during childbirth and the 
decision to choose between alternative health care providers.  The estimated nested structure 
can be best illustrated in a tree in which decisions are made in each distinct nest (Brown & 
Theoharides, 2009). To re-iterate, the nested logit is appropriate in that it allows for the 
estimation of the covariance between the errors and cross-elasticities to vary between options. 
This study adopts the multinomial nested logit type approach used by Sahn et al., (2003)27. The 
nesting structure estimated is presented in Figure 3.2 
                                                                 
26 In our case, the errors within the health care facilities (private and public) may tend to be correlated, but the 
errors between no care and choosing between public and private care are uncorrelated.  
27 An alternative to this approach is the multinomial probit model. However, the multinomial probit model is 
similar to the multinomial logit model, just like the binary probit is similar to the binary logit model. The only 












Since this is based on the choices that individual women or households make conditional on 
being pregnant, women who did not give birth within the period of the survey are not included. 

























     (3.7) 
Where 𝑖 represents health care options available, 𝑗 is the lower level nests (public and private), 
and ℎ is the upper level nest (home and health facility). The indirect utility from each chosen 
health provider is given by 𝐻𝑖. The inclusive value parameters are 𝛿𝑗𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏𝑘 . While 𝛿𝑗 is the 
inclusive value parameter for the lower level nests, 𝜏𝑘  is the inclusive value parameter for the 
upper level nests (known as the limbs). The lower and the upper level nests to which the option 
ℎ belong is given by 𝑗(𝑘) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ(𝑘) respectively. It should be noted that if the inclusive value 
parameter of the upper level nest is constrained to one, the model reduces to a one-level nested 
logit probability, and finally to a multinomial logit model, if the inclusive value parameter for 
the lower nest is constrained to one. There are therefore three options (home, public and 
private), and can be estimated using a one-level multinomial nested logit presented in Figure 
3.2, as opposed to the two-level nested logit (see Sahn et al., 2003). This method is 
advantageous as it allows for the estimation of cross changes in probabilities and avoid the 
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3.5. Data and Sample Characteristics 
The data used in this chapter is extracted from the 2010 Tanzanian Demographic and Health 
Survey. Since this chapter is interested in women who gave birth during the five years before 
the survey, the sample is limited to individual women who reported to have given birth within 
the five years prior to the survey. For the purpose of the empirical analysis in this chapter, this 
survey is limited in the lack of an accompanying community survey. With regard to cost, 
getting the direct costs (user charge for supplies) in each option is difficult and has made the 
use of prices in health care demand literature limited (Booysens & Visser, 2005; Brown & 
Theoharides, 2009; Sahn et al., 2003). Similarly, most datasets have no information on the 
quality of care provided by each alternative provider. Again, these limitations do not undermine 
our analysis. Following Sahn et al. (2003) user charges are excluded, but the indirect or 
opportunity costs that is associated with distance to the health facility is included.  
As Table 3.1 demonstrates, 50 percent of the sample delivered at home without a skilled health 
professional (though some were attended to by traditional Birth Attendants (TBA)), compared 
to 42 percent in the public health care facility, and 8 percent in a private health care facility. 
For individual characteristics, the average age of women in the sample is 36 years. The average 
years of schooling per woman is approximately five years, whereas the average years of 
schooling per male is approximately six years. Over 83 percent of all women in the sample are 
employed. This includes those employed in both skilled and unskilled jobs. The fertility rate 
measured by number of children ever born per woman is 5.4. Of the number of children per 
woman, at least 1.3 of them are of age five years and below. The awareness about pregnancy 
complications is used as a measure of reproductive health knowledge. Over 54 percent are 










Table 3.1: Mean statistics for variables used in the analysis 
Variable  All Deliver in a 
facility 
Delivery at home 
Proportion of individuals that delivered at home 11937 0.50 (0.50)     
Proportion of individuals that delivered in public facility  9921 0.42  (0.49)     
Proportion of individuals that delivered in private facility  1854 0.08 (0.29)     
Characteristics of the individual woman        
Age of individual women (years) 24069 36.0 (7.98) 28.4 (6.75) 29.6* (6.99) 
Individual years of schooling 24069 4.82 (3.43) 5.78 (3.32) 4.06* (3.28) 
Individual is employed 19962 0.83 (0.34) 0.81 (0.39) 0.81 (0.39) 
Number of children ever born by the individual 24069 5.44 (2.65) 3.46 (2.22) 4.59* (2.46) 
Number of under-five children by the individual 24069 1.13 (0.91) 1.60 (0.66) 1.88* (0.70) 
Completed number of antenatal care visits 7053 0.43 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.35* (0.48) 
Knowledge of pregnancy complications 8718 0.54 (0.50) 0.63 (0.48) 0.42* (0.49) 
Household characteristics        
Distance to health facility is problematic 9891 0.46 (0.50) 0.35 (0.48) 0.56* (0.50) 
Individual lives in urban areas 4533 0.20 (0.40) 0.33 (0.47) 0.07* (0.26) 
Has health insurance 795 0.05 (0.23) 0.06 (0.24) 0.02* (0.15) 
Household size 24069 7.14 (4.05) 6.80 (4.17) 7.77* (4.68) 
First wealth quintile 4830 0.21 (0.41) 0.14 (0.35) 0.29* (0.45) 
Second wealth quintile 5445 0.23 (0.42) 0.17 (0.38) 0.30* (0.46) 
Third wealth quintile 5145 0.22 (0.42) 0.21 (0.40) 0.24* (0.43) 
Fourth wealth quintile 4968 0.20 (0.40) 0.23 (0.42) 0.14* (0.35) 
Fifth wealth quintile 3681 0.14 (0.35) 0.25 (0.44) 0.03* (0.17) 
Partners’ characteristics and the differences        
Years of schooling of the partner 22884 5.68 (3.49) 6.56 (3.36) 4.81* (3.20) 
Husband/partner is more educated than wife 7908 0.34 (0.48) 0.33 (0.47) 0.34 (0.47) 
Husband/partner and wife are equally educated 10338 0.49 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 0.46† (0.50) 
Wife is more educated than husband/partner 4638 0.17 (0.38) 0.16 (0.37) 0.20‡ (0.40) 
Average difference in education of partners 22884 0.79 (0.65) 0.84 (0.39) 0.75 (0.88) 
Husband/partner is older than wife 19359 0.93 (0.25) 0.94 (0.24) 0.94 (0.24) 
Husband/partner and wife are of same age 621 0.03 (0.16) 0.03 (0.17) 0.04 (0.19) 
Wife is older than husband/partner 693 0.04 (0.20) 0.03 (0.17) 0.02† (0.15) 
Average difference in age of partners 20673 7.33 (6.94) 7.04 (6.41) 7.57 (7.40) 
Indicators of bargaining  
Wife beaten justify if she (violence)        
Goes out without telling her partner 8943 0.41 (0.49) 0.38 (0.49) 0.45* (0.50) 
Neglects their children 9336 0.44 (0.50) 0.41 (0.49) 0.47* (0.50) 
Argues with her partner 8967 0.41 (0.49) 0.40 (0.49) 0.46* (0.50) 
Refuses to have sex with her partner 7599 0.37 (0.48) 0.32 (0.47) 0.41* (0.49) 
Burns food 4200 0.20 (0.40) 0.18 (0.39) 0.23* (0.42) 
Getting money for medical care is problematic 10935 0.49 (0.50) 0.40 (0.49) 0.53* (0.50) 
Spouses cooperate in health care decision 11412 0.62 (0.49) 0.62 (0.49) 0.52* (0.50) 
Spouses cooperate in household visit decision 11307 0.51 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 0.42* (0.49) 
Spouses cooperate in household purchases decision 5613 0.32 (0.47) 0.32 (0.47) 0.27* (0.45) 
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses. ‡, † and * indicates that the difference in characteristics between those 
delivered in a facility and those who delivered at home are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 




In terms of household characteristics, the average number of children per household is five. 
Less than half (46 percent) of women who gave birth within this period viewed distance to the 
nearest facility as a hindrance for accessing maternal health care services. Over 80 percent of 
the sample are from rural areas, relative to 20 percent residing in urban areas. Only 5 percent 
of the sample is covered with health insurance. Finally, about 14 percent of all households in 
the sample belong to the uppermost wealth quintile, with 23 percent belonging to the second, 
22 percent to the third, and 20 percent to the fourth wealth quintile. Over 21 percent of 
households are from the lowest quintile. This indicates that over 44 percent of the sample are 
in the low income class, 22 percent in the middle class, and 34 percent in the high income 
brackets. As is the case in the previous chapter, there are over 43 percent women in the sample 
that completed the recommended number of antenatal visits. In general, samples with 
favourable individual and household characteristics are more likely to deliver in a health care 
facility as opposed to delivering at home. 
 
3.5.1. Measures of Bargaining  
Several studies have used economic resources to analyse the bargaining power within couples. 
The main focus has been on current assets and those brought into marriage (Beegle et al., 
2001b; Quisumbing & Maluccio, 2000), unearned income (Schultz, 1990; Thomas, 1990), or 
remittances and welfare receipts (Lundberg et al., 1997; Lundberg & Pollak, 1994). Recent 
literature has deviated from economic factors and rely on non-economic factors (domestic 
violence, decision making process, female education, employment and discretion over 
resources) that proxy the bargaining power or the status of women in a household (Ghuman, 
2003; Maitra, 2004; Nikièma et al., 2008). These non-economic factors are common in 
sociology and demography literature, and measure the degree of autonomy of women in the 
household. In this chapter, differences in age and education of couples and other indicators of 
the status of women in the household are used as measures of bargaining power, in addition to 
economics resources.  
The level of education of women determines the probability of antenatal care use as well as 
institutional delivery (Overbosch et al., 2004). It is generally argued that education of women 
increases their economic independence, access and control over resources, knowledge and 
exposure, autonomy and decision making power, and reduces the constraints to physical 




household decision, and is likely to increase the use of reproductive health services, as these 
services are primarily at the domain of women.  For the purpose of descriptive statistics, 
differences in education of couples is categorised into a set of dummies28. The dummies 
include: husband/partner is better educated than wife, partners are equally educated, and wife 
is better educated than husband.  
The descriptive statistics in Table 3.1 shows that in 34 percent of all households, women are 
less educated than their partners; in 49 percent, they have the same level of education; and only 
in 17 percent are women more educated than their partners. A similar approach is used to 
categorise the dummies for differences in age between couples. In 93 percent of all households, 
women are younger than their partners, in 3 percent they are of the same age, and in 4 percent 
women are older than their partners. The average difference in education between partners is 
0.79, whereas the average difference in age between partners is 7.33 years. This implies that 
on average, women are over 7.33 years younger than their partners and just about a year less 
educated than their partners.  
For the sociological or demographic (non-economic) measures of power, two sets of criteria 
are used to describe the status of women in the household. The first measure is the degree of 
female autonomy in terms of freedom from domestic violence by her partner, and second is 
participation in household decision-making, in addition to differences in age and education 
(Caldwell et al., 1992; Dyson & Moore, 1983). Following Ghuman (2003), to capture the 
effects of women’s freedom from domestic violence, an index is constructed from five 
questions in TDHS using the Principle Component Analysis (PCA). That is, women were asked 
whether or not they were beaten if (1) they went out without telling their partner, (2) they 
neglected their children, (3) they argued with their partner, (4) they refused to have sex with 
their partner, and (5) they burnt food. A summary of the indicators of domestic violence reveals 
that on average, 41 percent of the women were beaten if they went out without informing their 
partner, 44 percent if they neglected their children, 41 percent if they argued with their partner, 
37 if they refused to have sex with their partner, and 20 percent if they burnt food. The 
correlation between these factors is presented in Table B3.1 and the details of the PCA 
weighting factors are presented in Table B3.2 of the appendix. 
In terms of decision making power of the woman, they were asked whether or not they 
cooperate with their partners on decisions regarding household health care use, household daily 
                                                                 




purchases and relatives’ visit to the household. Concerning discretion over household resources 
by the woman, they were asked whether or not getting money to seek health care was 
problematic. Likewise, employment status of the woman is used to proxy for her discretion 
over economic resources. Finally, educational attainment and knowledge about pregnancy 
complications are used as a proxy for access to information by the woman. The selection of 
these measures is guided by the literature on household bargaining power (Aizer, 2007; 
Friedberg & Webb, 2006; Garikipati, 2008; Ghuman, 2003; Panda & Agarwal, 2005).  
On average, over half of all women in the sample live in household where couples cooperate 
in decision over relatives visit, 62 percent in household where couples cooperate in health care 
seeking decision, and only 32 percent in household where partners cooperate in daily purchases 
decision. About 49 percent of women in the sample reported that getting money from their 
partners to go for medical care is problematic, and over 43 percent reported to have completed 
the required number of antenatal care visits.  
Finally, statistics in the last four columns of Table 3.1 show that on average, the characterist ics 
of those who delivered in a health facility are significantly different from the characteristics of 
those who delivered at home. For instance, a lower proportion (18 – 41 percent) of those with 
domestic violence delivered in a facility and a higher proportion (23 – 47 percent) of those that 
experienced domestic violence delivered at home. Over 53 percent of those who had problems 
getting money for care delivered at home whereas only 40 percent delivered in a facility. A 
higher proportion (32 – 62 percent) of those who cooperate in decision-making delivered in a 
facility and a lower proportion (27 – 52 percent) delivered at home. The proportion of those 
who delivered in a facility increases as we move from lower to higher income quintiles. 
Table 3.2 shows the average difference in the level of use of health care facilities at delivery 
across various bargaining indicators, individual characteristics and household socioeconomic 
factors. For instance, the first row indicates that only 47 percent of women who report beaten 
if they went without telling their partners actually delivered in a facility, whereas over 51 
percent of those not beaten delivered in a facility. Women who are subjected to domestic 
violence by their partner are significantly less likely to deliver in a health facility than women 
who are free from violence. As expected, the use of health care is higher among couples that 
cooperate in household decision. On average, over 52 percent of households where couples 




no cooperation in health care decision. Furthermore, health facility use is higher among 
households that cooperate on relatives visit and those that cooperate in purchase decisions.  
Table 3.2: Mean comparison of health facility deliveries across various characteristics    
Deliver in a facility   Mean  Mean 
Difference 
 Variables Obs. Yes Obs. No (Yes - NO) 
Wife beaten justify if she (violence):       
Goes out without telling her partner 8820 47.0  14703 51.3 -0.042* 
Neglects their children 9216 47.6 14343 51.0 -0.034* 
Argues with her partner 8832 46.0 14688 51.9 -0.059* 
Refuses to have sex with her partner 7464 44.8 16032 52.0 -0.072* 
Burns food 4119 46.5 19485 50.5 -0.040* 
Spouses cooperate in health care decision 8160 51.5 12315 46.3 0.052* 
Spouses cooperate in household visit decision 7764 51.4 12669 46.5 0.049 * 
Spouses cooperate in household purchases  5538 51.2 14916 47.3 0.040* 
Getting money for medical care is problematic  10761 43.4 12924 54.9 -0.115* 
Completed number of antenatal care visits  7002 61.9 8796 46.2 0.157* 
Individual is employed 19641 55.8 4647 48.4 0.074* 
Has knowledge of pregnancy complications  8610 61.9 6744 43.5 0.185* 
Distance to facility is problematic 9696 39.3 13959 57.0 -0.177* 
Has health insurance  780 74.6 22920 48.8 0.258* 
Individual lives in urban areas  4488 81.4 19224 42.3 0.391* 
Individual belongs to first wealth quintile 4761 32.0  18951 54.1 -0.221* 
Individual belongs to second wealth quintile 5349 37.2  18363 53.3 -0.160* 
Individual belongs to third wealth quintile 5037 45.8  18675 50.7 -0.049* 
Individual belongs to fourth wealth quintile 4917 58.6  18795 47.3 0.112* 
Individual belongs to fifth wealth quintile 3648 84.2  20064 43.4 0.408 * 
Notes: * Significantly different from zero. Obs. = number of observations, Yes = individual has such 
characteristics and No = individual does not have such attributes. The Yes and No columns shows the proportion 
of these individuals that delivered in a facility. 
 
 
Turning to individual characteristics, the fraction of employed women who delivered in a 
facility is higher than the fraction of unemployed women who delivered in a health care facility. 
Up to 56 percent of all employed women gave birth in a medical facility, compared to about 
48 percent of unemployed women. Birthing care is highest among women who completed the 
required number of antenatal care visits and those with knowledge about the risks associated 
with pregnancy. Among women who completed antenatal care, 62 percent used a medical 
facility during childbirth, relative to only 46 percent for those who did not complete the 
required antenatal care. Again, 62 percent of those who reported to have knowledge of 




Only about 43 percent of women who had problems getting money for medical care used 
birthing care, relative to 55 percent for those who had no problem getting money for care. 
 
With regards to household characteristics, the difference is particularly stark for household 
wealth. While a substantial proportion of women from the uppermost wealth quintile (84%) 
uses a medical facility at childbirth, only a small proportion of those in the lowest wealth 
quintile (32%) use birthing care at delivery. The proportion of use increases as we move from 
the lowest to the highest wealth quintiles, with higher quintiles having higher used proportions. 
Interestingly, the greatest gap in the use of birthing care is among those in the highest wealth 
quintile (41%) relative to those in other quintiles. As expected, urban women are more likely 
to deliver in a medical facility than rural women. Over 81 percent of urban women used a 
medical facility at childbirth, compared to only 42 percent for the rural population. Among 
those women with access to health insurance, 75 percent received medical care during 
childbirth relative to 49 percent for those without health insurance. Finally, a substantia l 
percent (61%) of those who reported distance to the nearest facility as problematic are less 
likely to use birthing care, compared to those who reported living close to a medical facility 
(43%). The differences in the use of birthing care resulting from differences in the 
characteristics reported here suggest that women with favourable individual or household 
characteristics have health care utilisation advantage over their counterparts. 
Table 3.3 shows how bargaining indicators varies with household socioeconomic status. This 
is to identify whether or not bargaining outcomes are always worse in poor households or in 
rural communities. The results in Panel A reveal significant variation between various wealth 
quintiles and bargaining indicators (domestic violence and household decision-making). The 
first row illustrates the distribution of those who report being beaten if they go out without 
telling their partners across the various income quintiles. For example, of those who reported 
being beaten if they went out, a quarter are in the first quintile and 19 percent in the fifth 
quintile. Households in the first wealth quintile stand out with the highest level of domestic 
violence ranging from 25 to 28 percent. In contrast, households in the fifth wealth quintile 
stands out with the lowest incidence domestic violence ranging from 6 to 10 percent. A huge 
proportion of women subjected to violence are from rural areas. For instance, 85 percent of 
women who reported being beaten if they went out without telling their partners are from rural 
areas and only 15 percent are urban dwellers. The majority of women who reported that getting 
money for medical care is problematic are from the first wealth quintile. The proportion 




quintile to 8 percent for the fifth quintile. Over 87 percent of all women who had problems 
getting money for medical care are from rural areas, and only 13 percent from urban areas.  
 Table 3.3: Cross tabulation of wealth quintile and residential type by bargaining indicators 
Panel A: Percentage distribution of sample across wealth quintile levels and residential type  
 Household wealth quintile Residential type 
  First Second Third Fourth Fifth Rural Urban 
Wife beaten justify if she (violence)        
Goes out without telling her partner 24.91 22.61 23.68 18.94 9.86 85.43 14.57 
Neglects their children 23.67 22.58 24.07 19.66 10.02 85.52 14.48 
Argues with her partner 25.41 22.83 23.77 18.79 9.20 86.39 13.61 
Refuses to have sex with her partner 26.49 22.54 24.73 18.83 7.41 87.78 12.22 
Burns food 28.08 22.41 25.42 18.06 6.03 87.88 12.12 
Spouses cooperate in health care decision 18.53 22.93 23.1 20.07 15.37 83.54 16.46 
Spouses cooperate in household visit decision 18.34 22.62 22.29 20.35 16.4 82.75 17.25 
Spouses cooperate in household purchases 19.14 22.83 21.83 20.34 15.86 81.45 18.55 
Getting money for medical care is problematic  26.86 25.27 21.62 18.33 7.92 86.87 13.13 
 
 Panel B: Percentage for the sample by household wealth quintile and residential type 
  Household wealth quintile Residential type 
  First Second Third Fourth Fifth Rural Urban 
Wife beaten justify if she (violence)               
Goes out without telling him  45.21 38.50 40.68 32.25 22.56 38.31 28.30 
Neglects their children 44.10 39.42 42.43 34.33 23.51 39.33 28.87 
Argues with him 44.86 37.72 39.74 31.74 20.57 37.64 25.86 
Have sex with him 41.11 32.66 36.22 27.38 14.48 33.57 20.30 
Burns food 23.93 17.81 20.40 14.34 6.45 18.42 11.01 
Spouses cooperate in health care decision 39.10 43.07 43.53 37.02 38.88 41.11 37.21 
Spouses cooperate in household visit decision 38.20 41.94 41.48 37.00 40.89 29.46 31.32 
Spouses cooperate in household purchases 29.46 31.32 30.02 27.39 29.26 29.26 30.59 
Getting money for medical care is problematic  63.78 56.47 48.85 40.86 23.89 51.07 33.62 
 
Concerning cooperation in household decision, the fifth and the first quintiles have the lowest 
rates ranging from 15 to 16 percent for fifth quintile, and 18 to 19 percent for the first quintile. 
It is noticed that the high rates of cooperation in household decision are found in the second 
and third quintiles. Similarly, the higher rates of cooperation in decision making are in the rural 
than urban areas. These results are not surprising as the proportion in each quintile or in the 
rural-urban areas is likely to depend on the proportion of individuals in that particular quintile 
or area (see Table 3.1). In other words with unbalanced group size, larger clusters are likely to 
weigh more on the mean parameter estimates. To buttress this claim, in Panel B, individua ls 
are categorised into their respective quintiles or location and in each category, the proportion 




Unlike Panel A, in Panel B individuals are grouped into their respective wealth quintiles or 
residential type, and in each quintile or location the proportion that cooperates in decision-
making or experience domestic violence is identified. For instance, the first row indicates that 
23 percent of all individuals in the fifth quintile and over 38 percent of the rural sample reported 
being beaten if they went out. Individuals in the lower wealth quintile or in the rural areas are 
more likely to be subjected to domestic violence, and household are less likely to cooperate in 
decision making relative to their counterparts. For example, of all individuals in the first 
quintile, over 23 to 45 percent are victims of the various indicators of violence, whereas only 
about 6 to 23 percent in the fifth quintile are subjected to violence. Over 18 to 39 percent of all 
rural individuals are victims of violence, but only 11 to 28 percent of all urban individuals are 
likely to be subjected to violence.  
While approximately 64 percent of all women in the first quintile had difficulty getting money 
for medical care, only about 24 percent in the uppermost quintile had such challenges. In the 
rural sample, 51 percent of the women had problems getting money for medical care, compared 
to only 34 percent for the urban sample. In terms of decision-making, only about 29 to 39 
percent of all households in the first quintile are able to cooperate in any aspect of decision 
making in the household, relative to 29 to 41 percent in the fifth quintile. The figures are not 
surprising if compared to the differences in Panel A. This also indicates that the proportions in 
Panel A are driven by the proportion in each subsample. Hence, bargaining power is highly 
correlated with wealth and location, confirming the fact that most communities in Tanzania are 
patriarchal. 
Figure 3.3 presents some of the potential personal barriers that may hinder the use of a health 
care facility at childbirth. With the exception of distance to facility, the rest of the other 
questions were specifically for women who did not give childbirth in a facility, and therefore 
cannot be included in the empirical analysis. Distance to the nearest facility appears to be the 
major constraint that prevented most women from delivery in a health care facility. For 
example, over 46 percent reported distance as a major constraint for not using a health facility 
at birth. Over 22 percent indicated that their inability to deliver in a health facility is because 
they had difficulties getting money or approval from their partners to seek care. This indicates 
that their limited discretion over household resources highly affect the chance of delivery in a 
health facility. Custom and tradition also hinder facility delivery. It is identified that 9 percent 
of those who did not give birth in a facility claim it is not customary. About 8 percent cited 




remaining barriers, such as quality of service and the absence of a female provider, as reasons 
for not delivering in a facility.  
Figure 3.3: Reported barriers for not delivery in a facility 
 
 
3.6. Empirical Results 
Before discussing the results on health care provider choice, it is useful to present simple logit 
estimates on the decision to deliver in a health facility as opposed to home birth. Suppose 
individuals are divided into two groups: those who delivered at home and those who received 
care at childbirth (whether public or private). In this case, the outcome variable is binary and 
the empirical strategy translates into a logit estimation. The marginal effects estimates of the 
logit model are displayed in Table 3.4. Four different specifications are estimated. The first 
specification considers only individual characteristics, while the second model controls for 
spouse characteristics. The third model controls for other identified indicators of bargaining, 
and in model four, household demographic and socioeconomic variables are included. Note 





Table 3.4: Marginal effects of bargaining including individual and household characteristics  
 Probability of delivery in a facility 
Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Individual age (in years) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.005*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Individual years of schooling 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Individual is employed 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Completed number of antenatal care visits  0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Knowledge of pregnancy complications  0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.09*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of children ever born by individual -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Number of under five children by individual -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Individual is younger than her partner  -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Absolute difference in age between couples   0.00 -0.00 0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Absolute difference in age interacted with wife younger  -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Absolute difference in education  -0.05* -0.04* -0.06** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Individual less educated than her partner  -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Absolute education interacted with wife less educated   0.05*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Domestic violence index   0.00 -0.005* 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Getting money for medical care is problematic   -0.05*** 0.01 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Spouses cooperate in health care decisions    0.02 0.02 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Spouses cooperate in household visit decisions    0.03** 0.04*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Spouses cooperate in household purchase decisions    -0.01 -0.01 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Distance to facility is  problematic    -0.08*** 
    (0.01) 
Urban residence    0.12*** 
    (0.02) 
Has health insurance     0.04 
    (0.02) 
Household asset index    0.14*** 
    (0.01) 
Household size    -0.00 
    (0.00) 
Observations 5,099 4,258 4,164 4,158 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, level of significance:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Model I:  
Individual characteristics only. Model II: Individual and spouse characteristics . Model III: Individual and spouse 
characteristics and bargaining indicators. Model IV: Individual, spouse and household characteristics , and 






The results indicate that favorable individual characteristics and cooperation in decision 
making within the household raises the probability of childbirth in a health facility. The 
educational attainment and employment status of women are used to measure their level of 
economic empowerment. In terms of education, increasing the years of schooling by one raise 
the propensity of facility delivery by 2 percentage point. While employed women’s probability 
of delivery in a health facility is significantly higher than that of unemployed women in the 
first three models, the effects are insignificant in the fourth model. The effect of maternal 
employment on the probability of facility use reduces as spouse and bargaining indicators are 
controlled, but insignificant as we control for household characteristics. The probability of 
delivery in a facility, as opposed to home significantly increase with maternal age. Women 
aware of the risk associated with pregnancy are 9 percentage points more likely to deliver in a 
facility than their counterparts with no health knowledge.  
Interestingly, individuals who completed the required number of antenatal care visit have a 
higher propensity of delivery in a medical facility. Precisely, those who completed the number 
of antenatal visits are 6 percentage point more likely to deliver in a medical facility, compared 
to those with incomplete number of visits29. The probability of delivery in a health facility 
decreases with the number of children ever born, and the number of children under the age of 
five to an individual woman. Specifically, increasing the number children for an individua l 
woman by one reduces the probability of facility use by 3 percent, whereas raising the number 
of under-five children per woman reduces the probability by 5 percent. While the number of 
under-five children may constrain the willingness of facility use, the number of children ever 
born enhances experience, thereby limiting the chance of facility use in subsequent births.   
A woman’s inability to control household resources reduces the chance of using a health 
facility at childbirth. The significant effect of discretion over household resource is knocked 
out as we control for household characteristics (see Model IV). For example, in Model III, 
women who have problems getting money for medical care are 5 percentage points 
significantly less likely to deliver in a health facility, compared to their counterparts with 
discretion over household resources. Statistically, the probability of facility use at childbirth 
reduces significantly with the level of domestic violence. If there is cooperation in decision-
                                                                 
29 It should be noted that the antenatal care variable could be further disaggregated to make a distinction between 
those who did not initiate antenatal care at all, and those who initiated but did not complete the recommended  
number of visits. This is impossible in our analysis as only 2 percent of the sample did not initiate antenatal care 





making within couples, the likelihood of delivery in a health care facility increases. For 
instance, the probability of delivery in a health facility is 4 percentage points higher in 
households where both partners make decisions regarding relatives visit to the household. 
Contrary, Maitra (2004) showed that women’s participation in health care decision has no 
significant influence on hospital delivery, but on prenatal care in India. 
The absolute difference in education between spouses is inversely associated with facility 
delivery whereas the absolute difference in age is not significantly different from zero. If 
women are less educated than their partners, the probability of delivering in a facility reduces 
by 2 percentage point. The effect of absolute difference in education on facility use at childbirth 
decreased the more a woman is less educated than her spouse. 
The addition of household characteristics to Model III affects the magnitude of both bargaining 
and individual covariates, but not the signs. While the estimate of decision on relative’s visit 
increases from 3 percent to 4 percent, that of maternal education falls from 3 percent to 2 
percent (see Model III and IV for comparison). For household factors, while distance to the 
nearest facility reduces the chance of seeking health care, being in urban areas, having health 
insurance and raising household wealth increase the propensity to seek care during childbirth. 
Urban dwellers are 12 percentage points more likely to deliver in a health care facility than 
their rural counterparts. Interestingly, the propensity to deliver in a facility increases with the 
level of household wealth. The propensity of delivery in a facility increases by 14 percentage 
points for every unit rise in household wealth. The propensity of delivery in a facility reduces 
by 8 percentage point for those with limited access facility. The major findings from the logit 
model is that cooperation in household decision-making process, the empowerment of women 
through the right to employment and education, and their discretion over household wealth 
significantly enhance their ability to use health services at delivery. In addition, these variables 
still play a significant role even after controlling for household characteristics.  
Table 3.5 presents estimates of the multinomial nested logit model of health care provider 
choice. Four different models of health care provider choice during childbirth are estimated 30, 
as is the case with the logit estimates presented in Table 3.4. Note that seeking health care or 
not forms the first nest options of the model, followed by the choice between public and private 
                                                                 
30 It is important to note that we have attempted to further split the subsamples of the public and private care into 
hospital and non-hospital care. However, because of a limited number (8%) of the sample that actually made use 




if the individual decide to seek care, and home, if she decides not to seek care. Following Sahn 
et al. (2003), the inclusive value parameter on the base option, home care, is normalised to 1. 
The inclusive value parameter (τ) is used to check whether or not the nested model is consistent 
with utility maximization. The inclusive value parameter helps identify options with high or 
low degree of substitutability. Options with lower inclusive values close to zero have a very 
high degree of substitutability, and vice versa. In this study, the inclusive value parameter for 
all specifications are consistent with random utility maximisation (are between 0 and 1). Again, 
the inclusive value parameter for all specifications are close to zero than one. The implica t ion 
is that there is a very high degree of substitutability between alternatives. Similarly, Sahn et al. 
(2003) found a very high degree of substitutability between public and private non-hospita l 
care in Tanzania.  
The post-estimation analyses from model four indicate that the predicted probability of seeking 
care in a health facility or choosing a particular provider holding all covariates constant at their 
means is illustrated in Figure B3.1 of the appendix. The predicted probability for not using a 
health care facility is 48.3 percent of the total sample. The probability of seeking care from 
public provider is 43.3 percent, and about 8.3 percent for choosing a private provider. 
Conditional on seeking care in a facility, the probability of choosing a public provider is 84 
percent, relative to 16 percent for choosing a private provider. In terms of individua l 
characteristics, the results from the multinomial nested logit are similar to the logit model with 
regards to signs and significance. In order to show how health care provider choice within the 
household is affected by discrete changes in parental bargaining, and other covariates, 
parameter estimates from these variables are used to compute mean changes in probability of 
care use. The estimates presented in Table 3.5 allow us to determine the change in the 
probability of using a particular provider for discrete changes in each of the controls. As pointed 
out earlier, while the multinomial logit assume constant cross-elasticities, the multinomia l 







Table 3.5: Multinomial Nest logit estimates for health care provider choice 
 The probability of delivery in public or private facility as opposed to home 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Variables Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private 
Individual age (in years) 0.03*** 0.03** 0.04*** 0.02 0.03*** 0.02 0.02** 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Individual years of schooling 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.08*** 0.13*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Individual is employed 0.75*** 0.73*** 0.67*** 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.70*** 0.22 0.28 
 (0.13) (0.18) (0.15) (0.21) (0.15) (0.22) (0.16) (0.23) 
Completed number of antenatal care visits 0.33*** 0.47*** 0.31*** 0.48*** 0.30*** 0.48*** 0.27*** 0.45*** 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.12) (0.08) (0.12) 
Knowledge of pregnancy complications 0.56*** 0.52*** 0.55*** 0.46*** 0.53*** 0.48*** 0.40*** 0.33** 
 (0.06) (0.11) (0.07) (0.13) (0.07) (0.13) (0.07) (0.13) 
Number of children ever born by individual -0.19*** -0.20*** -0.19*** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.11** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) 
Number of under five children by individual -0.40*** -0.38*** -0.39*** -0.40*** -0.39*** -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.34*** 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07) (0.11) 
Absolute difference in education   0.05 0.32 0.07 0.22 0.04 0.15 
   (0.17) (0.27) (0.17) (0.28) (0.18) (0.29) 
Individual less educated than her partner   -0.11*** -0.10* -0.11*** -0.11* -0.09** -0.09 
   (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) 
Absolute education interacted with wife less educated    0.17*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.10** 0.14* 
   (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) 
Individual is younger than her partner   -0.05 -0.52 -0.14 -0.56 -0.16 -0.55 
   (0.28) (0.54) (0.29) (0.51) (0.29) (0.50) 
Absolute difference in age between couples   -0.04 -0.09 -0.05 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 
   (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.12) 
Absolute difference. in age interacted with wife younger   0.04 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.02 
   (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.12) 
Domestic violence index     0.02 -0.11** -0.01 -0.13*** 
     (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Getting money for medical care is problematic     -0.21*** -0.21 0.07 -0.01 
     (0.07) (0.13) (0.08) (0.14) 
Spouses cooperate in health care decisions     0.09 0.21 0.11 0.21 
     (0.09) (0.15) (0.09) (0.15) 
Spouses cooperate in household visit decisions      0.09 0.32* 0.13 0.36** 
     (0.10) (0.17) (0.10) (0.17) 
Continued on next page 
 





Table 3.5 continued from previous page 
 The probability of delivery in public or private facility as opposed to home 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 (1) (2) (5) (6) (9) (10) (13) (14) 
 Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private 
Spouses cooperate in household purchase decisions     -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.09 
     (0.10) (0.16) (0.10) (0.17) 
Distance to facility is problematic       -0.36*** -0.02 
       (0.08) (0.17) 
Urban residence       0.80*** 1.21*** 
       (0.13) (0.22) 
Has health insurance        0.30 1.16*** 
       (0.23) (0.36) 
Household asset index       0.44*** 0.28*** 
       (0.06) (0.10) 
Household size       -0.00 -0.03 
       (0.01) (0.02) 
Constant -0.90*** -2.76 -1.47*** -2.98 -1.36*** -3.33 -0.63** -2.68 
 (0.22) (0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.28) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) 
Inclusive value parameter estimate (τ) 0.19 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.19 
Observations 5,099 5,099 4,258 4,258 4,164 4,164 4,158 4,158 
                       Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In Model I only individual characteristics are considered, in     




Table 3.6 presents the change in probability of utilising a health care option for discrete changes 
in bargaining power within couples and other covariates computed from the multinomial nested 
logit estimates in Table 3.5. This shows the sensitivity of use for each provider’s services to a 
change in these attributes. The results show that raising the level of cooperation in decision 
making on health care use from non-cooperation to cooperation reduces the home delivery 
option by 0.01 for the entire sample. The large increase in the use of health care as a result of 
this policy change is mostly found in the use of public facilities (0.004), with only 0.001 for 
private care. Similarly, raising the level of cooperation in household visit decision within 
couples from non-cooperation to cooperation reduces home delivery by 0.013 for the entire 
sample. There is an equal increase in the use of both public and private health option by 0.002 
from this policy change. In general, the mean changes are economically small 
Table 3.6: Mean change in probability of facility use associated with observable characteristics 
 
Home 
delivery Public care Private care 
Individual characteristics    
Age of respondent (years) -0.003 0.002 0.000 
Individual years of schooling -0.011 0.000 0.008 
Individual is employed -0.075 0.058 0.002 
Completed antenatal visits -0.035 0.022 0.002 
Knowledge about pregnancy complications -0.054 0.044 0.001 
Number of children ever born 0.019 -0.014 -0.001 
Number of under five children by individual 0.040 -0.031 -0.001 
Indicators of bargaining    
Index of domestic violence 0.005 -0.000 -0.001 
Getting money for medical care is problematic 0.021 -0.016 -0.000 
Spouses cooperate in health care decisions -0.011 0.004 0.001 
Spouses cooperate in household daily purchases 0.003 -0.004 0.000 
Spouses cooperate in household visit -0.013 0.002 0.002 
Household characteristics    
Distance to facility is problematic 0.030 -0.032 0.002 
Reside in an urban area -0.085 0.043 0.006 
Has health insurance -0.043 -0.002 0.008 
Household asset index -0.041 0.000 0.034 
 Note: Whether these means changes are significant or not depend on the estimates in Table 3.5 
 
Reducing cash holding for women to seek care (limiting their discretion over household 
resources) raises the probability of self-care (home delivery) seeking by 0.02. The negative 
effects are higher in public than private facilities. A unit rise in domestic violence increases the  




This exerts a negative effect on private facility delivery by just 0.001. In terms of maternal 
employment, changing the employment status of a woman from unemployed to employ reduces 
the probability of self-care option by 0.08, thereby raising the probability of health facility 
option. Most of the employment induced changes that raise the probability of care use for public 
care (0.06) and private care (0.002) comes at the expense of a decline in the use of self-care.  
The other parameters in the model generally conform to our expectations. If an additiona l 
woman reports distance to a facility as problematic, the probability of seeking self-care 
increases by 0.03 and private care by 0.002, but reduces the use of public care option by 0.03. 
This indicates complete substitutability of public facility use to home for an increase in 
distance. Improving household living conditions (increase in wealth) by a unit, for example, 
reduces the self-care option by 0.04. The increase in care use resulting from an increase in 
household wealth is mainly in the private care option (0.03). In terms of residential type, a 
discrete change in the place of residence from urban to rural raises the overall probability of 
delivery in a health facility by 0.05. The rise in use of a health facility as a result of the change 
in location is larger in public than private facilities. In all, residing in urban areas has shown to 
have the highest effect in reducing the probability of home delivery option. 
Interestingly, a discrete change in antenatal care usage from incomplete to complete visits 
reduces the probability of home delivery option by 0.04.  The change in probability of care use 
with respect to knowledge of pregnancy complication is substantially stronger in public than 
private health facilities. A discrete change in health knowledge from not being aware, to being 
aware of risk associated with pregnancy, results to a 0.04 rise in the use of public care and 
0.001 rise in the use of private care. An increase in years of schooling of an individual woman 
reduces the probability of home option by 0.01. The effect of the number of children ever born 
and the number of under-five per woman on the probability of care use are negative. The 
probability of self-care option increases by 0.04 for every additional under-five child per 
woman, whereas the probability of self-care option increases by 0.02 for every additional child 
per woman. As is the case with the logit model cooperation in household decision making 
process, freedom from domestic violence and women’s empowerment through the right to 
employment and education, and discretion over household wealth, significantly enhance their 







This chapter sought to empirically examine the relationship between the status of women in 
the household and the use of health care at childbirth in Tanzania. It argues that over and above 
traditional household demography and socioeconomic factors, individual preferences within 
couples may differ, and the resulting outcome of reproductive health care decisions is likely to 
be subjected to a negotiation process between couples. The outcome of the negotiation depends 
largely on each couple’s ability to exercise his or her preferences. The study identifies several 
features for measuring bargaining power within couples in the household. These include the 
power in decision making, discretion over household wealth, relative characteristics of couples 
and domestic violence. The analysis further shows how these features can influence women’s 
decision to give birth in a public or private-based care facility. In line with previous literature 
on health care provider choice, the study considers that the decision to deliver in a health care 
facility and the choice between public and private care follow a nesting structure and can be 
modelled using a one-level multinomial nested logit model.  
First, excluding household resources, the level of cooperation between couples in the 
household decisions raises the probability of delivery in a health care facility. Specifically, if 
couples cooperate in household health care seeking or in household daily purchase decisions, 
the probability of delivery in a health facility increases. The probability of using health care 
reduces if women have limited discretion over household resources for care. Interestingly, high 
values of domestic violence are found to significantly reduce the probability of care use. In 
terms of female empowerment, employed women significantly increase the probability of 
facility use at childbirth. Likewise, the probability of care use increases significantly with 
maternal years of schooling and difference in education between couples. The probability of 
facility use increases significantly with maternal age, but is insignificant with differences in 
age of couples. 
Second, distance to the facility is included to control for the supply side influence as well as 
antenatal care completion to control for health care knowledge. Completing the number of 
antenatal care visits significantly increase the probability of health care use at childbirth. The 
effects are higher in private than public health facilities. On the other hand, the probability to 
seek care at childbirth significantly declines with distance to facility.  
Third, household demographic and socioeconomic characteristics are included to control for 




health insurance and among households in urban households. The probability of health care 
use reduces with experience (number of children ever born) and with the number of under- five 
children per woman.  
For effective public policies and other initiatives aiming to ensure full utilisation of 
reproductive health services, our findings suggest attenuation or elimination of constraints that 
limit cooperation within couples. Economic measures that improve women’s access to 
autonomous resources may strengthen their bargaining power and offset unequal bargaining 
within couples. This brings more women in a better position, especially when bargaining over 
resources for health care. Based on these findings, this study argues that the provision of free 
maternal and child health care services to the community is a necessary but not a suffic ient 
condition to ensure full utilisation. The indirect costs are also important and their negative 
consequences on reproductive care utilisation can be minimised if women have equal power in 








































4.1. Introduction  
 
Bargaining with commitment within couples matters for household outcomes, since 
cooperation between spouses results in an efficient allocation of resources within the household 
(Rasul, 2008). As highlighted in the introductory chapter, women devote a larger portion of 
their time and income to children’s needs and nutrition than men (Gupta, 1996; Kabeer, 1994; 
Thomas, 1993). The extent of cooperation within couples in most African societies is limited 
as women are typically the socially and economically disadvantaged group in terms of 
education, employment, inheritance, credit and control over household resources (Blackden et 
al., 2006; Kevane, 2004; Nikièma et al., 2008). While intra-household bargaining has been 
widely examined by economists as affecting fertility decisions (Hossain, 1998; Rasul, 2008), 
labour supply (Lim et al., 2007), the use of health services (Maitra, 2004; Nikièma et al., 2008; 
Beegle et al., 2001), and child survival (Ghuman, 2003)31; this chapter focuses primarily on how 
the level of cooperation within couples in household decision and relative control over 
resources contribute to the rural-urban gap in child nutrition in Tanzania.  
Economists and demographers have long focused attention on modelling child health outcomes 
in both developed and developing countries. Another growing concern has been the rural-urban 
child health differential in developing countries (Fotso, 2007; Smith et al., 2005; Van de Poel 
et al., 2009). Arguably, shrinking the rural-urban inequality32 in child health is an important 
pathway for achieving national child health targets for most third world countries. There is 
sufficient evidence that rural children are generally more likely to be malnourished relative to 
                                                                 
31 Rasul (2008) and  Hossain (1998) reported that if couples bargain with commitment, the outcomes of fertility  
takes account of each spouse’s fertility preferences; otherwise, the influence of each spouse’s fertility preference 
on fertility outcomes depends on the distribution of bargaining power. Lim et al. (2007) showed that preference 
heterogeneity between spouses and differences in bargaining power is inversely correlated with cash crop 
production in Ethiopia. Maitra (2004) and Nikièma et al. (2008) reported that domestic power imbalance may  
delay or exclude women from health care, whereas their control over household resources significantly increase 
health care usage. Considering differences in educational attainment of couples, Beegle et al. (2001) identified  
that there is better health service use if a woman is more educated than her husband. There exists a weak 
association between women’s autonomy and child mortality (Ghuman et al., 2003). 





their urban counterparts (Hussain & Lunven, 1987; Ruel, 2000; Von Braun, 1993; Fotso, 2007; 
Smith et al., 2005; Van de Poel et al., 2007). Understanding what drives the rural-urban gap in 
child nutritional outcome is essential for effective maternal and child health policy intervention, 
since the huge and persistent regional disparity is likely to affect national targets.  
 
While some researchers examine the importance of household-level factors in explaining the 
rural-urban gap in child health (O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 2008; Sastry, 2004), others argue that 
community factors cannot be ignored (Fotso, 2007; Sastry, 1997; Van de Poel et al., 2009). 
The focus has been on cross country studies (Fotso, 2007; Van de Poel et al., 2007; Harpham, 
2009; Smith et al., 2005). Findings from such studies may be less informative to individua l 
countries, as what explains this gap varies according to the level of development of countries , 
and their prevailing national health care policies. The effect and contribution of intra-househo ld 
bargaining to explaining this gap is still underexploited. This chapter provides evidence that 
differences in intra-household bargaining between the rural and the urban households 
contribute positively to the rural-urban gap in child health. It further shows that failure to 
correct for the possible sample selection bias understate this gap33.  
 
It is a stylized fact that the allocation of investments in health capital and other household 
expenditures depend not only on individual preferences, but also on his/her position in 
decision-making within the household. For example, even if husband and wife value their 
health and the health of any other household member identically, it is not obvious that their 
preferences over investment in health capital will be identical (Bolin et al., 2002)34. Since 
women tend to earn less than men in most developing countries, the opportunity cost of child 
upbringing (time devoted for child care) is lower for women than men (Ray, 1998). In addition, 
the economically disadvantaged women, rather than men, are directly involved in reproductive 
health practices (Rasul, 2008). Maternal health and their access to health care matters for child 
health outcomes. Empowering women economically and improving their bargaining power in 
                                                                 
33 While Van de Poel et al. (2009) and Sastry (1997) used child mortality to estimate the rural-urban gap in child 
health, Smith et al. (2005) and Fotso (2007) used child malnutrition. This study considers child malnutrition as a 
measure of child health and moves a step further to show that the child health gap is understated if Fotso (2007) 
and Smith et al. (2005)’s approach is used. The malnutrition sample might not be a random sample and might not 
reflect the birth history for these regions as nutritional information is available only for children alive. 
34 Jacobson (2000) argues that this is basically because of the conflicting interests of spouses. The amount of 
health capital the husband desires to hold may be different from the amount the wife prefers him to hold. 
Investments made by one spouse on the other’s health capital cannot be realised by the investor should the family 
dissolve. Since the human capital cannot be shared in case of divorce or inherited at death, spouses then develop 




the household is better for maternal and child health. Caldwell et al. (1992) and Dyson & Moore 
(1983) identified female autonomy as essential in reducing child mortality. Ghuman (2003) 
found a weak association between women’s autonomy and child mortality. These studies used 
women’s freedom of movement, discretion over earned income, decision making in household 
matters, and domestic violence as indicators of bargaining within couples. This study makes 
use of some of these measures, but it differs in that it focuses on both their effect and their 
contribution to the rural-urban child health differential.  
 
In addition to being economically disadvantaged, culture and more specifically gendered 
institutions (norms) in many developing societies overrule and limit women’s bargaining 
power (Mabsout & Van Staveren, 2010; Van Staveren & Odebode, 2007). Female earnings, 
their level of education (Oreffice & Bercea, 2007) 35 and smaller age differences with partners 
(Friedberg & Webb, 2006) significantly improve their bargaining power in household decision 
making36. It is obvious that bargaining power within couples in urban and rural communit ies 
may be dissimilar, since the level of education, earnings, awareness of marital rights and gender 
institutions are likely unequal between these areas. While most studies focus on differences in 
household resource endowment as an important determinant of the rural-urban gap in child 
health37, identifying the contribution of intra-household bargaining is crucial, as restrictions on 
women’s power undermine their ability to secure better health care, for themselves and their 
children.  
 
Within the context of Tanzania, there is very high rural-urban disparity in child nutritiona l 
outcomes. While only about 25 percent of urban children are malnourished (stunted), over 38 
percent of rural children are malnourished (see Table 4.1). In addition, considering height-fo r-
age (HAZ) and child survival rate38, Tanzania national averages could have been better than 
                                                                 
35 However, Mabsout and Staveren (2010) argued that female bargaining power depends on individual, household 
and institutional variables. They also posited that institutional factors are most likely to reduce female bargaining 
power even if she has control over personal resources.  
36 The implication is that, excluding institutional bargaining with asymmetrical bargaining power (one partner 
having advantage over the other), the extent of bargaining between spouses is dependent on the relative control 
over income and assets, self-esteem, awareness of one’s rights as well as age and education prior to marriage 
(Mabsout & Staveren, 2010; Nikièma et al., 2008). 
37 There are two strands of literature regarding differences in community development and the rural-urban child 
health differential. For instance, Lalou and LeGrand (1997) and Smith et al. (2005) note that favourable 
socioeconomic status and the availability of modern health care systems in urban areas favour public policies on 
maternal and child health programs. In all, cities are endowed with better sanitation facilities and income earning 
opportunities that facilitate access to modern care (Haddad et al., 1999).  




the WHO recommended standards39, if the percentage of stunted children in rural areas is 
similar to the percentage of stunted children in urban areas. Similarly, there exist lower levels 
of cooperation between spouses in rural compared to urban Tanzania (see Table 4.1). For 
example, over 64.7 percent of all households in urban communities cooperate on health care 
seeking decisions relative to 58.7 in rural areas. It is also shown in Table 3.3 of Chapter 3 that 
all indicators of bargaining power are weaker in rural than in urban Tanzania.  
 
Table 4.1: Intra-household bargaining power and child health status 2010 (percentage) 
  Observations Rural Urban Total 
Child Survival 26233 89 91* 89 
Child Malnutrition (Stunted) 2287 38 25* 35 
Spouses cooperate in health care use decision 14868 59 65* 62 
Spouses cooperate in relative visit decision 12457 50 52* 51 
Getting money for health care is problematic 14217 53 35* 49 
Wife beaten if she goes out without telling him 10753 43 33* 41 
Wife beaten if she neglects children 10059 46 36* 44 
Wife beaten if she argues with partner 10473 43 33* 41 
Wife beaten if she refuses to have sex 9178 39 26* 37 
Wife beaten if she burns food 5043 22 14* 20 
Source: Computed from 2010 TDHS, * indicates that the rural-urban difference is significant. 
 
The rural-urban gap in child health owing to differences in household resource endowment 
may be exacerbated by differences in household bargaining power within couples, as non-
cooperation results in inefficient resource allocation. The focus on Tanzania is therefore 
motivated by two reasons. First, studies of child nutrition and mortality have not 
comprehensively shown what might account for differences in child health outcomes across 
regions in Tanzania40. Finally, there exists no evidence as to how bargaining power within 
couples can explain child health outcomes in Tanzania. The prevailing rural-urban gap, and the 
lower female bargaining power in rural areas suggest a number of questions that demand 
insightful answers. Does bargaining power within couples explain child nutritional status in 
Tanzania, and if so, to what extent does it contribute to the rural-urban gap in child nutrition?  
                                                                 
39 According to the WHO (1995), a country is said to have very high levels of malnutrition if the percentage of 
under-five malnutrition measured by height-for-age z-score and weight-for-age z-score exceeds 30 percent of the 
population. 
40 While the study by Jakobsen (1987)  was limited to the economic and geographical factors in explaining child 
nutritional status in the Highlands of Tanzania, Mbago and Namfua (1992) focused on the socioeconomic 
determinants of child malnutrition in low income urban areas in Tanzania. Similarly, the study by Howard (1994) 
was limited to childhood nutrition in Chagga Tanzania. In addition, while Mturi and Curtis (1995) investigated 
the determinants of child mortality at national level, the studies by Ainsworth et al. (2000) and Ng'weshemi et al. 




Hitherto, the Tanzanian literature on child health outcomes has focused on household 
characteristics, ignoring the possible influence of household bargaining process (constituted by 
domestic violence, female discretion over household resources, and decision making) on child 
health. The focus has been at national level and some specific districts, ignoring what may be 
responsible for the rural-urban differential. The literature on female autonomy indicates that 
freedom of movement, decision making, and relative control over resources determines their 
ability to obtain adequate health care (Beegle et al., 2001a; Bloom et al., 2001a). Consequently, 
female control over an independent income is important, as women devote a larger portion of 
their time and income to children’s needs and nutrition than men (Thomas, 1993). As such, 
reduced disparity between husband and wife’s decision making power allocates resources 
efficiently, be it on health or non-health related activities. In addition, better maternal and child 
feeding practices promote child health, and this partly depends on female control over 
household resources vis-à-vis the level of cooperation between spouses. This chapter therefore 
empirically examines the effect of intra-household bargaining on child nutrition and identifies 
the extent to which the bargaining contributes to the rural-urban gap in child nutrition in 
Tanzania. 
 
4.2. Methodology  
Economists have focused on explaining the microeconomic determinants of individual or 
household health outcomes. This chapter adopts the household production framework by 
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983). This framework has been used by Kovsted et al. (2002), 
Mwabu (2009a) and Wagstaff et al. (2006) to analyse child health. In line with McElroy (1990), 
the study assumes that both parents make decisions concerning the quality of health outcomes 
of their children. The utility for each parent is a function of both health and non-health related 
market consumption goods (𝐺), leisure (𝑙), and child health quality (ℎ). The production 
function for child health quality is as follows: 
ℎ = ℎ(𝐺, 𝐸; 𝛹)           (4.1) 
 
Where 𝐸 represents environmental or health related inputs, and 𝛹 is a parameter indicating the 
household’s production efficiency. Parents (mother (𝑚) and father (𝑓)) may have dissimilar 
utility functions denoted by 𝑈𝑚  and 𝑈𝑓. In general, each individual parent’s utility is written as 
 





There are outside options available to each parent in the household. Examples include the 
opportunities to re-marry, support from family and friends, and what is identifiable to the 
individual should the household dissolve (McElroy, 1990). The utility derived from such 
options is known as the individual reservation utility, denoted as 𝑈𝑚 and ?̅?𝑓. The reservation 
utility is a function of prices and other factors, such as education, age, income, and employment 
status that hinders, or promotes the ability of an individual to achieve his/her preferences within 
the household bargaining process. Based on McElroy (1990), and for the purpose of this study, 
the reservation utility for each parent is assumed to be contingent on a vector of prices 𝑝, wealth 
𝑊𝑖 , and an extra-household environmental parameter 𝜋𝑖 , representing an unexpected increase 
in wealth from parents or welfare transfer. 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈𝑖(𝑝, 𝑊𝑖; 𝜋𝑖);   𝑖 = 𝑚, 𝑓         (4.2) 
 
Given their reservation utility, each chooses the amount of market goods (𝐺), and the level of 
child health (ℎ) that maximise household utility given by: 
 
𝒱 = [𝑈𝑚(𝐺, ℎ, 𝑙𝑚) − 𝑈𝑚 (𝑝,𝑊𝑚; 𝜋𝑚 )] 𝘹 [𝑈𝑓(𝐺, ℎ, 𝑙𝑓) − 𝑈𝑓(𝑝, 𝑊𝑓 ; 𝜋𝑓)]     (4.3) 
 
Subject to the household budget constraint and child health 
 
𝑝𝐺 = 𝜔𝑚(𝑇𝑚 − 𝑙𝑚) + 𝜔𝑓(𝑇𝑓 − 𝑙𝑓) + 𝑊𝑚 + 𝑊𝑓        (4.4) 
 
ℎ = ℎ(𝐺, 𝐸; 𝛹)             
 
Where, 𝑝𝐺 is household total expenditure on both health and non-health related commodit ies, 
𝜔𝑖  is the market wage rate, and 𝑇𝑖 is the time available for each individual parent 𝑖. With 
respect to equation 4.1, 4.3 and 4.4, a reduced form demand function for child health is 
obtained. This demand function is contingent on household wealth, a household production 
efficiency parameter, health related goods, prices, and the bargaining power for each household 
member (Maitra, 2004). The child health demand function is therefore given as: 
ℎ = ℎ(𝑝, 𝐸, 𝑊𝑚, 𝑊𝑓 ;  𝜋𝑚 ,  𝜋𝑓,  𝜑, 𝛹)       (4.5) 
 
Where 𝜑  is a set of variables identifying each parent’s relative bargaining power within the 
household that influence the purchase of goods and services. Equation 4.5 is an empirica l 
version of the child health equation. Our measure of child health in this scenario is child 
nutrition (height- for-age Z-score)41. 
 
                                                                 




4.3 Intra-household Bargaining and Child Health Literature  
As indicated in the previous chapter, a number of studies have investigated the health care use 
and fertility decision effects of bargaining power within couples. The various dimensions of 
classifying bargaining power indicators have also been presented in the previous chapter. In 
order to contextualise the analysis in this chapter, this section presents evidence on child health 
effects of intra-household bargaining and female autonomy. Studies of child health effects of 
parental bargaining are limited in that there is little evidence on how differences in bargaining 
within couples in rural, and urban households explain the rural-urban gap in child health. To 
the best of our knowledge and in the context of Tanzania, there is no evidence to support the 
child health effects of intra-household bargaining. This section therefore presents internationa l 
evidence on the effect of intra-household bargaining on child health.  
Since the 1980s, there has been growing concerns about the health status of women and their 
children, especially in a patriarchal kinship setting where male children are favoured and 
female autonomy is limited (Caldwell, 1986; Dyson & Moore, 1983). The work of Dyson and 
Moore (1983) is one of the first empirical studies to compare the demographic outcome of 
different kinship structures. Their findings suggested that infant and child mortality rates are 
likely to be high in structures where women’s status is generally low. Subsequent studies have 
continued to empirically show a positive association between women’s autonomy with their 
health status and the health of their children (Das Gupta, 1990; Doan & Bisharat, 1990; Castle, 
1993; Murthi et al., 1995). 
In addition to these studies, Jejeebhoy (1998) investigated the association between domestic 
violence on infant mortality in rural India. The study showed that there exists considerable 
consequences of domestic violence on pregnancy loss and infant mortality. With these findings, 
they concluded that infant mortality is significantly conditioned by the strength of the 
patriarchal social system.  Thomas et al. (2002) examined how the distribution of power 
between husbands and wives affects child health. The study argues that relative power 
measured by ownership of assets affects resource allocation within the household. The results 
suggest that the relative position of women in resource ownership at the time of marriage and 
current ability to retain resources under her control is essential for child health.  
Ghuman (2003) considered several indicators of female power between Muslim and non-
Muslim communities, and assessed their effects on the probability of child survival. The study 




mortality. There was no significant association between violence and child mortality in all 
religious groups. The results further suggested that limited power of women in decision making 
(afraid to disagree with partner) was associated with infant and child mortality. Lower 
discretion over earnings was found to be highly associated with infant and child mortality.  
Specifically, child nutritional status has been shown to rely heavily on female status in the 
household (Brunson et al., 2009; Casale, 2003; Dancer & Rammohan, 2009; Desai & Johnson, 
2005; Doan & Bisharat, 1990; Pierre-Louis et al., 2007; Shroff et al., 2009; Simon et al., 2002; 
Smith, 2003; Allendorf, 2007; Shroff et al., 2011). Of these studies, Shroff et al. (2009; 2011) 
stated that low female autonomy compromises her health outcome and affects the quality of 
infant care and nutrition. In other words, maternal autonomy in decision making, permission 
to travel, attitude to domestic violence and financial autonomy influences child care and child 
health outcomes. More specifically, the studies show that women with higher autonomy were 
less likely to have a stunted child. Most of the studies listed above rely on these four dimens ions 
of female autonomy and provide similar evidence of positive association with child nationa l 
status. 
In line with female autonomy, there is growing evidence on child health effects of maternal 
specific characteristics. Most of these characteristics include maternal education, employment 
status, maternal health and age at first birth. This chapter therefore estimates child stunting 
effects of the indicators of bargaining and maternal specific characteristics in rural and urban 
communities and identify the contribution of each to the rural-urban gap in child nutrition. 
4.4. Estimation Strategies 
Child nutritional status (height- for-age) is a continuous variable with high values indicat ing 
better child nutritional outcomes. The effects of bargaining on child health can be estimated 
using an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) technique. However, most studies have used binary 
choice models to identify the determinants of under-five nutritional outcomes. In order to use 
binary choice models, children are categorized into two groups: the child is malnourished 
(stunted), otherwise the child is not stunted.  In this study, a probit model is used to estimate 
the probability of child malnutrition. In addition to this, and for the purpose of sensitivity, this 
study augments the probit model with an OLS technique. Concerning the probit model, the 
underlying unobserved latent variable 𝑌𝑖∗ is defined for a vector of observable explanatory 





∗ = 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑖          (4.6) 
So that: 
𝑌𝑖 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑌∗ > 0
0   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
           (4.7) 
 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡∗ is the underlying latent variable of whether or not an individual child 𝑖 at time 𝑡 is 
stunted, and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of observable characteristics of the individual and the household at 
time 𝑡. The probability that a child is stunted is represented as:  
𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1/𝑥𝑖𝑡)= 𝛷(𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽)        (4.8) 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1 implies the child is malnourished (stunted), 𝛽 is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated, and 𝛷 represents a standard normal cumulative density function. 
 
4.4.1 Decomposition Technique 
To understand the prevailing inequality in child health outcomes in Tanzania, this chapter 
considers rural and urban children who are alive and decomposes their observed health 
(nutrition) gap using the detailed Oaxaca and Blinder decomposition42 approach. The rural-




′ 𝛽𝑖𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗                     (4.9) 
 
Where 𝑖 refers to the individual child, 𝑗 is child residential type,  𝐻𝑖 refers to child health 
(nutrition) for the urban (rural), 𝑋𝑖′ is a vector of determinants of child health, 𝛽𝑖 is a vector of 
associated parameter estimates and 𝑖 is a normally distributed error term. The standard 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition splits the difference between the health outcomes of the urban 
and rural children into the observed and unobserved portion as follows: 
 
𝐻𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 − 𝐻𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 = ∆?̅?[𝐷𝛽𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 + (𝐼 − 𝐷)𝛽𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 ] + ∆𝛽[?̅? 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛(𝐼 − 𝐷) + ?̅? 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝐷]    (4.10) 
 
Where I is an identity matrix equal to one if 𝑥 is a scalar and not a vector, D is a matrix of 
weights, 𝐻𝑗  (𝑗 = 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛, 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙) is the predicted mean nutrition outcome for a given group of 
children, ?̅? 𝑗 is the mean vector of explanatory variables, 𝛽 is a vector of parameter estimates 
and ∆ denote a change. When D = 0, equation (4.10) reduces to: 
                                                                 






𝐻𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 − 𝐻𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 = ∆?̅?𝛽𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 + ∆𝛽?̅? 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛                      (4.11) 
 
In this case, the explained gap is weighted by the coefficients of the rural group and the 
unexplained gap is weighted by the control variables of the urban group. Seemingly, if D = 1 
equation (4.10) becomes: 
 
𝐻𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 − 𝐻𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 = ∆?̅?𝛽𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 + ∆𝛽?̅? 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙                      (4.12) 
 
 
Here, the explained gap is weighted by the coefficients of the urban group, whereas the 
unexplained gap is weighted by the control variables of the rural group. In either way, we will 
be able to identify what accounts for the poor child health in rural areas. The difference between 
these two equations is that in equation (4.11) the interaction effects are imbedded in the 
unexplained portion, whereas in equation (4.12) it is in the explained part. Decomposit ions 
based on this approach will be sensitive to whatever group’s health outcome that is assumed to 
be the norm (Madden, 2004). There are several ways for weighting the observed and 
unobserved gap. For instance, Reimers (1983) proposed the proportion of the two groups be 
used to weight the unexplained gap, whereas Cotton (1988) proposed the mean of the 
coefficient vectors be used to weight the explained gap. Contrary to these approaches, Neumark 
(1988) suggested, that the coefficients from the pooled regression be used. It is not conclusive 
at best which of these approaches is the most appropriate. However, according to Jann (2008), 
these approaches are inappropriate as some of the unexplained parts may be transferred into 
the explained component. Jann (2008) concluded that the pooled model with a group indicator 
as an additional variable is the most appropriate. This study therefore follows the Jann (2008) 
decomposition approach to understand what explains the rural-urban gap in child health.  
 
 
4.4.2 Decomposition with Selectivity-Corrected 
Using the anthropometric measure of health to compare health status between or within 
regions, it is important to correct for possible sample selection bias. Selectivity arises from the 
fact that this measure of health is observed only for people alive and this might be a selective 
group. In our case, only the nutritional status of children alive is observed. Studies that have 
employed this measure to account for the rural-urban gap in child health, especially child 
nutrition have failed to correct for the possible selectivity bias. To fully comprehend the 




all children born during the period under study. However, it is difficult to ascertain the 
nutritional status of children who died during this period. This study corrects for selection bias, 
by taking account of the gap due to selectivity43 in the child health equation. A two equation 
model of child health (nutritional status and survival rate) is considered. The survival rate (to 
control for children not alive) and nutritional status functions for an individual child 𝑖 in a 
residential type 𝑗 are presented as: 
 
𝑆𝑖𝑗 = 𝑍𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗                          (4.13) 
 
𝐻𝑖𝑗 = 𝑋𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗                             (4.14) 
 
Where 𝑆𝑖𝑗 is a dummy variable equivalent to one if the child is alive and zero if he/she is dead 
and  𝐻𝑖𝑗 is a continuous variable that measures the nutritional status of children alive,  𝑍𝑖𝑗 ′ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
 𝑋𝑖𝑗
′  are vectors of explanatory variables, 𝛾𝑗  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽𝑗  are associated parameter vectors and 
𝑖𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜇𝑖𝑗 are error terms. The error terms follow a bivariate normal distribution of the 
form (0, 0,  𝜎𝜀𝑗, 𝛿𝜇𝑗, 𝜌𝑗 ). Nutritional status is observed for those whom 𝑆𝑖𝑗 > 0, so that the 
expected nutritional status of a surviving child is determined according to  
𝐸(𝐻𝑖𝑗|𝑆𝑖𝑗 > 0) = 𝑋𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽𝑗 + 𝐸(𝜇𝑖𝑗| 𝑖𝑗 > −𝑍𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛾𝑗 )  
                          = 𝑋𝑖𝑗′ 𝛽𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗𝜆𝑖𝑗                         (4.15) 
 
Where 𝜃𝑗 = 𝜌𝑗 𝛿𝜇𝑗 , 𝜆𝑖𝑗 = ∅(𝑍𝑖𝑗′ 𝛾𝑗 )/𝛷(𝑍𝑖𝑗′ 𝛾𝑗 ), ∅(𝑍𝑖𝑗′ 𝛾𝑗 ) is the standard normal density function 
and  𝛷(𝑍𝑖𝑗′ 𝛾𝑗 ) is the standard normal cumulative density function. The estimating equation of 
rural-urban nutrition for surviving children (in the presence of selectivity) is expressed as:  
 
𝐻𝑖𝑗| 𝑆𝑖𝑗 >  0 = 𝑋𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗 𝜆𝑖𝑗 + 𝑖                    (4.16) 
 
Equation (4.16) is estimated using the Heckman two-step estimation procedure separately for 
rural and urban children. Correction of selectivity bias requires the child health decomposition 
of the form: 
 
𝐻𝑢 − 𝐻𝑟 = 𝑋𝑟
′ (𝛽𝑢 − ?̂?𝑟) + (𝑋𝑢
′ − 𝑋𝑟
′)′?̂?𝑢 + (𝜃𝑢?̂? 𝑢 − 𝜃𝑟?̂?𝑢)               (4.17) 
 
                                                                 
43 According to Neuman and Oaxaca (1998) there is need to correct for selectivity bias in studies of wage 
inequality since wages are observed only for the employment. In this light, we correct for selectivity bias in the 
child nutritional equation using the child survival functions since both can subsequently be used to decompose 




Where 𝐻 is the predicted mean of height- for-age Z-score of children in a given group, 𝑋  is the 
mean vector of child health determining variables, ?̂? is a vector of parameter estimates for 
the 𝑋′𝑠, 𝜃 is an estimate of 𝜌𝛿𝑢 and ?̂? is an estimate of the mean Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). 
The first two terms at the right of equation (4.17) are the unexplained and explained portions 
of the rural-urban gap in child health respectively and the third term is the selectivity 
component. To estimate this equation, the Oaxaca with Heckman decomposition is used to 
adjust for sample selection bias.  
 
4.4.3 Estimation Issues 
The potential problem with decomposing the rural-urban gap in child nutrition is the possibility 
for selectivity bias (O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 2008). The main impediment for correcting for 
sample selection bias is the difficulty of finding an identification strategy. This has prevented 
previous studies from accounting for the possible sample selection bias. This study is not aware 
of any study that has attempted to address the possible sample selection bias. This study 
therefore employs the Heckman two-step sample-selection procedure in an attempt to correct 
for possible sample selection bias. According to Cameron (2005), the use of Heckman two-
step automatically corrects for sample selection problems. The major problem with this 
approach is to identify an exogenous (exclusion restriction) variable, and the fact that the error 
terms of the selection and outcome equation may be correlated. The exclusion restriction must 
not directly impact child nutrition but affect the probability of child survival.  
 
In this chapter, the regional survival rates for 2004 (obtained from 2004 TDHS) are used as a 
possible variable that exogenously determined child survival in 2010, but not individua l 
nutrition in 2010. Figure 4.1 shows the concentration of child survival rate by region in 2004 
and 2010; and child nutrition44 in 2010 in Tanzania.  As shown in this figure, the distribution 
of child survival rate across the country in 2010 was largely determined by the distribution of 
child survival rate in 2004. Panel B of the figure shows that the distribution of child nutrit ion 
across the country in 2010 is weakly correlated to the distribution of child survival rate in 2004. 
While the correlation between regional survival rates in 2004 and 2010 is 0.81, the correlation 
between regional survival rates in 2004 and nutrition in 2010 is only 0.27. In addition, it is 
evident that child survival rate in 2004 significantly predict child survival rate in 2010 (see 
                                                                 
44 In this case, the child nutritional outcome is  one if the child is healthy (not stunted) and zero if the child is 
stunted. Hence, a region’s child nutrition rate is the proportion of healthy children to the total number of children  




Table C4.4 of the appendix). Furthermore, the reference population to which a child’s 
nutritional status is compared take account of only children alive. Given the approach for 
computing nutritional outcomes, it is less likely that regional survival rates explain regional 
nutritional outcomes45.  
 
This suggests that previous child survival rates predict current child survival rates, but not 
current nutritional status. The study acknowledges that any intervention in favour of regions 
with low survival rate could alter or reverse the survival trends, thereby reducing the strong 
association between previous and current regional differences in child survival rate. Based on 
our knowledge and in the context of Tanzania, there have been no region specific child health 
care policy within this period, and most child health intervention programmes have been at the 
national level as highlighted in the introductory chapter. As it is difficult to find a perfect 
exclusion restriction and since there is no formal statistical test, this study assumes that the 
theoretical justification above is plausible for the exclusion restriction.  Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to stress that the validity of this exclusion restriction does not undermine the focus 
of this chapter. The study decomposes the rural-urban child nutrition with and without selection 
and further use a nonlinear decomposition by Fairlie (2005) to decompose the rural-urban child 
survival, as a robustness check, and to assess the seriousness of this problem. 
 
Figure 4.1: Correlation between survival and nutrition 
 
 
                                                                 
45 Parsons and Vézina (2014) used a similar approach by arguing that the allocation of Vietnamese immigrants in 




4.5. Data and Data Analysis  
As indicated earlier, the analysis in this chapter is based on the Tanzanian Demography and 
Health Survey conducted in 2010. Since the main focus of this chapter is on the health of 
children under the age of five, the sample is limited to children aged 0–59 months. The sample 
is further divided into rural and urban subsamples. There are two commonly used measures of 
child health. First is the under-five survival or mortality rate. This measure is limited as it says 
nothing about the health status of children currently alive. The second measure is child 
nutritional status. This chapter considers rural and urban live children and identifies their 
prevailing nutritional gap. It helps identify children who are at risk of morbidity and mortality, 
and provides useful information for policies aimed at improving child health. 
 
There are basically three major approaches for measuring child nutritional status. These 
approaches include clinical signs, biochemical indicators, and anthropometric measures (see 
Onis, 2000). The anthropometric approach is the most appropriate measure of child nutritiona l 
status and is preferred, as it is able to distinguish between short-term changes from long- term 
changes in child nutritional status (WHO working group.1986; O'Donnell & Wagstaff, 2008; 
Onis, 2000).  Anthropometric measures use information on children’s height, weight, and age 
to generate three key indicators of child nutritional status, namely height-for-age (stunting), 
weight-for-height (wasting), and weight-for-age (underweight). In each of these measures child 
nutritional status is expressed in the form of a Z-score by comparing either the height or the 
weight of a child to that of a similar child from a reference healthy population (see Zere & 
McIntyre, 2003a). While anthropometric indicators are sensitive in initial cases of malnutrit ion, 
non-invasive, less costly and easy to find, the other two measures are only useful in advanced 
stages of malnutrition (WHO working group.1986, WHO, 1995).  
 
The weight- for-height measure reflects acute malnutrition, is sensitive to short-term changes, 
and is essential in evaluating benefits from nutrition intervention programmes. The weight-fo r-
age measure cannot distinguish between short-term and long-term malnutrition. It is therefore 
difficult to interpret. Wasting and stunting are appropriate measures of child nutrition status, 
as they can discriminate between temporary and permanent malnutrition (WHO working 
group, 1986). However, the literature on child nutrition regards stunting as the most appropriate 
measure of childhood malnutrition, as it is directly associated with socioeconomic status and a 
reflection of long-term dietary inadequacy (Skoufias, 1998). It is an overall measure of 




analysis in this chapter makes use of the stunting measure of child nutrition. To understand the 
relationship between these measures, they are all included in the descriptive analysis. Whether 
or not a child is stunted, wasted, or underweight is based on the WHO recommended range of 
the Z-score46. It should be noted that the measures of intra-household bargaining are as defined 
in chapter three.  
 
Table 4.2 demonstrates significant differences in the levels of child health, bargaining 
indicators, as well as individual and household characteristics across rural and urban areas. 
This allows us to test for the equality in mean of the characteristics between these regions to 
verify the previously claimed or discussed important differences. The results reveal some 
interesting differences in observable indicators of intra-household bargaining, as well as 
individual and household characteristics between the rural and urban population. It should be 
noted that stunting, wasting, and underweight are all measures of child malnutrition, but in the 
context of this chapter malnutrition strictly refers to stunting, and the two terminologies are 
used interchangeably. In terms of child health, about 38 percent of rural children are stunted 
while only 25 percent of urban children are stunted. The rate of underweight children in rural 
areas is 22 percent compared to 16 percent in urban areas. The under-five survival rate for rural 
areas is 89 percent compared to 91 percent for urban areas. As expected, child health outcomes 
are substantially and significantly better in urban areas than rural areas. It is also observed that 
differences in the covariates are generally significant and favour the urban population. 
 
With regards to maternal characteristics, only 3 percent of rural women had completed at least 
secondary education compared to over 16 percent of their urban counterparts. While only about 
13 percent of urban women had no formal education, over 30 percent in rural women had no 
formal education. A similar pattern is observed for the spouse’s educational attainment. On 
average, 9 percent of men in rural areas had completed secondary education relative to over 26 
percent of men in urban areas. It is surprising that urban women are on average more 
malnourished than their rural counterparts. Maternal employment rates (both skilled and 
unskilled) are significantly higher in urban than in rural areas. A bulk of women, 58 percent of 
the rural and 50 percent of the urban population, had their first pregnancy over the age of 35 
years. Over 97 percent of all child birth in both areas is singleton.  
                                                                 
46 A child is moderately stunted, wasted, or underweight if the Z-score value is between -2.00 to -2.99; and 
severely stunted, wasted, and underweight if the Z-score value is less than -3.00; otherwise the child is not 




Table 4.2: Comparison of determinants of child health outcomes across urban and rural areas 
Variables Obs. All Rural Urban 
Measures of child health        
Child survival rate (percentage) 26233 88.9 (0.32) 88.8 (0.32) 90.6* (0.31) 
Percentage of stunted children 2287 35.4 (0.48) 37.8 (0.49) 25.2* (0.43) 
Percentage of  children underweight 1504 21.0 (0.41) 22.2 (0.42) 15.9* (0.37) 
Percentage of wasted children  380 4.16 (0.20) 4.07 (0.20) 4.55 (0.21) 
Maternal and child characteristics        
Age at first birth (10 - 19) 368 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.12) 
Age at first birth (20 - 34) 11758 0.42 (0.49) 0.40 (0.49) 0.49* (0.50) 
Age at first birth (35+) 17651 0.57 (0.50) 0.58 (0.49) 0.50* (0.50) 
No formal education 8258 0.27 (0.44) 0.30 (0.46) 0.13* (0.34) 
Completed primary education 18301 0.68 (0.47) 0.67 (0.47) 0.71 (0.45) 
At least secondary education 3218 0.05 (0.22) 0.03 (0.16) 0.16* (0.36) 
Individual is employed 25719 0.83 (0.34) 0.77 (0.34) 0.89* (0.38) 
Maternal health status (height-for-age) 29524 -1.22 (1.02) -1.22 (1.01) -1.24* ()1.03 
Child is singleton birth 28762 0.97 (0.17) 0.97 (0.17) 0.96 (0.19) 
Indicators of bargaining        
Partner has no formal education 5827 0.18 (0.39) 0.21 (0.16) 0.06 (0.24) 
Partner has completed primary education 19115 0.73 (0.44) 0.74 (0.41) 0.68 (0.47) 
Partner completed secondary education  4078 0.09 (0.28) 0.04 (0.20) 0.26 (0.44) 
Spouses cooperate on health care decision 14868 0.62 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49) 0.69* (0.46) 
Spouses cooperate in daily purchase decision 12457 0.40 (0.49) 0.40 (0.49) 0.46* (0.50) 
Getting money for health care is problematic 14217 0.49 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) 0.35* (0.48) 
Wife beaten if she goes out without telling him 10753 0.41 (0.49) 0.43 (0.50) 0.33* (0.47) 
Wife beaten if she neglects children 11059 0.44 (0.50) 0.46 (0.50) 0.36* (0.48) 
Wife beaten if argues with partner 10473 0.41 (0.49) 0.43 (0.50) 0.33* (0.47) 
Wife beaten if she refuses to have sex 9178 0.37 (0.48) 0.39 (0.49) 0.26* (0.44) 
Wife beaten if she burns food 5043 0.20 (0.40) 0.22 (0.41) 0.14* (0.35) 
Household characteristics        
Household is in the first wealth quintile 5995 0.21 (0.41) 0.26 (0.44) 0.04* (0.20) 
Household is in the second wealth quintile 6374 0.23 (0.42) 0.27 (0.45) 0.03* (0.17) 
Household is in the third wealth quintile 6301 0.22 (0.42) 0.26 (0.44) 0.07* (0.25) 
Household is in the fourth wealth quintile 6386 0.20 (0.40) 0.17 (0.38) 0.28* (0.45) 
Household is in the fifth wealth quintile 4721 0.14 (0.35) 0.03 (0.18) 0.58* (0.49) 
Distance to health facility is problematic 12118 0.46 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 0.23* (0.42) 
Access to clean source of drinking water 14243 0.44 (0.50) 0.37 (0.48) 0.76* (0.43) 
Access to at least a pit latrine 22975 0.83 (0.38) 0.80 (0.40) 0.97* (0.16) 
Number of children under age five (mean) 29777 1.64 (1.48) 1.76 (1.56) 1.15* (0.99) 
Household size (mean number) 29777 7.14 (4.05) 7.34 (4.26) 6.32* (2.90) 
Note: * indicates that the rural-urban gap is significant at 5%. Values in parentheses are standard deviations.  






In terms of bargaining attributes, there exist low levels of cooperation between spouses in rural 
household and rural women are more prone to being subjected to domestic violence. The 
converse holds true for the urban sample. For instance, while over 43 percent of rural women 
are beaten if they argue with their partners, only 33 percent of urban women are beaten when 
they argue with their partners. In 60 percent of all rural households, spouses cooperate in health 
care decision relative 69 percent when the urban sample is considered. The level of cooperation 
in household daily purchase decision is higher in urban than in rural households. While over 
half of all rural women had difficulties getting money from their partners to seek care, only 35 
percent of urban women faced this challenge.  
 
The household socioeconomic status is on average generally and significantly better in urban 
than in rural areas. Over 51 percent of rural women reported distance to facilities as problematic 
compared to just 23 percent in urban areas. Rural households are exposed to poor sanitation 
(no toilet) and limited access to clean source of water than urban households. Concerning 
household wealth, only 20 percent of rural households belong to the high income quintiles 
(fourth and fifth) compared to 86 percent for their urban counterparts. Rural households have 
significantly higher fertility rates, identified by the average number of children in a household. 
The rural-urban differences reported here suggest that urban children are likely to have a 
nutritional advantage. The greater access to economic resources and high level of cooperation 
among urban households increase the chance of providing adequate care for children. 
 
Table 4.3 shows the average difference in the level of stunting across various bargaining 
indicators and other covariates. Stunting rates are substantially and significantly higher in 
violence prone households than violence free households. For example, stunting is 5 percent 
higher in households where women are beaten if they went out without telling their partners 
compared to their counterparts. As expected, the rate of stunting is lower if couples cooperate  
in household decision making process. The rate of stunting is 2 percent significantly lower if 
couples cooperate in health care use decisions than when they do not cooperate.  In addition, 
stunting rate is 3 percent significantly lower among household with parental cooperation in 
daily purchase decisions. Interestingly, child stunting rate is 7 percent higher among women 





Table 4.3: Mean comparison of child stunting across various characteristics 
   Mean  Mean Difference 
 Variables Obs. Yes Obs. No (Yes - NO) 
Maternal and child characteristics       
Child is delivered in a health facility 3260 30.0 3422 37.2 -0.072*  (0.115) 
Individual is employed 5774 26.8 989 35.0 -0.082*  (0.016) 
Child is singleton birth 6605 33.2 163 58.3 -0.251*  (0.037) 
Indicators of bargaining      
Wife beaten justify if she (violence):       
Goes out without telling her partner 2531 36.5  4182 31.8 0.046*  (0.012) 
Neglects their children 2637 36.2 4090 32.2 0.040*  (0.012) 
Argues with her partner 2523 36.1 4190 32.4 0.038*  (0.012) 
Refuses to have sex with her partner 2143 37.1 4563 32.3 0.048*  (0.012) 
Burns food 1182 38.4 5556 32.8 0.056*  (0.015) 
Spouses cooperate in health care decision 2362 32.7 3539 35.1 -0.024‡  (0.013) 
Spouses cooperate in household visit decision 2239 33.4 3649 33.7 -0.003   (0.013) 
Spouses cooperate in household purchases  1601 31.5 4294 34.4 -0.029†  (0.014) 
Getting money for medical care is problematic  3091 37.4 3669 30.7 0.066*  (0.012) 
Household characteristics      
Distance to facility is problematic 2813 36.8 3939 31.6 0.052*  (0.012) 
Individual belongs to first wealth quintile 1383 41.7 5385 31.8 0.110*  (0.014) 
Individual belongs to second wealth quintile 1552 38.1 5216 32.5 0.056*  (0.014) 
Individual belongs to third wealth quintile 1449 35.0 5319 33.5 0.015  (0.014) 
Individual belongs to fourth wealth quintile 1394 29.8 5374 34.8 -0.050*  (0.014) 
Individual belongs to fifth wealth quintile 990 19.8 5778 36.2 -0.164*  (0.016) 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, level of significance: * p<0.01, † p<0.05, ‡ p<0.1. The mean values are percentages of 
children who are stunted. Obs. = number of observations, Yes = individual has such characteristics and No = 
individual does not have such attributes. The Yes and No columns shows the proportion of stunted children.  
 
 
Regarding individual characteristics, children of employed women are less likely to be stunted 
relative to children unemployed women. Over 58 percent of multiple birth children are stunted 
compared to 33 percent for singleton births. In terms of household characteristics, the 
difference is particularly high for household wealth. While a substantial proportion of children 
from the poorest household (42 percent) are stunted, only about 20 percent of those from the 
richest households are stunted. The proportion of stunted children decreases as we move from 
the lowest to the highest wealth quintiles. An interesting observation is that the greatest gap in 
child stunting is among those in the highest quintile relative to those in other quintiles.  
 
4.5.1 Child Nutrition and Household Wealth 
This sub-section helps identify the possible relationships that exist between the various 
anthropometric measures of child health. Figure 4.2 closely examines the three anthropometr ic 




while stunting and underweight are highly sensitive to household wealth, wasting appears to 
be less responsive to wealth. Children from the lowest quintile have rates of stunting and 
underweight that are almost twice those of the richest quintile.  Using per capita expenditure 
decile, Zere and McIntyre (2003a) showed that stunting rate for children from the poorest 10 
percent of households in South Africa are eight times those of the richest 10 percent and 
underweight is about three times higher.  
 
Figure 4.2: Child nutrition by household wealth quintile 
 
 
Figure 4.3 provides an understanding of the relationship between the various anthropometr ic 
measures of child nutritional status between rural and urban areas. The notion here is to identify 
whether or not a stunted child is likely to be underweight or wasted. According to O'Donnell 
and Wagstaff (2008), the absence of wasting in a population does not necessary signify the 
absence of stunting, since the former is short-term. This study finds no evidence to suggest that 
a child who is stunted is most likely to be wasted. There exists a positive association between 
underweight and stunting, and between underweight and wasting. These relationships are 
consistent across rural and urban dwellers (see Figure 4.3). Considering data for under- five 
children in 22 African countries, De Onis et al. (1993) showed that the frequency of 
underweight has a strong and positive correlation with wasting and stunting. They found a very 
low correlation of 0.1 between wasting and stunting. Similar results were obtained by Victora 









4.6. Empirical Results 
Table 4.4 presents the marginal effect estimates of female discretion over household wealth, 
her position in decision-making, and domestic violence on the probability of under- five 
stunting. It also includes additional controls for the characteristics of the mother, the child, and 
the household. Three different specifications are estimated, and each provides estimates for the 
pooled, rural, and urban samples. The results discussed in this section are obtained from the 
third specification, and are presented in columns 7 to 9 (the last three columns). Estimates in 
column 7 are for the pooled sample, in column 8 for the rural sample, and in column 9 for the 
urban sample. It is not surprising that the rural sample is almost four times higher than the 
urban sample. First, over 75 percent of the population in Tanzania live in rural areas. Second, 
the final report of the survey and the descriptive statistics presented in Table 3.1 indicate that 
only 20 percent of the sample was from urban areas. The discussion is limited to the pooled 
sample and the observed difference with the rural and urban estimates are reported. Generally, 
the results are more statistically significant for the rural, but the signs on the coefficients for 
the urban specification tell the same story. The observed difference in the level of significance 





Table 4.4: Marginal effects of bargaining including controls for personal and household characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Variables Pooled Rural Urban Pooled Rural Urban Pooled Rural Urban 
Maternal and child characteristics          
Age at first birth (20-35 years) -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.02 -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04 -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Age at first birth (35+ years) -0.13 -0.25 0.12 -0.11 -0.21 0.01 -0.12 -0.21 -0.01 
 (0.15) (0.20) (0.22) (0.16) (0.21) (0.23) (0.16) (0.21) (0.23) 
Individual years of schooling -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00 -0.02*** -0.00 0.00 -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Individual is employed -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.06* -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Maternal health (height-for-age) -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.07*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Child is male 0.04*** 0.03** 0.05** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Child is delivery in a facility -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.04 -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.03 -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Child is singleton birth -0.25*** -0.24*** -0.22** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.15 -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.15 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) 
Indicators of bargaining          
Absolute difference in education    -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Individual less educated than her partner    -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
Absolute education interacted with wife less educated     -0.01 0.00 -0.05** 0.00 0.01 -0.04** 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Absolute difference in age between couples    0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
Individual is younger than her partner    0.02 0.05 -0.11 0.01 0.04 -0.09 
    (0.05) (0.06) (0.15) (0.05) (0.06) (0.15) 
Absolute difference in age interacted with wife younger    -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Domestic violence index    0.01*** 0.01** 0.01* 0.01* 0.00 0.01* 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Getting money for care is problematic    0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04 0.03** 0.03* 0.03 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Both partners decide on daily purchases    -0.04** -0.03* -0.03 -0.04** -0.04** -0.03 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 





Table 4.4: Continued from previous page 
 Pooled Rural Urban Pooled Rural Urban Pooled Rural Urban 
Partner alone decides on daily purchases    0.08*** 0.09** 0.03 0.07** 0.08** 0.03 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
Both partners decide on health care use    -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.06 -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.06* 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
Partner alone decides on health care use    0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Household characteristics          
Distance to facility is problematic       -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
       (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
Number of under-five in household       -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
       (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Household size       -0.00* -0.00 -0.01 
       (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Second wealth quintile       -0.02 -0.03 0.03 
       (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) 
Third wealth quintile       -0.04** -0.05** -0.01 
       (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) 
Fourth wealth quintile       -0.08*** -0.09*** 0.00 
       (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) 
Fifth wealth quintile       -0.18*** -0.21*** -0.03 
       (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
Observations 6,659 5,437 1,222 5,478 4,489 989 5,470 4,483 987 
       Robust standard errors in parentheses: level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The reference categories: Wife alone for decision making variables, unemployed for  










The results show that child-specific characteristics have significant influence on child 
nutritional outcome (stunting). Male children have higher stunting probability than their female 
counterparts. The probability of stunting is 4 percentage point higher among male than female 
children. Children delivered in a health facility have lower stunting probability compared to 
those delivered at home. Specifically, the use of a health facility during childbirth reduces the 
probability of child stunting by 4 percentage points. In addition, the type of childbirth 
significantly influence the probability of child malnutrition (stunting). The probability of child 
stunting is 23 percentage points lower among singleton birth relative to multiple births. There 
is an inverse association between maternal educational attainment and child malnutrition. The 
relationship is significant in the urban and not the rural specification. The significant effects of 
place of delivery and birth type are observed only in the pooled and rural samples. 
 
In addition, maternal empowerment in terms of education and employment, her health status 
and age at birth significantly affect child health. The propensity of child stunting reduces with 
maternal years of schooling in urban areas. Similarly, children of employed women are less 
likely to be stunted compared to those of unemployed women. The effects are significant across 
all specification, ranging from 7 percentage points for the pooled sample to 6 percentage for 
the urban sample. This adds to the fact that a woman’s limited discretion over household 
resources reduces her ability to seek care or provide recommended nutrients to their children 
(see Ghuman, 2003). Maternal health status is inversely associated with the probability of child 
stunting. A unit rise in the nutritional status of the mother reduces the probability of child 
stunting by 10 percent for rural children and 7 percent for the urban children. The probability 
of child stunting is significantly lower among women who gave birth at age 20 – 34 years, 
relative to those who gave birth at age less than 20 years. This findings are similar to previous 
findings by Van de Poel et al. (2009) on the probability of child mortality.  
 
The results confirm the impact of bargaining power within couples on child stunting as 
expected. First, the results show that cooperation in decision making within couples reduce the 
probability of child stunting.  If partners cooperate in health care use decisions, the probability 
of child stunting reduces by 8 percent. Similarly, if partners cooperate in household daily 
purchase decisions, the probability of child stunting reduces by 4 percent; but if partner makes 
purchase decisions alone, the probability of child stunting increases by 7 percent. This 
relationship is significant only with the pooled and rural samples. On the other hand, the 




and with the incidence of domestic violence. The probability of child stunting is 3 percent 
higher among women with limited discretion over household wealth than those with access to 
household wealth. The results suggest that a unit increase in domestic violence significantly 
increase the probability of child stunting by 1 percentage points. This is only in the pooled 
sample. Another observation is that differences in the level of education between couples 
significantly reduce child stunting in urban areas and not in the pooled or rural population.    
 
In terms of household characteristics, household size and household resources endowment are 
inversely and significantly associated with the probability of child stunting. If the household is 
made up of more adult than children, then it is possible that household size reduces child 
stunting, otherwise the converse is true. The probability of child stunting is 4 percent lower in 
poorer households than in poorest households. Interestingly, the propensity of child stunting 
decreases consistently and significantly with the level of household wealth. The effects of 
household wealth are significant only in the rural and the pooled population.  
 
The results suggest that the significant impact of these variables in the pooled sample is driven 
by the effect in the rural sample. The major findings suggest that cooperation in household 
decision making, absence of domestic violence, female discretion over resources, and their 
empowerment through the right to education and employment are essential in reducing child 
malnutrition (stunting) in Tanzania in general and in rural Tanzania in particular. Relative to 
household characteristics, the effects of bargaining and maternal specific characteristics are 
smaller but economically significant, indicating that female empowerment and participation in 
household decision are likely to partially alter the level of child stunting. In addition, maternal 
and child specific factors are important in explaining child stunting. These relationships remain 
significant after controlling for household resource endowment. For a sensitivity check, an 
OLS is estimated with the same covariates. Not surprisingly, the estimates in Table C4.1 of the 
appendix are substantially higher than the probit estimates. However, same signs and similar 




4.6.1 Decomposition Results 
This analysis seeks to answer three fundamental questions. Firstly, what is the child nutritiona l 
gap between rural and urban communities? The answer to this question is the total difference 
between the two areas. Secondly, what would the nutritional gap be if the sample of children 
alive is not random? This is the total gap from a selectivity corrected child health equation. 
Thirdly, what would the nutritional gap be if rural households were exactly identical to urban 
households except for differences in bargaining power within couples? This is the difference 
due to bargaining effects within households. To answer these fundamental questions, the 
detailed Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition with and without selection is adopted (see section 4.4). 
In addition, a generalised non-linear decomposition detailed in Fairlie (2005) is adopted to 
identify the difference in child survival probability between these areas. It should be noted that 
the nutritional variable here is continues with high values implying better nutritional outcomes.  
 
Table 4.5 presents the contribution of each covariate to the observed and unobserved rural-
urban gap in child nutrition with and without selection bias.  The contribution resulting from 
bargaining power (measured by female decision-making power, her discretion over resources, 
domestic violence, differences in education, and differences in age between couples) within 
couples is about 5 percent without selection and 4 percent with selection47 (6 percent of the 
total explained gap). Maternal and child specific characteristics account for 10.8 percent of the 
total gap without selection and 9.7 percent with selection bias (16 percent of the total explained 
gap). Over 53.4 percent of the gap without selection and 47.9 percent of the gap with selection 
(78 percent of the total explained gap) is due to differences in socioeconomic status between 
the rural and urban households. Van de Poel et al. (2009) also confirmed that a greater part 
(67%) of the rural-urban gap in infant mortality in six Sub-Saharan African countries is 
attributed to differences in household level characteristics. Interestingly, differences in 
household wealth alone account for 32 percent of the overall gap. The main finding from this 
analysis is that if the level of bargaining within rural households is equivalent to the level of 
bargaining within urban households, the overall gap in child nutrition between these areas will 
reduce by 5 percent without selection and 4 percent with selection.  
 
 
                                                                 




Table 4.5: Detailed decomposition of rural-urban child nutritional status in a selectivity-
corrected health equation 
 Selection bias not adjusted Selection bias adjusted 
Variables Explained % Explained % 
Domestic violence index 0.001 0.11 0.001 0.10 
Spouses cooperate in household purchases  0.002 0.47 0.002 0.42 
Spouses cooperate in health care decisions  0.003 0.72 0.003 0.64 
Getting money for care not problematic 0.011 2.49 0.011 2.23 
Absolute difference in education 0.002 0.52 0.002 0.46 
Absolute difference in age  0.001 0.20 0.001 0.18 
Contribution from bargaining 0.02 4.51 0.02 4.03 
Individual is employed 0.009 1.97 0.009 1.77 
Individual years of schooling 0.025 5.52 0.025 4.95 
Individual age at first birth 0.008 1.84 0.008 1.65 
Child is singleton birth 0.008 1.82 0.008 1.63 
Child is delivered in facility childbirth) 0.017 3.77 0.017 3.38 
Maternal health (height-for-age) -0.018 -4.08 -0.018 -3.66 
Contribution from maternal factors 0.049 10.84 0.049 9.72 
Household size -0.000 -0.07 -0.000 -0.06 
Number of under-five in the household -0.027 -6.10 -0.027 -5.47 
Distance to facility is problematic -0.007 -1.59 -0.007 -1.43 
Household wealth index 0.144 32.31 0.144 28.97 
Has access to pure drinking water 0.012 2.62 0.012 2.35 
Has access to toilet facilities  0.041 9.08 0.041 8.14 
Zone of Residence 0.076 17.13 0.076 15.36 
Contribution from household factors 0.239 53.38 0.239 47.86 
Total explained/Unexplained 0.308 68.73 0.308 61.61 
Observations 4,570  4,570  
Note: A detailed of the results which include both the explained and unexplained component of the gap are 
presented in Table C4.3 of appendix C. 
 
A contribution from each variable reveals the difference in its distribution between the rural 
and urban samples, and its degree of association with child nutrition. The interpretation focuses 
on results obtained from the model with selection bias (sample selection not adjusted), but 
identified changes after correcting for sample selection bias are reported. In terms of bargaining 
indicators, half of its contribution is due women limited discretion over household resources to 
seek care. High incidence of domestic violence in rural areas increase the overall gap by 0.1 
percent, while low level of cooperation in health care used and household daily purchase 
decisions in rural areas increase the gap by 0.54 percent. Differences in educational attainment 
between couples account for 0.52 percent and differences in age 0.2 percent of the gap. The 





Concerning maternal and child-specific characteristics, differences in maternal education 
between rural and urban areas account for 5.5 percent of the gap in child nutrition. Differences 
in age at first birth and maternal employment contribute 2 percent each to the overall gap. 
Maternal health actually reduces the rural-urban gap by about 4 percent. The results confirm to 
the findings observed in the descriptive analysis. Another important finding is that differences 
in facility use during childbirth between these areas account for over 3.8 percent of the gap, 
and child birth type account for about 4 percent of the gap. For household characterist ics, 
differences in household wealth contribute 32 percent, zone of residence 17 percent, access to 
toilet facilities 9 percent, and access to clean water sources 3 percent. Other household factors 
such as distance to a health facility, household size, and number of under-five children in the 
household contribute negatively to the total explained gap. The relative contributions and the 
observed explained and unexplained gaps are presented in Figure 4.4. 
 
 









Table 4.6 illustrates an extended decomposition of the rural-urban gap in child nutrition. The 
gap is divided into the explained (due to differences in observable characteristics) and 
unexplained (due to differences in coefficients and unobservable). First, it is assumed that there 
is no sample selection bias (sample is random) or there is no possibility to correct for possible 
sample selection bias as has been the case in the literature. Second, it is assumed that sample 
selection bias can be adjusted. This helps identify the likely changes in the total gap, the 
explained, and the unexplained gap when selection bias is adjusted. In addition, the nonlinear 
decomposition is used to determine the rural-urban difference in child survival rate. The results 
are generally more plausible for urban than for rural children. Without adjusting for sample 
selection, the average nutritional status is -1.14 for urban children and -1.59 for rural children. 
After correcting for possible selection bias, the average child nutritional status in urban areas 
reduced to -1.39 and in rural areas reduced -1.89. The results from the non-linear 
decomposition indicate that child survival rate in urban areas is 92 percent, relative to 90 
percent in rural areas.  
 
Table 4.6: Extended rural-urban child health decomposition (sample selection corrected) 






Predicted mean for urban population -1.1427*** -1.3901*** 0.9206 
  (0.0738) (0.1134)  
Predicted mean for rural population -1.5887*** -1.8876*** 0.8958 
  (0.0314) (0.0490)  
Total gap (Urban - Rural) 0.4461*** 0.4975*** 0.0248 
 (0.0802) (0.1235)  
Total explained gap 0.3065*** 0.3065*** 0.0197 
  (0.0693) (0.0693)  
Percentage of explained gap 68.7% 61.6% 79.12% 
Total unexplained gap 0.1396* 0.1910 0.0052 
  (0.0767) (0.1246)  
Percentage of unexplained gap 31.3% 38.4% 20.88% 
Total gap in predicted means  0.4460*** 0.4975*** 0.0249 
  (0.0802) (0.1235)  
Percentage of total gap 100% 100% 100% 
Number of observations 4,570 4,570 17,642 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses: level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Model (1) include sample 
selection bias; Model (2) sample selection bias is corrected and Model (3) is non-linear decomposition for child survival rate.  
 
The overall rural-urban gap in child nutrition is 0.45. This gap increased to 0.50 after correcting 
for possible sample selection bias (see row 3). Consequently, failure to correct for possible 
sample selection bias results in an underestimation of the rural-urban gap in child nutrit ion. 
The results reveal that about 69 percent of the gap can be explained by differences in the 




62 percent once selection bias is corrected (see row 5). Without selection, the difference in 
coefficients (unobservable) explains only about 31 percent of the gap and about 38 percent 
with selection (see row 7). In the non-linear decomposition, differences in covariates between 
rural and urban households account for over 79 percent of the gap in child survival rate.  
 
This section has identified evidence of sample selection bias and how it affects the total gap, 
the gap due to observable, and unobservable covariates in child nutrition. It is also observed 
that the increase in the overall gap after correcting for selectivity is explained by the 
unobservable characteristics. The results suggest that differences in household factors remain 
the main drivers of the rural-urban gap in child nutritional status, but can be exacerbated by 
differences in bargaining power within couples in these region. Finally, failure to correct for 




This chapter has investigated the contribution of intra-household bargaining to the rural-urban 
gap in child nutrition in Tanzania, a country with a significant disparity in rural-urban child 
health and parental bargaining outcomes. The argument in this chapter is that parents care about 
the health of their children, but their actions may affect child health inputs which in turn affect 
child health. This implies that increasing parental cooperation or female participation in 
household decision making, and a declined rate of domestic violence in rural communit ies 
reduce the rural-urban gap in child nutrition, in addition to the prevailing disparity due to 
differences in household wealth. This offers an attractive policy option particularly when 
compared to the difficult alternative of household wealth redistribution. The study further 
suggests that the overall gap is likely to be underestimated if possible sample selection bias is 
not adequately addressed. 
   
First, the chapter examined the effect of bargaining on child nutrition in Tanzania. The effect 
of bargaining on child nutrition was estimated using a standard probit and the ordinary least 
square to check for the sensitivity of the results to different specifications. A variety of parental 
bargaining attributes are used to examine the relationship between intra-household bargaining 
and the probability of child stunting. The results suggest that parental cooperation in decision 
making and low incidence of domestic violence significantly increase child nutritional outcome 




in reducing child malnutrition. The effects are significant mostly in rural but not in urban 
communities. Controlling for household characteristics slightly affect the magnitude of the 
coefficients of parental bargaining, but not the sign or significance. Taken together, the results 
suggest that child specific attributes, such as gender of child, child’s birth type, and being 
delivered in a facility are important in explaining the probability of child stunting. Mother-
specific observable components, such as educational attainment, age at first birth, maternal 
employment, and maternal health directly improve child nutrition. At household levels, 
household wealth is directly associated with the probability of child nutrition.  
 
There are two main conclusions about the rural-urban gap in child nutritional outcome. First, 
all of the results suggest that differences in intra-household bargaining between rural and urban 
households appear to have altered the rural-urban gap in child nutrition. The generalised 
detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition and the Heckman two-step decomposition suggest that 
differences in bargaining within couples increase the gap by approximately 5 percent. The 
results confirm that over 69 percent of the gap is explained by differences in the distribution of 
factors that determine child health, whereas differences in the effects of these determinants 
(coefficient effects) account for only 31 percent of the gap. The study illustrates the 
significance of properly correcting for sample selection bias in identifying rural-urban 
differences in child health, since failure to do so clearly results in understating of the gap. After 
correcting for selection bias, the child health gap increased from 0.45 to 0.50. A bulk of the 
total explained gap is due to differences in household wealth. 
  
In sum, the chapter has shown that child nutrition in Tanzania depends on parental actions and 
household living conditions that may limit their ability to care for their children. In addition to 
the behavioural differences between rural and urban areas, rural households live under 
conditions that are detrimental to the health of their children. Poor child health and the rural-
urban gap derived mainly from household and community factors can be exacerbated by the 
inability of parents to cooperate in their actions. Similarly, maternal specific characterist ics 
account for a significant portion of the gap in child nutrition. From this perspective, this thesis 
argues that policies need not be limited to correcting deficiencies at community and household 
endowment, but how to empower women. Empowering rural women reduces the gap directly 











5.1 Summary of Findings 
The utilisation of maternal health care services in Tanzania has declined substantially over the 
last decade (2000-2010). The rapid decline does not synchronise with the increased government 
interventions and is likely to hinder progress towards achieving national and regional health 
goals. Additional concerns have been raised regarding promotion of access to child health care 
services with the aim of improving child health outcomes. While the country celebrates the 
huge decline in infant and under-five mortality, the nutritional status of the surviving rural 
children relative to urban children is poor despite efforts to reduce this gap. Empirical evidence 
has identified individual, household, and community characteristics as the possible setbacks 
for the use of health services. Accordingly, most researchers view the rural-urban gap in child 
health as a main consequence of differences in socioeconomic status between these areas. The 
results obtained in this thesis confirm to this claim. Little is empirically known about the health 
care utilization effects of social networks. There is also very little empirical evidence on how 
the bargaining process between couples can enhance the use of health services as well as reduce 
the rural-urban gap in child health. This thesis separately investigated these issues in three 
linked chapters using data from the 2010 TDHS.  In the process, the thesis contributed to a 
currently small body of empirical evidence on social networks, intra-household bargaining, 
health care use, and child health in Tanzania. 
Chapter Two presented an empirical analysis of the impact of information externalities through 
social networks on antenatal care utilization in Tanzania. The evidence suggested that networks 
impact positively and significantly on the probability of early antenatal check-up and antenatal 
completion. The impact of networks is substantially lower for timing of antenatal visits than 
for antenatal completion probabilities. Using a fixed effect model to control for the various 
channels of omitted variable bias escalated the impact of network on antenatal care use. The 
impact deteriorated once individual and household observable characteristics were included. 
The chapter subsequently used two measures of social interaction to identify whether or not 
the impact of the social networks is sensitive to the measure of the quantity of network. Age-




Generally, networks affect health care utilization behaviour, confirming to the fact that one’s 
attitude is affected by the behaviour of others around the individual. Networks matters and can 
affect one’s attitude through information transmission and norms. If high utilizing age-marita l 
cohorts reside in areas with high concentration of the same age-marital cohort, access to health 
is found to increase. This underlines the influence of information. On the other hand, if low 
utilizing age-marital cohorts reside in areas with high concentration of the group, access to 
health care is found to decrease. This highlights the influence of norms. Though it is difficult 
to ascertain the true effect of networks, this study provides new approaches for quantifying the 
size of one’s network. It presents novel evidence that shows that irrespective of the way in 
which the size of one’s network is quantified, belonging to a high quality network increases 
access to health care.  
It is acknowledged that even within the same cohorts and geography, socialization is likely to 
be influenced by the social status of women. The educated are likely to interact mostly with 
the educated and the rich are most likely to interact with the rich. From this perspective, the 
magnitude of the effects of social network on antenatal care utilisation is dependent not only 
on the quantity and quality of one’s potential contact, but also on whether the individual is able 
to access her network effectively. The results showed that network effects were higher among 
employed and educated women as well as those who relocated within the intervening period. 
Additionally, network had stronger effects among affluent relative to poor households. The 
indirect effect of networks in both early antenatal check-up and antenatal completion are 
highest in urban areas.  
 
The third chapter investigated the role of bargaining power within couples on health care 
provider choice during childbirth in Tanzania. The effect of bargaining power between couples 
on the decision to deliver in a health care facility is estimated using a logit model and on health 
provider choice using a multinomial nested logit model. In the first stage, individuals decide 
whether or not to deliver in a health facility, and in the second stage they choose between 
private and public facilities. These decisions are likely to be subjected to negotiations within 
couples as their preferences over care use varies. A variety of bargaining indicators were used 
to assess the various channels through which cooperation between partners can influence the 




Overall, the results of the effect of bargaining suggested that negotiation within couples appears 
to have altered partially the health care seeking behaviour of women at childbirth. The logit 
estimates suggested that couples’ cooperation in household decision making would have the 
probability of delivery in a health facility increase (after controlling for socioeconomic status). 
Limited discretion over household resources by women and the presence of female domestic 
violence in the household are found to significantly reduce the probability of care use. In terms 
of female empowerment, employed women significantly increases the probability of facility 
use at childbirth. Likewise, the probability of health care use increases significantly with 
maternal years of schooling and with differences in education between couples.  
Distance to the facility is included to control for the supply side influence as well as antenatal 
care completion to control for health knowledge. While completing the number of antenatal 
care visits significantly increases the probability of health care use, the probability significantly 
declines with distance to facility. Household demographic and socioeconomic characterist ics 
are included to control for household wellbeing. The probability of care use increases 
significantly with household wealth and among households in urban areas. The probability of 
health care use reduces with experience and with the number of children under five years per 
woman. These factors also explain the probability of using a public or a private facility. In 
general, the bargaining effects are relatively smaller than the effects resulting from individua l 
and household characteristics. 
The fourth chapter examined the effects of intra-household bargaining processes on child 
nutrition using the probit and the OLS techniques. The chapter further explored differences in 
the probabilities of child malnourishment between rural and urban areas arising from 
differences in household bargaining process. This chapter made use of the identified indicators 
of bargaining power within couples in Chapter 3. The estimates in both models suggested that 
intra-household cooperation in decision making, low incidence of domestic violence, and 
female discretion over household resources are likely to reduce the probability of child stunting 
by 5 percent. The effects were less substantial and less significant in urban areas than was the 
case for rural areas. Maternal specific factors such as educational attainment, health status, and 
employment were found to significantly reduce the probability of child stunting. As expected, 
the findings confirmed that child-specific characteristics, such as being female, delivered in a 
facility, and being singleton birth, reduce the probability of child stunting. Similarly it was 





 The results suggested that differences in intra-household bargaining between rural and urban 
areas appear to contribute to the rural-urban gap in child nutrition. The gap was estimated using 
the generalised detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition and the Heckman two-step 
decomposition approach. This helped to identify the true gap and contribution of bargaining by 
controlling for possible sample selection bias. The results confirmed that the overall gap in 
child nutrition increased from 0.45 to 0.50 and the gap due to differences in bargaining declined 
from 4.5 percent to 4 percent after controlling for selection bias. A larger percentage of the 
explained gap is due to differences in individual characteristics (10.8 percent) and household 
factors (53.4 percent). The contribution due to differences in bargaining and female specific 
characteristics are smaller but economically significant, indicating the importance of female 
empowerment and participation in household decision making. 
 
A larger percent of the gap is explained by differences in the distribution of factors that 
determine child health, whereas differences in the effects of these determinants (coeffic ient 
effects) account for only 31 percent of the gap. Correcting for selectivity, the total explained 
gap declined to 62 percent and the total unexplained to 38 percent. The study illustrates the 
significance of properly correcting for sample selection bias in identifying rural-urban 
differences in child nutrition, since failure to do so clearly results in understating of the gap.  
 
5.2 Possible Policy Implications 
The findings broadly point to two potential policy implications. First, the social network effect 
suggests that information externalities and norms are likely to significantly influence the 
probability of antenatal care use. Access to information about the availability and the 
importance of consuming health services as well as perceptions about modern health care 
provision depend critically on the social structure and the social networks to which these 
women belong. As most governments emphasis on subsidisation and free provision of these 
services, it is important to note that there is need to create awareness about the ongoing health 
care policies as well as service availability and importance. The poor and disadvantaged 
communities have limited access to the media and other formal sources of information. They 
thus rely on informal sources. Devising ways of sensitising such individuals is a potential way 
of increasing awareness and assuring full utilisation of freely provided health services. 
Second, confirmation of the health care use and child nutritional effects of bargaining within 




resources suggest that encouraging their participation in the labour market, especially rural 
women, is likely to enhance the use of modern health services and improve child health 
outcomes. Other policies that will foster women’s participation in household decision, free 
them from possible domestic violence practices, promote access to education and employment 
creation maybe particularly important for health care use and child well-being. 
 
5.3 Limitations of the Study 
This study has some limitations that are important to be highlighted. One is the way the social 
network variable was measured. As noted in Chapter 2, and as pointed out in previous literature, 
most datasets have no information on one’s actual contacts. As such, it was difficult to ascertain 
the actual quantity or quality of one’s network. However, an approach that identifies one’s 
potential quantity and quality of contacts was adopted from previous studies. In addition, a 
sensitivity analysis was performed by considering two approaches for measuring the quantity 
and quality of one’s potential contacts. The study equally acknowledges that homophily is an 
important determinant of the formation and differentiation of social groups, and is therefore 
likely to bias the network variable. According to McPherson et al. (2001) people’s networks 
are homogenous with regards to their sociodemographic, behavioural and interpersona l 
characteristics. With this argument, several studies have demonstrated empirically that has a 
significant influence on social group formation (Popielarz and McPherson, 1995 and Marsden, 
1988). While this likely selection problem cannot be completely addressed into this study, we 
have attempted to show the extent to which network effects varies if homophily exist, by 
estimating the network coefficient for subgroups of the population which share particular 
characteristics (see Table 2.10 and 2.11).    
The study acknowledges that the effectiveness of social networks is contingent on differences 
in the characteristics of care users, in the characteristics of their contacts or their relationship 
with their contacts, and the nature of the health care system. This study does not ascertain the 
various channels through which the effectiveness of networks is contingent on. It simply 
illustrates the actuality of the social network effects for the respective social clusters. 
Justification as to why the magnitude of network effects varies significantly across groups 
remain difficult, unless there is more detailed information on the functioning of the health care 




relationship. A further understanding of the dynamics and complexities of social networks in 
the Tanzanian health care system hinge critically on a robust data set on social networks. 
The analysis contained in this thesis assume away the barriers to assessing health care. This is 
especially the case with direct out-of-pocket payments. Also, it does not take into account the 
quality of services provided by different providers. This setback is due to the fact that the 
dataset does not contain information on these variables. As argued in previous literature, getting 
the direct costs of services in each option is difficult, making the use of prices impossib le 
(Booysens & Visser, 2005; Brown & Theoharides, 2009; Sahn et al., 2003). In the context of 
Tanzania, maternal health services are free in public facilities and the choice between the 
private and public care is most likely not to depend heavily on direct but on indirect cost of 
care. Indirect costs include the cost of waiting time and travel cost to the facility. As is the case 
in most studies, distance to the facility was used as a proxy for indirect cost of service.  
Another potential problem was obtaining an exclusion restriction to correct for the possible 
sample selection bias in the decomposition analysis. The main challenge for correcting for 
sample selection bias has been the difficulty of getting an identification strategy. For this 
reason, some previous studies have highlighted this problem, but no study has attempted to 
address it. This study therefore employs the Heckman two-step sample-selection procedure to 
correct for possible sample selection bias (Cameron, 2005). Getting an exogenous variable is 
the main hurdle for this approach, especially in the context of child nutrition and child surviva l. 
Regional child survival rates in 2004 were used as a possible variable that exogenous ly 
determined survival rate in 2010 but not nutrition. As evidence thesis demonstrates that the 
correlation between regional child survival rates in 2004 and 2010 is as high as 0.81 whereas 
the correlation between survival in 2004 and nutrition in 2010 is only 0.27. This suggests that 
previous survival rates predict current survival rates, but not necessary current nutritiona l 
status. The study therefore trust that the exclusion restriction was subsequently strong. As it is 
difficult to find a perfect exclusion restriction and since there is no formal statistical test, we 
assume that the theoretical justification above is plausible for our exclusion restriction.  
 
5.4 Future Research and Data Collection 
It is important to note that the limitations highlighted in this chapter do not undermine the 
conclusions so derived, but solutions to such setbacks could only improve on the analysis. The 




effectiveness of social networks and health care demand in Tanzania. They also point to the 
need for more robust measures of bargaining power within couples, especially in the context 
of institutional bargaining that may lead to unequal social norms (unequal gender norms). The 
network effects from one’s actual contact could be more imperative than the network effects 
from one’s potential contact. It is necessary to ascertain the various channels through which 
the effectiveness of networks is contingent on. In addition, there is need to justify why the 
magnitude of network effects varies significantly across groups. For a deeper understanding of 
why take-up of maternal health care in Tanzania is low despite the existing government policies 
required some focus group discussions. 
A more comprehensive dataset that contain information on one’s actual contacts, the 
characteristics of the contacts, the relationship with the contacts, and the functioning of the 
health care system are needed for the above suggested areas of research. Similarly, longitud ina l 
data is required to assess the dynamics and complexities of social networks in the Tanzanian 
health care system. The TDHS and other surveys in Tanzania should consider improving on 
social network questions that would allow researchers to draw reliable estimates of networks 
from one’s actual contacts.   
Furthermore, while knowledge of bargaining power within couples and health care provider 
choice is important, a suitable avenue of research would be to examine how the effect of 
bargaining are altered, if price, and quality of services for each provider is available. It is 
necessary to disentangle bargaining power from household level to institutional context. This 
will inform policies that seek to break gender institutions or traditional customs that give men 
some freely unequal social rights. For this to be feasible, subsequent surveys in Tanzania 
should include questions that will provide rigorous information on individual, household, and 
institutional bargaining power within couples. Finally, data collection that seek to assess health 
and health care issues should include questions that provide information on quality and price 
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Appendix A: Appendix for Chapters 2 
  
 Table A2.1: Mean statistics for sample by antenatal care visit 
Number of 
children 






1 1241 0.05 0.21 0.17 0.22 
2 2566 0.10 0.20 0.18 0.23 
3 3327 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.17 
4 3964 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.14 
5 3820 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.09 
6 3510 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.06 
7+ 11349 0.34 0.13 0.16 0.08 
Note: the Table illustrates how the level of antenatal care use decline with fertility rate 
Table A2.2: Marginal effects estimates of network as additional fixed effects are included 
 Probability of  antenatal care use Probability of early antenatal care use 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Contact availability  -0.10*** -0.19*** -0.22*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.16*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Network effects 0.39*** 0.66*** 0.75*** 1.06*** 1.09*** 1.22*** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) 
Individual relocated in the intervening period 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.12*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Distance to health facility is problematic -0.05** -0.04* -0.02 -0.03** -0.03** -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Number of children ever born -0.00 -0.03*** -0.02** 0.00* -0.02*** -0.02** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 5,310 5,310 5,181 5,249 5,249 4,038 
Age-fertility cohort fixed effects  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Cluster fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Notes:   Significance *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
             The contact availability variable is 𝑉𝑗𝑘  and the network variable is defined as  𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑗𝑘 = 𝑉𝑗𝑘 ∗ 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
Age- fertility cohort is a measure of the quantity of one’s contacts  
 
Notes:   Significance *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
             The contact availability variable is 𝑉𝑗𝑘  and the network variable is defined as  𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑗𝑘 = 𝑉𝑗𝑘 ∗ 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
             Age- marital status cohort is a measure of the quantity of one’s contacts  
 
Table A2.3: Marginal effects estimates of network as additional fixed effects are included 
 Probability of  antenatal care use Probability of early antenatal care use 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Contact availability  -0.06*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.17*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Network effects 0.19*** 0.95*** 0.97*** 0.94*** 1.24*** 1.43*** 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.11) (0.12) 
Individual relocated in the intervening period 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.11* -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Distance to health facility is problematic -0.06** -0.05** -0.02 -0.03*** -0.03** -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Number of children ever born -0.01* -0.03*** -0.01** 0.00 -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 5,310 5,308 5,179 5,231 5,231 4,026 
Age-marital status cohort fixed effects  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 





Table A2.4: Marginal effects of networks including individual and household characteristics 













 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Contact availability  -0.14*** -0.20*** -0.16*** -0.31*** -0.26*** -0.17*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Network effects 0.56*** 0.69*** 1.21*** 0.96*** 0.81*** 1.42*** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) 
Early antenatal check-up  0.38***   0.36***  
  (0.03)   (0.03)  
Individual characteristics       
Individual relocated in the intervening period 0.11** 0.11*** -0.01 0.10** 0.10** 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Individual age at birth (20 – 34 years) 0.09** 0.09** -0.01 0.08** 0.08** 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Individual age at birth (35 – 49 years) 0.50* 0.24** 0.13 1.77*** 1.55*** 0.56*** 
 (0.29) (0.10) (0.09) (0.27) (0.26) (0.11) 
Individual years of schooling 0.01** 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.01** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Knowledge of pregnancy complication 0.05*** 0.04** 0.03** 0.05*** 0.04** 0.03* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Distance to health facility is problematic -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Number of children ever born -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Number of under-five per woman -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.04*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.03*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household characteristics       
Getting money for care is problematic -0.06** -0.05* -0.02 -0.05* -0.05 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Male headed household 0.05* 0.04** -0.02 0.05* 0.05** -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Household asset index 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.01 0.05** 0.04** 0.03** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Household size -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Individual lives in the central -0.02 0.07** -1.35*** -0.09** -0.04 -1.25*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.13) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) 
Individual lives in the southern highlands -0.20*** -0.15*** 0.03 -0.21*** -0.15*** 0.10*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
Individual lives in the lake 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.07* 0.07* -0.13*** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Individual lives in the eastern 0.21*** 0.07** 0.19*** 0.06* -0.03 0.20*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
Individual lives in Zanzibar 0.07* 0.08*** 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
Individual lives in the southern -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.11 -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
Individual lives in the western -0.05 -0.14*** 0.02 -0.13*** -0.18*** 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
Observations 5,016 5,017 3,986 5,016 5,015 3,973 
       Notes:   Significance *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
                      The contact availability variable is 𝑉𝑗𝑘 and the network variable is defined as  𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑗𝑘 = 𝑉𝑗𝑘 ∗ 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
                       All regressions include cluster fixed effects for age-marital status cohort fixed effect 








Appendix B: Appendix for Chapters 3 
 
Table B3.1: Correlation between indicators of domestic violence 
 Went out Neglects children Argues with Refuse sex 
Goes out without telling her partner 1    
Neglects their children 0.685 1   
Argues with her partner 0.638 0.666 1  
Refuses to have sex with her partner 0.575 0.581 0.665 1 
Burns food 0.464 0.485 0.503 0.547 
Note: The more correlated the data is the better for the extraction of components otherwise it will be harder to 
apply this method 
 
Table B3.2: Detail of the principal component weighting factors (Eigenvectors) 
Variables Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Unexplained 
Wife beaten justify if she (violence) 
Goes out without telling her partner 0.454 -0.393 0.380 0.635 0.316 0.314 
Neglects their children 0.462 -0.334 0.329 -0.417 -0.627 0.289 
Argues with her partner 0.470 -0.16 -0.344 -0.525 0.600 0.264 
Refuses to have sex with her partner 0.453 0.170 -0.694 0.380 -0.374 0.316 
Burns food 0.394 0.829 0.384 -0.053 0.086 0.484 
Note: The Eigenvectors or loadings of the PCA show the percentage of variation unexplained. The lower the 
percentage of the unexplained the better. 
Table B3.2: Principal component/correlation 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 3.334 2.729 0.667 0.667 
Comp2 0.605 0.169 0.121 0.788 
Comp3 0.436 0.109 0.087 0.875 
Comp4 0.327 0.03 0.066 0.941 
Comp5 0.297 . 0.06 1 
Note: Components with Eigenvalues of more than one should be retained. 





Table B3.3: Mean change in probability of facility use associated with raising the following factors  
 Home care Public care Private care 
Spouses cooperate in health care decisions    
Home care -0.011 0.006 0.005 
Public care -0.010 0.004 0.006 
Private care -0.002 0.001 0.001 
Spouses cooperate in household purchase decisions    
Home care 0.003 -0.004 0.000 
Public care 0.003 -0.004 0.001 
Private care 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Spouses cooperate in household visit decision    
Home care -0.013 0.005 0.008 
Public care -0.011 0.001 0.010 
Private care -0.002 0.000 0.002 
Knowledge about pregnancy complications    
Home care -0.054 0.047 0.008 
Public care -0.050 0.044 0.007 
Private care -0.010 0.008 0.001 
Getting money for medical care is problematic    
Home care 0.021 -0.018 -0.003 
Public care 0.018 -0.016 -0.003 
Private care 0.003 -0.003 -0.000 
Index of domestic violence    
Home care 0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
Public care 0.000 -0.000 -0.005 
Private care 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
Individual woman is employed    
Home care -0.075 0.063 0.011 
Public care -0.069 0.058 0.010 
Private care -0.013 0.011 0.002 
Age of the individual (years)    
Home care -0.003 0.002 0.001 
Public care -0.003 0.002 0.001 
Private care -0.000 0.000 0.000 
Individual years of schooling    
Home care -0.011 0.009 0.002 
Public care -0.010 0.000 0.002 
Private care -0.002 0.002 0.008 
Has health insurance    
Home care -0.043 0.015 0.028 
Public care -0.035 -0.002 0.036 
Private care -0.007 -0.001 0.008 
Distance to facility is problematic    
Home care 0.030 -0.034 0.004 
Public care 0.024 -0.032 0.008 
Private care 0.004 -0.006 0.002 
Index of household wealth    
Home care -0.041 0.039 0.002 
Public care -0.033 0.000 0.001 
Private care -0.006 0.006 0.034 
Completed antenatal visits    
Home care -0.035 0.025 0.010 
Public care -0.032 0.022 0.010 
Private care -0.006 0.004 0.002 
Reside in an urban area    
Home care -0.085 0.062 0.023 
Public care -0.069 0.043 0.025 
Private care -0.013 0.008 0.006 
Number of children ever born    
Home care 0.019 -0.016 -0.003 
Public care 0.018 -0.014 -0.003 
Private care 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
Number of under five children by individual    
Home care 0.040 -0.034 -0.006 
Public 0.036 -0.031 -0.005 




Appendix C: Appendix for Chapters 4 
 
Table C4.1: Regression estimates of bargaining including controls for personal and household characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Variables Pooled Rural Urban Pooled Rural Urban Pooled Rural Urban 
Maternal and child characteristics          
Age at first birth (20-35 years) 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.03 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.05 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) 
Age at first birth (35+ years) 0.21 0.50 -0.57 0.16 0.42 -0.40 0.20 0.43 -0.35 
 (0.41) (0.49) (0.76) (0.43) (0.53) (0.77) (0.43) (0.53) (0.77) 
Individual years of schooling 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.01* 0.07*** 0.01 -0.01 0.06*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Individual is employed 0.30*** 0.25*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.29*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.26*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) 
Maternal health (height-for-age) 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.27*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.27*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.26*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
Child is male -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.12 -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.05 -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.05 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) 
Child is delivery in a facility 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.16* 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.07 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) 
Child is singleton birth 0.78*** 0.73*** 0.96*** 0.69*** 0.67*** 0.47 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.51 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.30) (0.12) (0.13) (0.38) (0.12) (0.12) (0.38) 
Indicators of bargaining          
Absolute difference in education    -0.01 -0.00 -0.04 -0.00 0.01 -0.03 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
Individual less educated than her partner    0.05 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.12 
    (0.08) (0.09) (0.19) (0.08) (0.09) (0.19) 
Absolute education interacted with wife less educated     0.03 0.00 0.08* 0.00 -0.01 0.06 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
Absolute difference in age between couples    -0.05 -0.06 0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.04 
    (0.04) (0.04) (0.15) (0.04) (0.04) (0.15) 
Individual is younger than her partner    -0.07 -0.16 0.61 -0.07 -0.13 0.55 
    (0.15) (0.16) (0.51) (0.15) (0.16) (0.51) 
Absolute difference. in age interacted with wife younger    0.05 0.06 -0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.04 
    (0.04) (0.04) (0.15) (0.04) (0.04) (0.15) 
Domestic violence index    -0.03*** -0.02** -0.05* -0.02* -0.01 -0.03 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Continued on next page          




Table C4.1: Continued from previous page          
 Pooled Rural Urban Pooled Rural Urban Pooled Rural Urban 
Getting money for care is problematic    -0.14*** -0.10*** -0.17* -0.07* -0.06 -0.12 
    (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) 
Both partners decide on daily purchases    0.04 0.07 -0.14 0.05 0.10* -0.18* 
    (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) 
Partner alone decides on daily purchases    -0.24*** -0.20** -0.24 -0.20** -0.16 -0.30 
    (0.09) (0.10) (0.19) (0.09) (0.10) (0.19) 
Both partners decide on health care use    0.21*** 0.17*** 0.30** 0.19*** 0.15** 0.30** 
    (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) 
Partner alone decides on health care use    -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.04 
    (0.04) (0.05) (0.11) (0.04) (0.05) (0.11) 
Household characteristics          
Distance to facility is problematic       0.04 0.04 0.04 
       (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) 
Number of under-five in household       -0.00 0.00 -0.01 
       (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) 
Household size       0.02*** 0.01* 0.03* 
       (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Second wealth quintile       0.05 0.09 -0.71** 
       (0.05) (0.06) (0.35) 
Third wealth quintile       0.12** 0.17*** -0.47* 
       (0.06) (0.06) (0.28) 
Fourth wealth quintile       0.33*** 0.38*** -0.16 
       (0.06) (0.06) (0.24) 
Fifth wealth quintile       0.62*** 0.73*** -0.05 
       (0.07) (0.10) (0.24) 
Constant -2.14*** -2.06*** -2.23*** -1.96*** -1.82*** -2.44*** -2.15*** -2.06*** -2.44*** 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.34) (0.21) (0.23) (0.69) (0.22) (0.24) (0.74) 
Observations 6,659 5,437 1,222 5,478 4,489 989 5,470 4,483 987 
R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The reference categories: Wife alone for decision making variables, unemployed 





Table C4.2: Test for selection 
 F-statistics Standard error P-values 
Selection 0.825*** (0.077) 0.001 
 
 
Table C4.3: Detailed decomposition of rural-urban child nutritional status in a selectivity-corrected health equation 







% Unexplained % 
Domestic violence index 0.001 0.11 -0.136 -30.5 0.001 0.10 -0.211 -42.4 
Spouses cooperate in household purchases 0.002 0.47 0.033 7.3 0.002 0.42 -0.163 -32.8 
Spouses cooperate in health care decisions 0.003 0.72 0.139 31.3 0.003 0.64 0.187 37.6 
Getting money for care not problematic 0.011 2.49 0.015 3.4 0.011 2.23 0.009 1.8 
Absolute difference in education 0.002 0.52 0.020 4.6 0.002 0.46 0.020 3.9 
Absolute difference in age 0.001 0.20 -0.105 -23.4 0.001 0.18 -0.086 -17.4 
Contribution from bargaining 0.02 4.51 -0.034 -7.5 0.02 4.03 -0.244 -49.2 
Individual is employed 0.009 1.97 -0.083 -18.6 0.009 1.77 0.001 0.2 
Individual years of schooling 0.025 5.52 0.315 70.5 0.025 4.95 0.370 74.5 
Individual age at first  birth 0.008 1.84 -0.053 -11.8 0.008 1.65 -0.020 -4.0 
Child is singleton birth 0.008 1.82 1.147 257.1 0.008 1.63 1.325 266.3 
Child is delivered in a facility 0.017 3.77 0.009 2.1 0.017 3.38 0.035 7.1 
Maternal health (height-for-age) -0.018 -4.08 0.078 17.5 -0.018 -3.66 0.084 16.9 
Contribution from maternal factors 0.049 10.84 1.413 316.7 0.049 9.72 1.795 361 
Household size -0.000 -0.07 -0.167 -37.5 -0.000 -0.06 -0.071 -14.4 
Number of under-five in the household -0.027 -6.10 0.002 0.4 -0.027 -5.47 0.018 3.6 
Distance to facility is problematic -0.007 -1.59 -0.024 -5.4 -0.007 -1.43 -0.040 -8.1 
Household wealth index 0.144 32.31 -0.006 -1.2 0.144 28.97 0.181 36.3 
Has access to pure drinking water 0.012 2.62 0.218 48.8 0.012 2.35 0.184 36.9 
Has access to toilet facilities 0.041 9.08 0.247 55.4 0.041 8.14 -0.022 -4.4 
Zone of Residence 0.076 17.13 0.057 12.9 0.076 15.36 0.058 11.7 
Contribution from household factors 0.239 53.38 0.327 73.4 0.239 47.86 0.308 61.7 
Constant   -1.567 -351.4   -1.667 -335.1 
Total explained/Unexplained 0.308 68.73 0.139 31.3 0.308 61.61 0.192 38.4 
O bservations 4,570  4,570  4,570  4,570  
 
 
Table C4.4: Marginal effects of child survival rate in 2004 on child survival probability in 2010 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Pooled Rural Urban 
Child survival rate 2004 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 29,458 23,956 5,502 
Standard errors in parentheses, level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
